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Abstract 
In 1993 Qatar became a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and in 1996 became an official member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). By being a member of the GATT/WTO, Qatar must abide by the rules and the 
regulations of this organization. The aim of the research is to determine the extent to 
which Qatar's economic policies and its trading activities have been influenced by the 
WTO regulations. The research assesses the economic performance of WTO membership 
for Qatar, with a specific focus on the energy sector with its three components of oil, gas, 
and petrochemicals that constitute the bulk of Qatar's exports. Qatar's imports come from 
diverse sources, and its WTO membership implies there is no discrimination in favour of 
particular suppliers, apart from those based in its GCC trading partners. 
The research has adopted two different methods of data collection; questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews. Different, and sometimes conflicting, data were received. 
However, the analysis of this data, as well as other supportive evidence from the 
background chapters on Qatar's economy and trade activities, has demonstrated that 
Qatar has been noticeably influenced by developments in international markets. Qatar's 
membership of the WTO has helped both directly and indirectly -- and will continue to 
help -- Qatar achieve its economic planning and diversification objectives. WTO 
membership has made Qatar a more stable and predictable market for foreign investors, 
particularly in the energy sectors. Qatar is advised to further utilize its membership of the 
WTO to take advantage of the opportunities available and overcome the possible 
challenges in order to achieve its overall economic objectives. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this study is to examine Qatar's trade policy in light of its international trade 
commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO). A key issue is the extent to which 
trade policy contributes to its economic diversification. This chapter elaborates on the 
research aim and objectives, and provides a discussion of the methodology used as well as 
explaining how the thesis is organised. 
The implications of WTO membership on the economy of an oil and gas rich state are 
especially interesting, as one of the main intentions of policy makers is to ensure and promote 
diversification of the economy through trade and other related requirements as stipulated by 
the WTO. In this thesis the techniques adopted in generating data and other information are 
empirical and involves the drawing of inference from observed phenomena. 
The objectives of the research have been stated to act as a map in directing the work to a 
logical conclusion. The country's production and export of crude oil and gas determines much 
of its GDP. A decline in the level of GDP may be taken as a measure of diversification. 
However, in reality, changes in the share of external trade activity reflect oil and gas prices, 
which make the measurement of the effects of WTO membership on diversification 
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it is important to ascertain the extent and benefits of 
diversification. 
The economic and commercial policies and their objectives have been shaped by the 
expectations of WTO membership. The collaboration between government and the private 
sector and their contribution towards sustainable economic development will be among the 
central themes of the project. 
The Government needs to comply with the WTO Agreement due to the scrutiny that occurs 
on a regular basis as a result of it being a member. Hence there is a need to emphasise 
adherence, and enhance policies which promote liberalisation and diversifications of trade by 
the Government and private sectors alike. Any trade disputes that occur as a result of mal 
practice is usually brought to an independent review panel within the WTO in order to settle 
disputes and promote collaboration. It is imperative to establish collaboration between both 
Government and the private sector, in order to promote sustainable development. This should 
- ii - 
additionally include equal and fair treatment of all trading partners, foreigners and locals 
alike, reducing the barriers to boost free trade. Transparency is obviously important for this 
process to be a success. 
However, one must bear in mind that free trade promotes sustainable development in the 
form of employment. Another form of sustainable development, as far as the Government is 
concerned, would be through custom and excise duties as a means of generating revenue as 
an alternative to taxing foreign companies. As locally owned companies are not taxed, the 
existing tax system could be regarded as discriminatory. It may be increasingly difficult to 
defend, and tax law may not be sustainable. 
1.1. AIM OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of conducting this study is to investigate the extent to which the economy of 
Qatar has benefited from becoming a member of the WTO. In order to satisfy this objective, 
the researcher analysed and considered three main points: Qatar's economic position prior to 
its WTO membership; the results of the economic reforms which Qatar subsequently 
embarked upon after becoming a member of the WTO; and the role the oil and gas polices 
played in these reforms. Each of these considerations will be taken into account in order to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses associated with Qatar's WTO membership. 
Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to explore the implications of Qatar's membership 
within the WTO, while its secondary aim is to ascertain whether Qatar's goal of satisfying the 
legal norms for creating trade liberalization and multilateral economic cooperation as 
imposed by the WTO have been fulfilled. In addition, the thesis will also consider the extent 
to which WTO membership has benefited Qatar, and how it has been helpful to its 
diversification policy. 
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
With its unprecedented growth and persistent need for infrastructure, Qatar is increasingly 
attractive for foreign investors. Foreign entry into Qatar is only possible through partnerships 
with local nationals unless approved otherwise. These partnerships have been subject to local 
laws and regulations. However, Qatar's membership of the WTO is expected to create new 
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opportunities for foreign multinationals, and further deregulation is anticipated in the coming 
years. For a foreign multinational investor in Qatar, the future business opportunities which 
arise from the implementation of the WTO principles will be of substantive relevance to this 
research, and it is therefore necessary to take the scope for future progression into account 
when trade strategies are formed. Hence, this empirical research will specifically investigate 
the legal norms in the area of economic liberalization and multilateral economic cooperation, 
as implied by WTO membership. 
The research has four main specific objectives: 
1. To investigate the extent to which Qatar's WTO membership is helpful to its 
diversification policy. 
Qatar's WTO membership and the subsequent changes it causes within the economic 
environment can be viewed from several different perspectives. With this as a consideration, 
we attempt to assure that the most realistic conclusion can be drawn from the investigations. 
The actual role of the regulatory framework must also be investigated in light of the 
complexities of Qatar's market. The regulatory changes are considered with respect to their 
enforcement in business practice. Thereby, the legalities concerning the regulatory 
framework can also be identified. This discussion raises the question of the extent to which 
Qatar's WTO membership limits its diversification policy. 
2. How would Qatar benefit if the remit of the WTO is extended to the international oil 
and gas market, including consideration of pricing issues? 
When examining the impact of Qatar's WTO accession with regards to the opportunities that 
could further be explored, it is necessary to consider the specific implications for the 
international oil and gas market with respect to pricing issues. This discussion raises the 
questions as to how the WTO agreement affects the industry, in what form, and how the 
changes will take place. The consideration and reasoning required to address this question 
then leads us to the third research objective. 
-13- 
3. Do the GATS (The General Agreement on Trade in Services) provisions have 
implications for Qatar's plans for its services sector? 
The GATS is one of the three international trade treaties as administered by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). It puts into place a framework of rules which govern international 
services trade, allowing for a more open and transparent trading system. It also provides a 
forum for settling trade disputes and for eliminating trade barriers progressively through 
negotiations. 
Under the ongoing investigations, it is imperative to seek and understand the effects of CATS 
provisions on Qatar, both generally and, in particular, on Qatar's plans for further developing 
its service sector. 
4. To what extent do Qatar's international agreement obligations limit its ability to 
pursue an independent foreign direct investment policy? 
As a final research area, this thesis seeks to investigate the extent to which Qatar's 
international agreement obligations limit its freedom of manoeuvre with respect to foreign 
direct investment policy. 
The main problem statement, and the following research problems, provides the context for 
the major research work of the thesis. In the following section, the purpose of the thesis will 
clarify the overall aim in order to give the reader a clear view of which direction the thesis 
will follow before finally reaching the conclusions and recommendations. 
1.3. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF WTO MEMBERSHIP 
When considering the impact of WTO membership on the economy of Qatar it is appropriate 
to adopt a cost benefit approach. It can be argued that as oil and gas account for most of 
Qatar's exports, the benefits from WTO membership are limited as oil and gas are not subject 
to tariffs or customs duties. However, Qatar is attempting to diversify into activities such as 
petrochemicals which have been subject to trade restrictions. Therefore WTO should not 
simply be evaluated in terms of the current composition of exports, but of their future 
composition when more diversification is achieved. 
-14- 
Most of Qatar's imports, apart from chemicals as shown in Appendix 5, are not subject to 
tariffs or customs duties, and hence WTO membership did not imply a need to liberalise. 
Even in the case of chemicals the tariffs were only 5.5 percent, which was much lower than 
that of most WTO members, and the same as that of the other five GCC countries which are 
members of the WTO. Therefore, as far as historical and current imports are concerned, it 
could also be argued that WTO membership made little difference. However, WTO 
membership helps ensure that future tariffs will not be introduced on goods that Qatar 
imports. There could be future pressures from Qatar's neighbours with large industrial 
sectors, such as Saudi Arabia, that would force it to adopt more protectionist policies towards 
countries outside the GCC while importing from the GCC tariff free. The WTO framework 
helps ensure the GCC remains liberal in its trading policies and open in its outlook rather than 
protectionist and inward looking. 
Qatar's membership of the WTO is of course not only about tariffs, but also about trade- 
related issues. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (CATS) requires Qatar to pursue 
open market policies with respect to its service sectors such as telecommunications and 
banking. It obliges Qatar to deal equally with foreign investors without any discrimination 
(Most-Favoured Nation Principle) and to provide them with the same treatment that it applies 
to its domestic services suppliers (National Treatment Principle). These commitments are in 
line with Qatar's open economic policies that seek to introduce competition in its market to 
achieve a higher quality of services for the benefit of customers. Hence, Qatar's aim to open 
its economy and attract foreign investment is supported by the WTO/GATS regulations. In 
other words, the open economy and free trade policies that characterise Qatar's political 
economy for the last decade have been locked-in by the regulations of the multilateral trading 
system. 
Perhaps, a good example of such a policy is the telecommunication sector. Until very 
recently, this sector was monopolised by Qatar Telecom (Qtel), which was the sole provider 
of telecom services in the country. Although such a monopoly meant secured revenue for the 
Government budget, without any competition, it also meant that consumers in Qatar were not 
having enough choices. They had to deal with the sole telecom provider, Qtel. Nevertheless, 
with the provision of the second mobile license to the very well-known international telecom 
provider, Vodafone, the monopoly of Qtel has been ended. Qatar's telecom market will be 
governed by competition. If Qtel wants to survive in the market, it has to compete with 
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Vodafone and reduce call charges which will benefit consumers in Qatar. However, Qtel and 
its employees have not welcomed the ending of the company's monopoly status, as 
competition has potential adverse implications for employee remuneration and security. 
There will be pressure for efficiency gains which means more evaluation of the combination 
of individual employees to the company, both Qatari and non-Qatari. Costs can be reduced by 
employing foreign workers rather than Qataris, but this is not likely to be welcome as far as 
local citizens are concerned. The Director of GSM at Qtel was one of the interviewees. 
Membership in the WTO gives Qatar a voice in international trade issues which it would not 
otherwise have. This can be regarded as a membership benefit. Qatar hosted the WTO 
meetings in 2001 at which the Doha Development Agenda was agreed. This represented a re- 
alignment of WTO priorities to take into account of the interests of developing countries. 
Although Qatar is not a typical developing country because of its oil and gas revenues, it 
shares common economic interests with developing countries in the Middle East and Asia. 
Specifically trade liberalisation by developed countries with respect to agriculture can help 
the growth of these economies. This enhanced growth means they are likely to import more 
oil and gas from Qatar, increasing its revenues from energy. In addition, greater agricultural 
production in countries such as India increases the market for Qatar fertilizers as the country 
produces both ammonic and urea for export to the sub-continent. The chairman of the Qatar 
fertilizer company (QAFCO) was one of the interviewees. 
1.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this research, as already mentioned, is to focus on whether Qatar has 
economically benefited from its membership of the WTO. 
Qatar became a member of the WTO in order to benefit in several economic areas, notably 
the free flow of trade, access to trade negotiations, the settling of trade related disputes the 
administration of trade agreements and co-operation with other nations and organizations. In 
addition, an advantage is that the WTO was able to provide assistance to developing 
countries such as Qatar on trade policy issues. 
The researcher has an interest in this issue as, since Qatar became a member of the WTO, it 
has opened up to international corporations and organizations which are all seeking to 
conduct business in the country. This is an important issue because it can have a significant 
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impact on the country's economy and people. Therefore, understanding what Qatar did to 
achieve its particular outcome can shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant 
theories in this field of international trade. 
A thorough study of Qatar's approach to development can also illuminate specific policies 
which emerging states should or should not emulate in the course of their own development 
schemes. 
These shall be explored in light of the following: 
" Qatar's oil production and exports; 
" Qatar's gas production and exports; 
" The share of oil in Qatar's GDP; 
" The share of gas in Qatar's GDP; 
1.5. RESARCH METHODS AND DESIGN 
The study was carried out using two methods. Firstly, a survey was conducted with major 
companies and secondly, interviews were carried out with a WTO representative, the 
Minister of Economy and Commerce, the Minister of Energy and Industry, and the heads of 
public companies. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches were utilized within this 
research. The reason for adopting the quantitative technique was that such an approach 
focuses on the measuring of things which can be counted "using standardized measures that 
fit diverse various opinions and experiences into predetermined response categories. The 
advantage of the quantitative approach is that it measures the reactions of a great many 
people to a limited set of questions, thus facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation of 
the data" (Patton, 1987, p. 9). The main purpose of quantitative research is to isolate causes 
and effects, while precisely defining categories before the study is undertaken (McCracken, 
1988). The phenomena can then be measured and quantified in order to determine the 
relationship between them (Flick, 1998). This research method requires researchers to create 
research designs and to construct a `sample' of the necessary size and type in order to allow 
the generalization of findings applying to a larger population. The advantage of quantitative 
research is that it is able to give objective results, so that the subjective views of the 
researcher and participant's influence can be eliminated. This method is best for closed 
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questions, which allows the participant to respond readily and unambiguously (McCracken, 
1990). 
On the other hand, a qualitative research design is used in order to collect data in the form of 
words and observations. Such data can take the shape of detailed descriptions of situations, 
events, people, interactions and observed behaviours, beliefs and thoughts (Vittles, 1991). As 
such, qualitative research focuses on open-ended questions or statements; this approach is 
adopted in this study. 
Despite this approach allowing participants freedom and more detailed answers, Denscombe 
(1999) nevertheless identifies some aspects of qualitative research as a cause for concern with 
regards to meaning and the way people understand things; he says human activity is seen as a 
product of symbols and meanings which are used by members of the social group as a way of 
making sense of things. Furthermore, as Densecombe (1999) states, qualitative methods focus 
on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings, allowing a strong handle on what 
`real life' is like. 
According to Blackman (1993), research on organizations largely requires qualitative 
participatory methods as its techniques involve close and sustainable encounters with people, 
such as participant observation and in-depth interviews from different categories of workers 
from different walks of life. Also, while qualitative techniques generate rich data concerning 
people's level of knowledge, attitudes and preferences, the same can be used in combination 
with some quantitative methods in order to generate questions for structured questionnaires, 
to add depth to generalizations from survey research, and to develop hypotheses for further 
studies. 
However, selecting a sample for research is crucially important. Black (2002) preferred 
randomization when considering sample selection. This was the approach adopted within this 
research. 
The research was based on data collected via questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. 
The questionnaires targeted business people within the business community in Qatar. The 
semi-structured interviews targeted Government officials involved in the trade and economic 
policy and decision making process in Qatar such as the Minister of Economy and 
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Commerce, the Minister of Energy and Industry, and other government officials from 
different Government institutions including Qatar's representative in the WTO. 
The questionnaires were distributed to 100 private businesses, but only 61 of these businesses 
were completed, representing 61% of those questioned. The researcher also planned to 
interview 22 people; however, only 17 of these individuals were willing to participate in the 
research program. Seven questions were posed to each of the participants, yielding various 
responses. Chapters six and seven of the thesis analyse the findings of both the questionnaires 
and the semi-structured interviews respectively. The sample in the two research methods 
(questionnaires and interviews) was selected randomly. 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF TIIE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One addresses the research context, 
methodology, Qatari Government and economy, as well as relevant trade issues; Chapter 
Two emphasizes the remit and the working of the WTO; Chapter Three seeks to explore 
Qatar's internal policy for economic relationships; Chapter Four considers Qatar's oil and gas 
policy; Chapter Five discusses the methodology; Chapter Six focuses on the surveys of the 
opinions of the private businesses in Qatar, Chapter Seven explores the data collected from 
the semi-structured interviews conducted with Government officials in Qatar; while Chapter 
Eight presents the conclusions and recommendations. 
In the writing the above-mentioned chapters of this thesis, the researcher has endeavoured to 
use both primary and secondary data. The interviews were the source for the primary data. 
The secondary data has been derived from sources such as research reports of credible 
agencies, seminar papers, journals (including e journals), bulletins and newspapers, books, 
annual reports of corporations, agreements and contracts, speeches made by the Royal 
Family, and ministerial decisions as passed by various ministerial bodies, trade commissions 
and statistical year-books. 
Publications of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
various United Nations (UN) bodies, and regional trade regulation schemes have also been 
used to further the research involved in the writing of this thesis. The domestic law of Qatar 
also acts as a major component of the research sources, and the researcher further 
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endeavoured to explore several statutes and by-laws of the domestic law in order to 
strengthen the understanding of the legislative background and origin of trade talks, including 
the negotiations between Qatar and the WTO. 
Statistical data has also been relied upon in making a comprehensive analysis of Qatar's entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its effects on development of the legal 
environment in the country. The legal measures put in place and their effects and degree of 
success were also addressed within the relevant chapters of the thesis. 
In writing this thesis, the use of Arabic language has been kept to a minimum. Personal and 
place names relating to Qatar are reproduced using the locally used spellings. The spelling of 
names, old cities, villages and neighbourhoods etc. are taken from Qatar Area Referencing 
System as developed by Qatar's Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture, and used on 
their maps in the country. 
The method adopted in the gathering of data was given consideration and was deemed to be 
practical and suitable. As is explained above, this method involves the use of questionnaire 
and interviews, which enabled the gathering of data to be carried out in a logical and more 
careful and systematic order. This approach developed both qualitative and quantitative data 
utilized in later chapters in order to arrive at the appropriate conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
Because Qatar is now a member of the World Trade Organization and as the main aim of this 
research is to assess Qatar's economic policies and performance in light of this membership, 
it is important to first study what this Organization looks like and how it has evolved. It is 
also important to explore the main principles and agreements of the WTO that Qatar's 
economy is now subject to and must abide by. Hence, this chapter is concerned with the 
various attempts made in order to reach a commons, international consensus for the forming 
of multilateral economic cooperation, which would both eliminate tariffs and boost trade. 
From Breton Woods to the founding of the WTO, the objective is to assist trade to now 
smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably. The task is to analyse how this important 
organisation has developed and how it functions. 
Therefore, the scope and objectives of the WTO are also examined in this chapter. The 
provisions of the WTO - pertaining to energy and the benefits of the treaty to Arab 
countries, together with the framework put in place by the treaty - will contribute to the 
explanation of the importance of a collective agreement for boosting trade through the 
elimination of discriminatory practices, which are principally restrictive. The researcher shall 
indicate the implications of the multilateral trading system on Qatar, as an Arab developing 
country, involved in the production of energy products. 
2.1. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OULTINE OF THE WTO 
Before analyzing the historical background of the WTO, one must first look to address the 
question of what developments eventually gave birth to the WTO. 
With a view to improving international economic relations, the international community 
made its first concerted attempt at reaching a multilateral accord. After World War II, the 
Bretton Woods system was designed as an integrated effort by the international community in 
order to encourage trade liberalization and multilateral economic cooperation. Implementing 
the Bretton Woods system meant adherence of rules and obligations so as to avoid economic 
conflict (Krueger, 1998). 
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The Bretton Woods System was introduced to consist of three main international institutions 
which were designed to regulate and harmonize the world trade, namely the International 
Monetary Fund (the `IMF'); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the 
`World Bank' or the `IBRD'); and the International Trade Organization (The 'ITO'). These 
three individual organizations when complimentarily combined were seen as the foundation 
to the new multilateral economic system. The IMF and the World Bank were to regulate and 
oversee the financial side internationally, while the ITO - the executive organ provided for 
in the Havana Charter - would have administered the Charter's agreements. Unfortunately, 
however, the Havana Charter was never ratified by the member countries on account of a lack 
of political will and, as such, the entire proposal was abandoned (Bretton Woods, 2007). 
2.2. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 
As the ITO project failed, the GATT then became the primary international agreement 
regulating trade between nations. The main objective of the GATT was to reduce tariff rates. 
When the ITO failed, the entire responsibility to administer trade and trade-relating matters 
between the nations was left in the hands of the GATT. GATT negotiations in the first four 
rounds dealt mainly with tariffs on goods (Narlikar, 2005, p. 19), with the first round of 
negotiations resulting in a tariff concession of about one fifth of the world's total trade. The 
rounds continued to concentrate on further reducing tariffs, until the 1960s when the Kennedy 
Round brought about a GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement, and a section dedicated to 
development. 
It is worth mentioning that before 1995, the GATT stood as a pioneer arrangement in 
regulating tariffs and trade. However, although the GATT was remarkably successful, it also 
suffered from several obstacles, some of which related to weak application of the GATT 
regulations in national laws and others to protectionist attitudes of some contracting parties, 
thus resulting in slow impetus for multilateral trade cooperation particularly in the 1970s, and 
also affecting the GATT regime. Furthermore, the procedure for provisional application to 
the GATT was complex and cumbersome, and the GATT did not plainly define the powers of 
the contracting parties in regards to decisions and authority on waivers. The gloomy legal 
status of the GATT and the lack of constitutional problems made it even more awkward. It 
was for these reasons that the need for a global trade regulator was considered to be 
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necessary, and the WTO then came into existence as a result in 1995. A large part of the 
WTO's current work has been brought about by the 1986-1994 negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round, and earlier negotiations under the GATT. New negotiations are now in process under 
the Doha Development Agenda, which was launched in 2001 (WTO, 2001). 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the sole international institution that deals with 
global regulations of trade between its member countries. Furthermore, it is a forum in which 
member governments are able to come together to negotiate trade agreements and settle trade 
disputes (WTO, 2003, pp. 8-9). Since its creation in January 1995, it has expanded the reach 
of trade rules deep into the regulatory structure of almost 140 sovereign states, affecting the 
daily lives of all citizens. It may be stated that the World Trade Organization is a creature of 
the 1995 WTO Agreement, formed in order to provide a "common institutional framework" 
for the covered agreements of the final act of the Uruguay Round. ' 
The WTO was established upon the organizational structure of the GATT and, to a greater 
extent, its Secretariat; it formalizes and extends the structure which has gradually evolved 
over the past 50 years. It is interesting to note that the Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration 
launching the Uruguay Round did not call nor recommend the creation of the WTO. Canada 
initiated the idea of establishing a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) in 1990 (English et 
el, 2002). The idea was contentedly accepted and, in fact, was later supported by the 
European Union. The idea as a whole was motivated by a desire to create a single 
institutional framework which would regulate and oversee the world trade. This would mean 
the GATT, its sister body and Trade in Intellectual Properties (TRIPs) would need to undergo 
modifications (Croome, 1999). The United States had initially objected to the idea of the 
creation of a new organization. Finally, with the proposal to create a new organization, the 
concept and idea of a single undertaking was redefined to mean that all GATT contracting 
parties had to become a member of the WTO (Croome, 1999; WTO, 2007b). 
The Uruguay Round Final Act offers a new GATT 1994 which absorbs the original GATT 
1947, its subsequent side agreements, the results of previous rounds and many of its decision 
1 The covered agreements of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round include the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
which are: the GATT (1994), which includes with certain exceptions the GATT (1947), its subsequent 
agreements and many of its decision and waivers; the CATS Agreement; the TRIPS Agreement; the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding; and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism [hereinafter occasionally referred to as the 
"Multilateral Agreements"]. 
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and waivers. The administration of the trade agreements in goods in the GATT 1994 and the 
new multilateral obligations beyond the scope of trade in goods, embodied in the GATS and 
TRIPS Agreements, are now the main function of the WTO (Daz, 1998). 
2.3. THE OBJETIVE OF THE WTO 
The issues surrounding the institutional framework of the WTO are the accomplishment of its 
objectives and the various modus operandi (modes of operation) being adopted, which will be 
addressed in this section. What are these frameworks, and how does the organization go 
about achieving these objectives? 
The main objective of the WTO is to "help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and 
predictably" (WTO, 2005c, p. 7). The goal is thereby to assist the producers and suppliers of 
goods and services, exporters and importers, to conduct their business while allowing 
governments to meet social and environmental objectives (Bhagwati, 1991; Blackhurst, 
1998). The organization acts as a forum for trade negotiations and for settling any trade 
disputes (WTO, 2005c). Trade relations can involve conflicting interests, the purpose of 
dispute settlement is to resolve these differences through a procedure based on an agreed 
legal foundation (WTO, 2003d, p. 12). Generally, the WTO reviews national trade policies, 
assists developing countries in trade policy issues, administers trade agreements, and 
cooperates with other international organizations. 
The central question underlying the WTO's main objectives is how policy makers should 
respond to the pressures now falling on the WTO system, while simultaneously ensuring the 
preservation of a trading system which has led to unprecedented growth in the world 
economy and contributed to the peaceful coexistence of nations. Today, the WTO comprises 
153 members (WTO, 2008b) and accounts for over 90% of global trade. The member 
countries of the WTO are unified in decision-making by ratifying the WTO agreements 
(WTO, 2007b). 
2.4. SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE WTO 
The WTO is responsible for administering world trade relations, negotiations, and dispute 
resolution which have all been embodied within the GATT for the last fifty-seven years. It 
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provides the `common institutional framework' for the conduct of trade relations between its 
members, as contemplated by the Covered Agreements and any further trade agreements that 
its members may choose to execute (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
2.4.1. Administrating Trade Agreements Article III of the WTO Agreement states that; 
`the WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration, and operation (WTO, 1995b). 
Furthermore, the objectives of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
should also be to provide the appropriate framework for the implementation, administration 
and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements' (WTO, 1995b). It is one of the primary 
functions of the WTO to administer, implement and regulate the working of trade agreements 
(Daz, 1998). 
2.4.2. Acting as a Forum for Trade Negotiations 
The WTO needs to be able to provide a place for the members to negotiate multi-lateral trade 
issues (Starbird et el, 2004, p. 46). 
2.4.3. Settling Trade Disputes 
The WTO's procedures for resolving trade disputes are vital for enforcing the rules and 
ensuring trade flows smoothly. Countries bring disputes to the WTO if they consider that 
their rights are being infringed under the agreements. Judgment is based on interpretations of 
the agreements and individual countries' commitments by specially appointed, independent 
experts (Sampson and Ginkel, 2001, p. 30). 
2.4.4. Reviewing National Trade Policies 
The purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism is to improve transparency and create a 
greater and clearer understanding of the policies which countries are adopting, and to assess 
the impact of each. Many members also consider the reviews as constructive feedback on 
their policies. All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny and report to the WTO 
Secretariat (WTO, 2008c). 
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2.4.5. Co-operating with Other International Organizations 
The WTO actively works to be consistent with the economic decisions by other international 
economic organisations due to the relation ship between the different economic variables, 
such as exchange rates and trade growth. Therefore, the WTO reached agreement with the 
IMF and the World Bank in December 1996 and April 1997 respectively, with a view to 
strengthening the consistency of world economic decisions and ensuring international 
economic policy was more coherent (WTO, 2005c). 
2.4.6. Assisting Developing Countries in Trade Policy Issues through Technical 
Assistance and Training Programs 
The WTO organizes around 100 technical cooperation missions to developing countries 
annually. Regional seminars are regularly held in all regions of the world with a special 
emphasis on African countries. Training courses are also organized in Geneva for officials 
from transition countries which are making the change from command economies to market 
economies (see Michalopoulos, 2001). 
2.5. TRADE WITHOUTH DISCRIMINATION 
2.5.1. Most Favoured Nation (MFN): Equal Treatment to all 
Foreign Goods and Services 
Under the WTO agreements, WTO members are normally not allowed to discriminate 
between their trading partners; grant someone a special favour - such as a lower customs 
duty rate for one of their products - and the same must be applied to all other WTO 
members. This principle is known as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, It is a very 
important principle in international trade. This importance is reflected by the fact that the 
MFN principle is clearly stipulated in the first article of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which governs trade in goods. In addition, the MFN is a priority in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4), although the principle is 
handled somewhat differently in each agreement. These three fundamental agreements 
collectively cover all three key areas of trade handled by the WTO (WTO, 2007b). 
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Some exceptions are, however, allowed. For instance, WTO members are able to establish 
free trade agreements that apply only to goods or services traded within the particular group 
- discriminating against goods or services from the outside. Or they can choose to give 
developing countries special access to their markets. A country could also raise barriers 
against products which are considered to be traded unfairly from specific countries. And 
when considering services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. 
However, the agreements only permit such exceptions under strict conditions. In general, the 
MFN means that each time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market; it has to do 
so for the same goods or services from each one of its trading partners - whether rich or 
poor, weak or strong. Equality is an essentially important principle of the WTO (Iioekman 
and Kostecki, 2001). 
2.5.2. National Treatment: Treating Foreigners and Locals Equally 
The principle of national treatment means that imported and domestically made goods should 
be treated equally, particularly after the foreign goods have entered the market. Hence, 
imported goods are subject to the same regulations that apply to domestic products. The same 
should also apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, 
copyrights and patents. This principle of national treatment is also found in all the three main 
WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of CATS and Article 3 of TRIPS), 
although, once again, the principle is handled somewhat in a different way in each of these 
agreements (WTO, 2007b). The national treatment principle only applies once a product, 
service or item of intellectual property has entered the market. But, it is important to 
emphasise that charging customs duty on a particular imported product is not a breach of the 
national treatment principle even if locally-produced goods are not charged an equivalent tax. 
2.5.3. Free Trade: A Gradual Process Carried Out Through Negotiations 
Reducing obstacles against trade is one of the most evident and successful means of 
encouraging trade between nations. The barriers concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) 
and measures, such as import bans or quotas which selectively restrict quantities. Since 
GATT's creation in 1947-1948, there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations and the 
ninth round - under the Doha Development Agenda - is still on-going. In the earlier 
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rounds, such negotiations focused on lowering tariffs (customs duties) on imported goods. 
And, as a result of the negotiations, by the mid 1990s, industrial countries' tariff rates on 
industrial goods had steadily fallen to less than 4% but, by the 1980's, the negotiations had 
been extended to entail non-tariff barriers on goods and became to cover new areas such as 
services and intellectual property (WTO, 2007b). 
Opening markets can be helpful and advantageous for member countries but it also requires 
adjustment and restructuring of domestic legal and economic systems, which can be costly 
for some countries. Understanding such difficulties, the WTO agreements allow countries to 
introduce changes gradually through `progressive liberalization'. Developing countries are 
normally allowed a longer time to accomplish their commitments (WTO, 2007b). 
2.5.4. Transparency and predictability 
The WTO provides a clearly predictable and transparent system where businesses and 
investors can work without being concerned about the sudden possibility of changing rules 
and regulations. In other words, as WTO members all agreed not to raise trade barriers, 
businesses and investors are assured that they can establish their operations in a stable and 
clearly predictable environment. They have a clear vision about the opportunities available to 
them in a particular country according the obligations and rights of that country under the 
WTO. With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged, jobs are created, and 
consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition by being offered a range of choices and 
lower prices. The multilateral trading system is therefore an attempt by various governments 
to create a business environment which is both stable and predictable (WTO, 2007b). 
When countries agree to open their markets for goods or services in the WTO, they `bind' 
their commitments. This means that they cannot exceed the bound levels stated in their 
schedules of commitments. With regards to goods, these bindings amount to ceilings on 
customs tariff rates. Sometimes, countries choose to tax imports at rates which are lower than 
the bound rates, which is frequently the case in developing countries. In developed countries, 
both the bound rates and the rates actually charged tend to be the same. And, while a country 
can change its bindings, it can only do so after negotiating with its trading partners, which 
could mean compensating them for the loss of trade. One of the achievements of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade talks was to increase the amount of trade under binding 
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commitments. In agriculture, 100 percent of products now have bound tariffs. The outcome 
of all of this is a significantly higher degree of market security for traders as well as investors 
(WTO, 2007b). 
The system also endeavours to improve predictability and stability by discouraging the use of 
quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports, as administering quotas 
can lead to more red-tape and accusations of unfair play. Another option is to make countries' 
trade rules as clear and public ('transparent') as possible. Many of the WTO agreements 
require governments to publicly disclose their policies and practices within the country or by 
notifying the WTO (see Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2001). 
Furthermore, the regular surveillance of national trade policies through the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism provides another additional means of encouraging transparency, both 
domestically and at the multilateral level (see Panagariya, 1999; Tharakan, 1999). 
2.5.5. Promoting Fair Competition 
It is a misconception to describe the WTO as a `free trade' institution as such description 
does not match the actual nature and work of the WTO. It is rather a rules-based system that 
works towards the objective of opening trade and fair and undistorted competition. The rules 
are built on a foundation of non-discrimination - such as the MFN and national treatment - 
and are designed to secure fair conditions of trade. The same applies to the issues of dumping 
(exporting at below-cost in order to gain market share) and subsidies. These issues are 
complex, and the rules attempt to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can 
respond, in particular by charging additional import duties calculated to compensate for 
damage caused by unfair trade. Many of the other WTO agreements aim to support fair 
competition, for example, in agriculture, intellectual property, and services (WTO, 2007b). 
2.6. ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORM 
The WTO system seeks to help development in member countries. This is reflected in 
recognising and appreciating that developing countries need more time to implement the 
system's agreements and special assistance. These recognitions are clearly found in the 
GATT and GATS as well as other WTO Agreements (WTO, 2007b). 
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2.6.1. The Uruguay Round 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries were prepared to take on most of the 
obligations which were required of developed countries. However, they needed a longer time 
to carry out such obligations. The WTO Agreements permitted transition periods in order to 
assist developing and least-developed countries in adjusting their economies to the WTO 
provisions (WTO, 2007b). 
At the end of the round, a ministerial decision adopted stated that countries which were 
considered to be `better off' hould accelerate implementing market access commitments on 
goods exported by the lesser developed countries, while seeking increased technical 
assistance for them (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). More recently, developed countries have 
started to allow duty-free and quota-free imports for almost all products from such least- 
developed countries. With regards to all of this, the WTO and its members are still going 
through a learning process. The current Doha Development Agenda includes developing 
countries' concerns surrounding the difficulties they face in implementing the Uruguay 
Round agreements (WTO, 2001). 
2.6.2. The WTO Agreements 
All agreements relating or pertaining to the Uruguay Round and the 1994 GATT form part of, 
and now come under the auspices of, the WTO. "The administration of the agreements on 
trade in goods in GATT 1994 and the new multilateral obligations beyond the scope of trade 
in goods embodied in the GATS and TRIPS Agreements will be the main function of the 
WTO, a role the GATT could fulfil only with great difficulty considering its competence 
extended only to tariffs and trade in goods" (WTO, 2007b). In the WTO, a unified 
administrative organ is created for all of the Uruguay Round Agreements. First, the difficulty 
of incorporating the `non-trade in goods' obligations of protection relating to intellectual 
property rights and trade in services in the GATT is resolved by the WTO, which `separates 
the institutional concepts from the substantive rules'. Second, the establishment of the WTO 
settles the question of institutional status which has hindered the GATT throughout (WTO, 
2007b). 
Among the other responsibilities of the WTO, it is also charged with the responsibility of 
implementing, administering, operating, and dealing with any further objectives of the 
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agreements2, as well as providing for future negotiation concerning the Agreements, 
resolving disputes, reviewing trade policies, and `with a view to achieving greater coherence 
in global policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International 
Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.... ' 
(WTO, 1995a). 
2.6.3. Application for WTO Membership 
As the WTO has progressed to its present position of controlling and regulating a substantial 
proportion of world trade, mechanisms have been put into place in order to encourage free 
flow of trade. What are the organizational structures in place? 
Applications for WTO memberships are overseen by individual Working Parties which 
examine, comment and decide to accept or reject the reports (often voluminous) that 
prospective member's supply, detailing their commercial policies. The applicant provides a 
memorandum on its foreign trade regime, which details and describes all aspects of its trade 
policy that could possibly have any bearing on the various WTO Agreements. In addition, 
prospective members must also negotiate with their most important trading partners among 
the existing WTO members on the terms and conditions of bound market access rights for 
goods and services which are exchanged at the time of the WTO membership (WTO, 2007, 
pp. 48-78). These bilateral negotiations may take over a year to complete. Despite the 
formidable challenges, the demand for accession to the WTO was strong from the outset. 
Many of the candidates for appointment in the mid-1990s had recently begun a difficult 
transition from centrally-planned to market economies. 
Article VIII of the WTO Agreement makes it clear that its members are under the legal 
obligation to accord legal personality to the Organization. The same article explains that the 
WTO has the legal capacity to sign a Headquarters Agreement. The WTO has such an 
2 Article III of the WTO Agreement, the GATT (1994), the Multilateral and Plurilateral Agreements, and the 
GATT (1947). "1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the 
objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework 
for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also 
provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a 
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial 
Conference" 
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Agreement now in place with Switzerland. The officials of the WTO (the WTO Secretariat) 
as well as the accredited (to the WTO) national delegates enjoy diplomatic privileges similar 
to those embedded in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (WTO, 1995b). 
2.6.4. The WTO Structure 
Art. IV WTO Agreement lays out the institutional structure of the WTO. The Ministerial 
Conference (MC) is the highest authority, meeting at an interval of at least every two years 
and is composing of representatives of all member states. In the two year interim, its tasks are 
carried out by the General Council (GC) which meets on an approximate monthly basis. 
Under the GC's guidance, the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, 
and the Council for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, deal with trade in goods, 
services and trade-related intellectual property rights, respectively. Various Committees and 
sub-Committees deal with more specific issues, such as, for example, antidumping, 
safeguards, etc (Gallagher et el, 2005). 
The WTO is financed through contributions of its members (WTO, 2007b). It should be 
noted that since the WTO is a formal institution, the entities which adhere to it are now called 
`members', as opposed to contracting parties, the term used for the participants in the GATT 
(WTO, 2007b). 
2.7. THREE LAYERS OF WTO OBLIGATIONS 
Accession to the WTO entails the assumption of specific legal obligations. WTO Members 
will accept disciplines on instruments affecting trade. The extent of the obligations assumed 
may vary across countries: some countries, for example, might be prepared to completely 
eliminate tariff protection; others might wish to simply impose a ceiling on their tariff 
protection to be re-negotiated downwards in the course of subsequent trade rounds (WTO, 
2007b). The obligations assumed are of a contractual nature, that is, dispositive in private-law 
parlance. As Jackson (1969) first pointed out, not even the most favoured nation (MFN) 
obligation has acquired the status of customary international law. 
There are three layers of legal obligations that can be assumed when adhering to the WTO, 
which could be classified as follows (WTO, 2005c, pp. 113-137): an inflexible, multilateral 
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set of obligations which are the legal obligations which will bind all WTO members upon 
accession. A country joining the WTO has no option but to abide by this set of obligations. 
These obligations are reflected in the WTO Agreement and all its annexes (the so-called 
multilateral agreements); a flexible, multilateral set of obligations, that is, the legal 
obligations which will bind only those WTO Members which have acceded to the 
corresponding WTO legal instruments. Such obligations exist as the WTO law, besides the 
multilateral agreements, also knows the so-called plurilateral agreements, that is, optional 
participation agreements; a bilateral set of obligations (Yi-Chong, 2004, pp. 15-43). These are 
sui generis obligations which are assumed by the acceding WTO member, and regulate in a 
specific manner its legal relations with the incumbent WTO members. 
Category (c) is distinctive, and its subject matter depends on the negotiation between the 
acceding country and the incumbent WTO Members. For example, during the negotiations 
that led to the accession of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the WTO, a special 
safeguard was concluded which, contrary to what is the case under the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement, allows WTO Members the possibility to impose discriminatory (i. e., country 
specific) safeguards against PRC. 13 At this point, we should state that so far there has been 
no dispute before the WTO adjudicating bodies concerning issues included in the bilateral set 
of obligations. 
2.7.1. Multilateral and Plurilateral Agreements 
Almost all the Uruguay Round Agreements were concluded following the so-called single 
undertaking-approach: membership in the WTO would be contingent upon accepting all of 
the treaties as a package; thus, for example, it would not be open for a state to accept the 
rights and obligations of the GATT, whilst refusing the Agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). This approach was in sharp contradiction with the 
GATT `a la carte', approach followed during the Tokyo Round (1973-1979): the 
participation in a series of side agreements, such as the Antidumping, the Subsidies, the 
Government Procurement etc., was optional, and a GATT contracting party could retain its 
status as such without adhering to any of the side agreements negotiated and concluded 
during the Tokyo round (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
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In the Uruguay Round, only four agreements were excluded from the 'single undertaking' 
approach. These are the so-called plurilateral or Annex 4 Agreements. Art. 11.3 of the WTO 
Agreement defines the legal status of these Agreements: `The agreements and associated 
legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, 
and are binding on those members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either 
obligations or rights for members that have not accepted them (WTO, 2008d). 
Participation in the Annex 4 Agreements is regulated in each and every Agreement (Article 
XII. 3 of the WTO Agreement). However, these four Agreements are only open for accession 
to WTO members, i. e. to states which have accepted all the multilateral agreements. Article 
II. 3 of the WTO Agreement reads to this effect: `The agreements ... (hereinafter referred to 
as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also parts of this Agreement for those Members that 
have accepted them... ' (WTO, 1995b). 
WTO Members can, by consensus (Article X. 9 of the WTO Agreement), add to the existing 
list of plurilateral agreements. The four plurilateral agreements are the Agreement on Civil 
Aircraft, the Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, 
and the International Bovine Agreement (WTO, 1995b). 
Article XXIV of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) regulates accession to 
the GPA in the following terms: 
1. `This Agreement shall enter into force on 1 January 1996 for those governments [8] whose 
agreed coverage is contained in Annexes 1 through 5 of Appendix I of this Agreement and 
which have, by signature, accepted the Agreement on 15 April 1994 or have, by that date, 
signed the Agreement subject to ratification and subsequently ratified the Agreement before 1 
January 1996. ' 
2. Any Government which is a Member of the WTO, or prior to the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement which is a contracting party to GATT 1947, and which is not a Party to 
this Agreement may accede to this Agreement on terms to be agreed between that 
government and the Parties. Accession shall take place by deposit with the Director-General 
of the WTO of an instrument of accession which states the terms so agreed. The Agreement 
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shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of its accession into the agreement, 
for an acceding government. ' (WTO, 1995t) 
2.8. WTO PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO ENERGY 
After discussing the development of the multilateral trading system, its historical evolvement 
from the GATT 1947 to the establishment of the WTO in 1995, its main principles, functions, 
and agreements, this section shifts now to focus on the WTO provisions that are relevant to 
"energy", both as goods and services. This is because "energy" is the most important aspect 
of Qatar's economy and its driving force. The objective is to prepare the foundation for 
discussions of the subsequent chapters, which will concentrate on analysing various aspects 
of Qatar's economy in relation to its membership to the WTO. 
2.8.1. General Principles of the GATT as Applied to the Energy Sector 
2.8.1.1. Non-discrimination (the MFN principle in relation to energy) 
The non-discriminatory principles apply to "energy", either as goods or services. The first of 
these principles is the MFN principle that can be found in the GATT, CATS, and the TRIPS. 
As is already explained, the MFN principle applies that all member countries of the WTO 
must treat all foreign products or services that enter into its territory equally and non- 
discriminatorily. Any favour or advantage of immunity provided to a particular foreign 
product must be extended to all other WTO members. Hence, the MFN, as was previously 
discussed, applies to any tariffs or any charges related to importation or exportation and the 
way of calculating these charges or customs duties. Hence, for energy producing countries, 
this means that if a WTO Member decides to impose customs duties, charges or any import 
or export regulations such as taxes -- which confer any advantage to energy products from a 
certain country -- it has to extend such an advantage to like products from any other WTO 
members without discrimination (Selivanova, 2007). The underlying essence of the MFN 
treatment defines that all members of the WTO should treat, and must be treated, equally and 
fairly, and be eligible to receive all of any advantages. 
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2.8.1.2. National Treatment in relation to energy 
As is discussed above, national treatment is the second non-discriminatory principle of the 
multilateral trading system. It relates to both goods and services and the objective is to 
provide equal treatment to all products and services in the market either foreign or national. 
Hence, as any other types of products and services, national treatment also applies to 
"energy". Therefore, any internal taxation, domestic regulations, and requirements must all be 
applied equally to foreign as well as domestic energy products and services (Pauwelyn, 
2001). Hence, the national treatment principle requires that all energy products and services 
(foreign or domestic) are subject to the same internal taxes and charges, laws and regulations. 
In practice this means that internal taxes for imported energy material and products must not 
to be higher than for like energy material and products of domestic origin (Selivanova, 2007). 
It is important to emphasise that the obligation to accord national treatment is applicable not 
only to taxation but to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of energy materials or products. 
With respect to transportation and distribution, Article III: 4 of the GATT provides 
justification to impose different charges as long as the difference is "based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product 
concerned". For instance, different charges may be due to different distances and parameters 
of pipelines used for oil and gas productions (Pauwelyn, 2001). 
2.8.1.3. Quantitative Restrictions 
Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions, which means that any protection should be carried 
out through tariffs and not through actions which directly affect volumes, such as quotas, 
import or export licenses, to cite a few examples. The reason behind this prohibition is that 
tariff measures are less distortional compared to quantitative measures. Prohibition of export 
or import restrictions is applicable also for prohibitions to the import or export of energy 
materials or products below a certain price (EEC, Programme of Minimum Import Prices, 
Licenses and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, 1978). According 
to ECS, requirements of minimum export or import price would limit the quantity of imports 
or exports. For example, if imports are cheaper than domestic products, such restrictions 
would not allow them to compete effectively on the domestic market. Measures for minimum 
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export prices - which used to be imposed in order to maintain a certain level of supply in the 
domestic market - would mean that the exports would not be provided at a competitive 
price in the foreign markets, which is not allowed (Pauwelyn, 2001). `Article XI. 2. a foresees 
several exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions; the most relevant for the 
energy sector is the provision that allows countries to temporarily invoke export prohibitions 
in order to relieve critical shortages of products essential to the exporting country. ' 
2.8.1.4. Exceptions 
WTO Members can use Article XX exceptions in order to introduce measures in pursuit of 
certain policy objectives which otherwise would have been inconsistent with the WTO, but 
such measures cannot constitute `arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination' and cannot amount 
to disguised restrictions on international trade. Article XX(g) allows measures `relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources as long as such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption'. This provision was 
invoked by the United States in the case involving gasoline against Venezuela and Brazil 
(WTO, 1995v). 
Article XXI provides another important exception provision. A WTO member is not 
prevented from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they 
are derived. Under this provision, it rests with the WTO member invoking the exception to 
determine what constitutes such `essential security interests'. Due to the importance attached 
to energy, it is likely that the application of the exception under Article XXI would be 
reasonable in order to enforce trade restrictions related to energy (Selivanova, 2007). 
2.8.1.5. Market Access 
According to UNCTAD (2000), energy products and materials don't often encounter market 
access issues within their export markets. During the Uruguay Round, tariff peaks for 
hydrocarbons were eliminated, and the duties were generally reduced. Tariffs were reduced 
more for processed than for unprocessed products. Energy tariffs mirror the goals of energy 
policy more than those of trade policy as the main objective is to secure energy supply 
(UNCTAD, 2000). In theory, export duties are subject to the same disciplines as import 
-37- 
duties; which can be applied but are subject to MFN requirements. Export duties have been 
less of a concern for WTO members as it is normally not in the interest of exporting countries 
to impose high export duties as This would leave exported products at an inconsistent and 
uncompetitive level within the exports markets. 
In the energy sector, the importing countries are interested in receiving energy products and 
materials at a low price. For exporting countries, export duties comprise a very large source 
of state revenue. Export duties are allowed but must be applied on a basis which conforms to, 
and is consistent with, the principles of MFN treatment. After the Uruguay Round, these are 
still unbound. In the accession negotiations, WTO members currently request energy 
producing countries to bind export duties, sometimes at zero (WTO, 2009a). `Energy 
exporters traditionally considered that high internal taxes, including excise taxes, imposed by 
importing countries on petroleum products including gasoline undermine their ability to 
derive income from their own natural resources' (OPEC, 2008). As long as these taxes are 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis, they are considered to be in line with the WTO 
(OPEC, 2008). 
2.8.1.6. Transit 
Energy transportation in the form of gas and electricity often takes place via pipelines or 
transmission network. Sometimes, transportation networks cross third countries in transit. 
Article V of the GATT provides for freedom of transit: `There shall be freedom of transit 
through the territory of each member, via the routes most convenient for international transit, 
for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other members. ' (WTO, 1995c). Traffic in 
transit cannot be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions. It is to be exempt from 
customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges, except those for transportation or 
commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or the cost of services 
rendered. This means that the energy materials and products in transit through a territory of a 
WTO member cannot be subject to customs duties or any other duties or charges. In order to 
be in line with Article V of the GATT, any such fees have to be commensurate with the 
expenses involved. 
3 OPEC is concerned that factors outside of its control may disrupt this stability. This includes taxation, which 
now constitutes the largest part of the price of oil products in some countries. 
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The non-discrimination obligation in Article V of the GATT means that transited goods from 
any WTO member have to be given the most favourable treatment consistent with that which 
transited goods from any other country receives. No distinction in treatment should be based 
on the flags of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any 
other circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, vessels or other means of transport. 
Article V of the GATT does not effectively provide members with an effective obligation to 
ensure that companies controlling pipelines in the energy sector comply with the transit 
obligation of Article V (Selivanova, 2007). 
2.8.1.7. State Trading Enterprises (STEs 
The energy sector has been traditionally dominated by state enterprises, be it government 
owned, government controlled, or linked to the government in any other way. Governments 
sometime entrust some regulatory powers to large energy corporations (Selivanova, 2004a, 
pp. 559-602). For instance, such companies can administer transportation, transmission and 
distribution systems, storage capacities, etc. Such enterprises are not necessarily led by 
market principles in making policy decisions as to pricing and other matters. Considering 
their dominance with regards to imports or exports, their policies might therefore potentially 
distort trade. The WTO rules designed to address practices by such enterprises is Article 
XVII of the GATT. Members act to ensure that state trading enterprises act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discrimination prescribed in the GATT for 
governmental measures which affect imports or exports by private traders. 4 The main issue 
related to the obligations of WTO members with respect to STEs in the energy sector, lies in 
the conditions of energy transportation and, in particular, with third-party access to pipelines. 
The coverage of Article XVII is, however, not limited to state enterprises, and state 
ownership is not the major criteria. Most importantly, Article XVII. 1 applies to any 
enterprises which possess exclusive or special privileges granted by the state, `including 
4 Article XVILI(a) of GATT states: "Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State 
enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, 
such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent 
with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental 
measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. " 
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statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their 
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports' (WTO, 1995c). 
Through Article XVII. I. b, state trading enterprises are obliged to make their purchases or 
sales on the basis of commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transport and other conditions of purchase or sale. They are also obliged to 
afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties' adequate opportunity in accordance 
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales 
(WTO, 1995c). 
The requirement to act in accordance with commercial considerations is not a separate 
obligation, but is, rather, an express clarification of the obligations contained in the preceding 
paragraph (a) of Article XVII. 1 to `act in a manner consistent with the general principles of 
non-discriminatory treatment' (Selivanova, 2007). 
2.8.1.8. Energy Services 
One needs to examine the contribution of the energy sector towards the attainment of the 
goals of the WTO. 
The functioning of oil and gas projects is focused around the management of the project by 
the operator, i. e. the company executing the project for the partners of the venture. For 
geological surveys, drilling, protecting the environment, designing and building the 
production facilities and operating production, the operator normally contracts separate 
specialised technical and consulting firms for different services, and buys equipment from 
several different suppliers. 
Throughout the period of the energy sector's development, the reliance of the operator on 
contracted services increased (Anez, 2003). Energy services thus directly affect the costs of 
energy production they constitute an integral part of the energy chain from discovery of an 
energy field to the distribution of the final product. 
WTO members have undertaken limited commitments in the area of energy services (Zarilli, 
2003). This could potentially be due to several reasons. Firstly, the energy sector being a 
-40- 
strategic sector for national security has traditionally been dominated by state companies. 
These companies are unwilling to give up the market power provided by their monopoly 
position and resist any liberalization efforts. Secondly, there is no single definition or clear 
notion of what is understood under `energy services'. This lack of definition additionally 
contributed to the delay in energy service liberalization, as some governments made 
development of classification a precondition to undertaking any further commitments in the 
sector. The energy services encompass services related to all stages of the energy production 
chain, such as exploration, development, drilling, extraction, construction, engineering, 
production, processing, refining, generation, transportation, transmission, distribution, 
storage, marketing, etc (Zarilli, 2003). 
The WTO services classification (W/120) does not include a special section for energy 
services but there are, instead, three separate sub-sectors which are each related to energy 
activities: `Services incidental to mining, rendered on a fee or contract basis at oil and gas 
fields' and `Services incidental to energy distribution' with are both detailed within the 
`Business Services' section, and `Transportation via pipeline of crude or refined petroleum 
and petroleum products and of natural gas' as detailed within the `Transport Services' section 
(WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, 2008). 
There are some parts of the energy production processes which are closely associated with 
service activities, for instance, the refining of oil, or liquefaction and gasification. As these 
manufacturing activities are closely related to the production of energy, they are not covered 
by the CATS. 
The CATS contains limited provisions which deal with the conduct of private entities, such 
as monopolies and exclusive service suppliers. Restrictive business practices by incumbent 
operators are subject to Article V1115 and Article IX. Article VIII is especially relevant to gas 
transportation and distribution services. Article VIII requires members to ensure that the 
incumbent natural monopolist in the transportation and distribution market does not act in a 
manner inconsistent with the MFN principles, and with the member's specific commitments. 
In addition, if such a monopoly supplier competes in the supply of a service outside the scope 
of its monopoly rights, the member has to ensure that the incumbent monopoly does not 
S Article VIII applies also to cases of exclusive service suppliers, when a Member authorizes or establishes a 
small number of service suppliers and substantially prevents competition among those suppliers. 
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abuse its position subject to the member's specific commitments. The problem is, however, 
that most of the WTO members have each undertaken relatively limited commitments with 
regards to energy services (WTO, 1995d). 
The United States and Norway both proposed to devise a reference paper for energy services, 
modelled on the reference paper of the CATS Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
Services, with a view to developing a set of rules for cross-border energy trade. 6 The purpose 
of this reference paper would be to ensure transparency in the formulation and 
implementation of rules, as well as non-discriminatory third-party access to, and 
interconnection with, energy networks and grids, non-discriminatory objectives and timely 
procedures for the transportation and transmission of energy, and requirements preventing 
certain anti-competitive practices for energy services in general. The energy sector requires 
more sophisticated regulations due to the possible impacts on the environment or issues 
related to energy efficiency and security of supply. 
2.8.1.9. Subsidies 
Studies have shown that subsidies to energy production and consumption amount to hundreds 
of billions of USD. Discussion of subsidies within the energy context is of a twofold 
character. First, traditional types of energy subsidies are subsidies granted to energy 
producers and downstream industries. This category comprises direct payments which 
support production (deficiency payments and operating subsidies to producers as well as 
consumer subsidies); tax-related subsidies, exemptions from taxation, tax credits, etc. ); 
policies that reduce costs of inputs (budgetary subsidies to energy inputs, price controls for 
inputs, etc. ); investment subsidies (equity participation, loans at preferential rates, loan 
guarantees, debt forgiveness, liability funding); and policies that create transfers through 
market prices (OECD, 1997, p. 18). The latter category is the most common in the energy 
sectors of developing countries and countries with economics in transition. In the developed 
countries, such subsidies were common in the past, where prices were controlled for social or 
political reasons. Secondly, in order to achieve environmental policy objectives, most 
importantly climate change policies, some measures have been introduced by governments 
6 Communication from the United States, Energy Services, S/CSS/W/27,18 May (2000); Communication from 
Norway, S/CSS/W/59,21 March (2001). 
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which allegedly could be inconsistent with the WTO subsidies rules (Article 19 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) (WTO, 1995p). 
Export contingent subsidies and subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic products over 
imported products are deemed to be specific according to Article 2.3 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) (WTO, 1995p). The SCM 
Agreement prohibits, in Part III, such as export subsidies (WTO, 1995p). If the government 
provides support only to industries which export, the programme would constitute a 
prohibited subsidy. 
Domestic subsidies, although not prohibited, can be actionable. If subsidised imports are 
causing injury to the domestic industry of a member, the member may impose a 
countervailing duty to offset the subsidy. Also, if a member believes that a subsidy results in 
adverse effects, it can also, as per Article 7 of the SCM Agreement, also bring a dispute 
settlement complaint before the WTO which requests the withdrawal of a subsidy or removal 
of adverse effects. 
Subsidies have been traditionally used by governments in order to develop the domestic 
energy sector as well as downstream industries. Some practices of energy-endowed states -- 
such as pricing policies, have been contested on the basis of subsidy disciplines. Currently, 
some climate change programmes are claimed to constitute a specific subsidy. 
2.8.1.10. Investment 
The energy sector is a capital-intensive industry which requires significant investments in 
infrastructure. The energy and power sectors - especially gas pipelines and oil fields - are 
among lead sectors in foreign direct investment (FDI). The TRIMs Agreement does not deal 
with investment policy per se, and only elaborates on the national treatment obligation and 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions with respect to certain investment measures, such as 
local content and foreign exchange-related requirements (Sterlini, 2005). Member countries 
may not impose investment measures that require companies to buy a certain amount of 
goods of national origin, or place conditions on certain imports that relate to the amount of 
exports. In this sense, the TRIMs Agreement did not create new obligations that went beyond 
GATT disciplines (Sterlini, 2005). Many performance-related and technology transfer 
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measures that some countries proposed to include in the Agreement, remained outside its 
scope. Another important limitation is that the TRIMs Agreement covers only those 
investment measures which are related to goods. The Agreement does not cover investment 
measures related to services. Instead, TRIMs are related only to measures with respect to 
treatment of imports and exports carried out by investors, and not their activities. 
Performance requirements, which are not covered by the Agreement, include export 
performance requirements, manufacturing requirements, product mandating requirements, 
technology transfer requirements, and local equity requirements, etc (Sterlini, 2005). 
2.8.1.11. Technology Transfer 
The WTO provisions relating to technology transfer are concentrated in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the CATS. Under TRIPS 
Article 7, one of the main objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is the promotion of 
technological innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology. This policy is further 
developed in Article 66(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires developed countries' 
governments to provide incentives for their companies to transfer technology to lesser 
developed countries in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. 
A similar approach can also be found in Article IV(1)(a) of the CATS, which refers to 
`access to technology on a commercial basis' as one of the means of increasing the 
participation of developing countries in world trade. Furthermore, developed country 
members should establish contact points with both developing and least developed country 
members in order to supply information concerning, among other things, the availability of 
service technology (Article, IV. 2. c). 
Developing country members can make the liberalisation of market access to Foreign Service 
providers subject to conditions that aim to achieve objectives set out in Article IV of the 
CATS. Thus, in the case of developing countries, a degree of host country regulation over 
entry conditions is accepted where this is likely to enhance a given country's access to 
technology (WTO, 1995d). 
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2.9. SPECIAL TREATMENT PROVIDED FOR DEVELOPING AND LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES UNDER THE WTO 
2.9.1 Developing Countries and the Implications for Qatar 
Being a developing country, Qatar is subject to special and flexible measures under the WTO 
that are designed to help developing countries meet their obligations under the WTO and 
assist them to integrate into the global economy. This section looks into the position of 
developing countries, in general, and elaborates the main multilateral regulations that affect 
them. It is important for Qatar's authorities to be aware of these provisions and benefit from 
their Ilexibilities. 
Around two third of the WTO's 153 members are considered to be `developing countries', 
including Qatar (WTO, 2008b). These countries play an increasingly important and active 
role in the WTO due to their numbers as they are becoming more and more important in the 
global economy, and because they look to trade as a vital and primary tool in their 
development efforts. Hence, developing countries are a highly diverse group of members, 
often with very different views and concerns (WTO, 2008b). Qatar should associate its trade 
policies and negotiating stance under the WTO with other developing countries of similar 
interests such as those of the GCC. It is important for Qatar to be aware of the opportunities 
available to it, under the WTO, as an energy producing country as well as a small developing 
country. 
The WTO agreements contain special provisions on developing countries. The Committee on 
Trade and Development (CTD) is the most important body that Qatar could utilise and take 
an advantage of. The Committee focuses on development issues and seeks to help developing 
countries meet their obligations towards the WTO. The CTD has an inclusive mandate to 
help developing countries implement WTO commitments. This mandate covers very wide 
areas and issues but the CTD has managed to prioritize them and carry out the most important 
ones first. The first important task is how the WTO provisions favouring developing 
countries are being carried out. The CTD also sets out guidelines for technical cooperation 
between member countries and between the WTO and its members. The CTD is also 
concerned about how developing countries increase their participation in the global trading 
system, and how to improve the position of least-developed countries. 
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Furthermore, Qatar, like any other WTO member, is obliged to inform the WTO regarding 
any special programmes involving trade concessions products from developing countries, and 
about regional arrangements among developing countries. Qatar should be aware that any of 
the following special arrangements must be informed to the Trade and Development 
Committee. If Qatar is involved in one of these arrangements, it must inform them to the 
CTD: 
" Generalized System of Preferences programmes, where developed countries provide a 
favourable and discriminatory treatment for some developing countries by lowering 
their trade barriers and exempting their products from tariffs; a special treatment that 
is not extended to other countries; 
9 Preferential trade arrangements among developing countries such as the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), MERCOSUR (the Southern 
Common Market in Latin America), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 
In November 2001, the Doha Ministerial Conference added new tasks and some new working 
groups. The Trade and Development Committee now meets in 'special sessions' in order to 
handle work under the Doha Development Agenda. The ministers have also set up working 
groups on Trade, Debt and Finance, and on Trade and Technology Transfer (WTO, 2001). It 
is important for Qatar to effectively participate in the meetings of the TDC to make sure that 
its interests are well-addressed. 
Another important element under the WTO Doha negotiations relates to "technical 
cooperation" whereby member countries continue to receive the necessary help to function 
under the multilateral trading system. The aim is to help create the necessary institutions and 
to train officials from the different countries (WTO, 2007b). The WTO regularly holds 
training sessions on trade policy in Geneva. In addition, the WTO arranges around 500 
technical cooperation activities every year, which include seminars and workshops in 
different countries and different training courses in the head-quarters of the WTO in Geneva. 
Qatar can also benefit from the services provided by other Committees dealing with specific 
issues such as trade and debt, and technology transfer. Technical assistance such as training 
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can also be provided to developing countries by the WTO Secretariat and Qatar is advised to 
seek such assistance as a means of developing its human resources in the field of 
international trade. Also, WTO agreements contain many different provisions which provide 
developing and least developed countries' special rights and treatment (see Michalopoulos, 
2001). 
Furthermore, part four of the GATT contains special provisions on trade and development 
which includes provisions on "non-reciprocity" in trade negotiations between developed and 
developing countries. To elaborate, part four stipulates that when developed countries grant 
trade concessions to developing countries they should not expect the developing countries to 
make similar treatment in return (WTO, 1995c). 
In addition, WTO agreements contain provisions that allow developing countries a longer 
time to meet their obligations and adhere to the WTO regulations in comparison with the time 
allowed for developed countries. Other provisions in the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
and the CATS are designed to increase trading opportunities for developing countries to 
access the markets of developing countries. Also, there are special flexible provisions in 
regards to technical barriers to trade that require WTO members to safeguard the interests of 
developing countries when adopting some domestic or international measures, as is the case 
in anti-dumping, safeguards, technical barriers to trade. Other provisions call for providing 
special assistance to developing countries to deal with commitments on animal and plant 
health standards, technical standards, and in strengthening their domestic telecommunications 
sectors and abiding by the CATS obligations (WTO, 2007b). 
Another element of the special treatment that is provided to developing countries under the 
multilateral trading system relates to the WTO Secretariat. The latter has special legal 
advisers whose main task is to assist developing countries in their trade disputes against other 
members and provide them with the necessary and useful advice on how they can best handle 
the dispute. This advisory service is provided to developing countries via the WTO's 
Training and Technical Cooperation Institute. Qatar, as any other developing country, can 
utilise this service and benefit from it (WTO, 2009b). 
Not only that, but Qatar can benefit from the technical assistance and the advisory services 
provided by the Advisory Centre on WTO law. The latter was established in 2001 by the 
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cooperation of 32 WTO Governments. Members of the Advisory Centre are those which 
contribute to its funding and benefit from its legal support and advice. It is worth-mentioning 
that all least-developed countries are automatically eligible to benefit from the Advisory 
Centre. Other developing countries are obliged to pay the fees for being members of the 
Centre In order to be able to benefit from its consultative services (Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law, 2009). Qatar could participate in this important Centre and seek its assistance on any 
matter related to WTO issues; as such, participation will help Qatar further integrate itself 
into the global economy. 
In 1997 a WTO Reference Centre programme was initiated with the primary objective of 
creating a network of computerized information centres in lesser developed and developing 
countries. The Centres provide access to WTO information and documents through various 
means, such as a print library, a CD-ROM collection and through the Internet by way of 
access to the WTO websites and databases. The Centres are located mainly in trade ministries 
and in the headquarters of regional coordination organizations. There are currently 140 
Reference Centres (WTO, 2007e). 
2.9.2. Least-developed countries: A very special treatment 
It is worth noting that the least developed countries are given even more attention and help 
under the regulations of the multilateral trading system. WTO agreements in different sectors 
and issues call members to provide very special and flexible help and to make every effort to 
assist the least developed countries to continue to be part and parcel of the multilateral 
trading system. WTO agreements call members to make all the necessary efforts to lower 
trade barriers against imports from least-developed countries and help them to improve their 
economies. 
Many Ministerial Decisions have been made in favour of least-developed countries since the 
Uruguay Round agreements were signed in 1994 (UNESCAP7,2009). For instance, during 
the Singapore Ministerial in 1996, Ministers reached an agreement on a `Plan of Action for 
Least-Developed Countries'. The plan required WTO members and institutions to provide 
technical assistance to enable the least-developed countries to improve their participation in 
UNESCAP stands for the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 
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the multilateral system. The plan also entailed a pledge from developed countries to seek 
improving market access for the products of least-developed countries (WTO, 1996). 
Another element of the special treatment provided for the least developed countries is the so- 
called the "Integrated Framework" programme, which was established in October 1997, one 
year after the Singapore Ministerial. The Integrated Framework is a technical assistance 
programme exclusively set up to help the least developed countries. It is a joint programme 
between six important international organizations, namely, the IMF, the International Trade 
Centre, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, the United Nations 
Development Programme, the World Bank and the WTO. I fence the Integrated Framework 
programme is a good example for the cooperation between the WTO and other international 
organisations (WTO, 2007c). 
As a result, many WTO members (developed and developing) have unilaterally helped the 
products of the least developed countries enter their markets. They exempted them from any 
import duties and import quotas on all exports from lesser developed countries. 
In the same retrospect, all of the WTO's official work is held mainly in Geneva as well as all 
the other unofficial contacts between representatives of different counties particularly which 
can be regarded as equally important. However, due to their financial constraints and 
economic difficulties, the least-developed countries have major difficulties in setting up 
offices in Geneva. Thus, there is only around one third of the 30 or so lesser developed 
countries in the WTO which have permanent offices in Geneva. These offices they cover all 
United Nations activities besides the WTO (WTO, 2007b). 
This particular problem was addressed during the negotiations between the WTO and the 
Swiss Government to allocate the WTO headquarters in Geneva. As a result of these 
negotiations, the Swiss Government agreed to provide special subsidized office space for 
delegations from least-developed countries. Moreover, some other WTO members offer 
financial support for Ministers and accompanying officials from least-developed countries so 
that they can be able to continue to help WTO ministerial conferences. 
The Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries (SLDC) was established under the WTO to 
carry out two main tasks. The first is to integrate the least-developed countries in the 
multilateral trading system. The second is to provide them with the necessary technical 
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assistance. The SLDC also carry out periodical assessment on how the special provisions 
favouring least-developed countries within the WTO agreements are being implemented and 
what is needed to further consolidate the integration of the least-developed countries. It is 
important to mention that the SLDC reports to the Committee on Trade and Development. 
2.9.3. Important considerations for developing countries and Qatar and their 
negotiating position under the DDA 
As a small developing economy, it can be said that it is in the direct interests of Qatar that the 
common position of developing countries continues to strengthen. The special technical and 
training assistance works for the benefit of Qatar. However, as is indicated above, developing 
countries are a very wide group with diverse interests and different economic and trade 
policies. For Qatar to benefit from its WTO membership and utilise the special provisions 
provided for the developing countries, it must identify the most suitable members with which 
Qatar has important trading interests and unite its negotiating position in the on-going Doha 
Round with them. Qatar should focus on sectors in which it has economic interests. In other 
words, not all the agenda of developing countries can serve Qatar's interests and Qatar must 
identify its own sub-group with whom it shares similar interests. 
The multilateral trading system through the different WTO Agreements provides many 
opportunities for developing countries to improve their economics. The DDA came to even 
provide further opportunities to liberalise trade on many issues and sectors such as agriculture 
and services (telecom, insurance, and finance). In addition, liberalization under the WTO 
improves global GDP and encourages world demand for developing countries exports. As a 
general view, these liberalisation initiatives would work for the benefit of Qatar. Obstacles 
against Qatar's gas, oil, and petrochemical exports would be reduced and domestic market 
would be further liberalised, thus creating more incentives for business opportunities and 
foreign investment. All of this would result into improving the living standards and providing 
Qataris with job opportunities. 
However, the Doha Round is facing major obstacles and has taken a very long time to 
negotiate. The conflicting interests between developed and developing countries on issues 
such as agriculture have made the negotiations very difficult to move any forward. 
Developing countries are complaining that they are facing great difficulties to implement the 
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WTO agreements reached under the Uruguay Round because the developed countries have 
deliberately made matters very complex for them. 
Developing countries complain that they still face very high tariffs on selected products - 
'tariff peaks'- in important markets particularly in agriculture, and the protective measures 
of the developed countries continues to obstruct their important exports. Examples include 
tariff peaks on textiles, clothing, fish and fish products. In the Uruguay Round industrial 
countries made, on average, only slightly smaller reductions in their tariffs on products which 
are mainly exported by developing countries (37%), than on imports from all countries (40%) 
(WTO, 2007b). At the same time, the potential for developing countries to trade with each 
other was also obstructed by the fact that the highest tariffs are sometimes in developing 
countries themselves. Nevertheless, it must be stated the increased proportion of the 
international trade amongst WTO members covered by `bindings' (committed ceilings which 
are difficult to remove) has added security to developing country exports (WTO, 2007b). 
Another related issue is `tariff escalation', where an importing country seeks to safeguard its 
domestic industry and factories by applying lower duties on imports of raw materials and 
components, but higher duties on finished products. However, the post Uruguay Round 
period has witnessed much improvement in this respect as many developed countries have 
eliminated escalation on many selected products, and thus more transparent and less 
discriminatory competitiveness is achieved in their markets. The DDA has addressed the 
issues and calls for further substantial reductions on escalations (WTO, 2001). 
Moreover, another issue of some concern to developing countries is the erosion of 
preferences. The special tariff concessions that were granted by developed countries on 
imports from certain developing countries become less meaningful if the normal tariff rates 
are cut as the difference between the normal and preferential rates is reduced. 
The question of how valuable and important of these preferences for the economies and trade 
of developing countries is a subject of controversy in the field of international trade. But, it is 
important to emphasise that unlike the regular WTO tariff commitments, preferential tariffs 
treatment is not `bound' under the WTO agreements and such preferences can, thus, be easily 
changed. They are often given unilaterally at the initiative of the importing country. This 
makes trade under the preferential tariffs treatment less predictable and transparent than 
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under regular bound rates, which cannot be increased easily. Eventually, countries stand to 
gain more from regular bound tariff rates. The latter provide transparent information for 
importers and exporters whose trading activities are based and directed according to the 
bound rates. 
However, this does not mean that preferences did not benefit developing countries. But, some 
countries and companies could have already benefited from such preferences. But the gains 
vary from one product to another. Also, such benefits depend much on whether producers 
have been able to take an advantage of the preferences to continue remain competitive and 
secure their market shares even after the preferences have been withdrawn (Iloekman and 
Kostecki, 2001). 
Thus, the question now is whether developing countries can really benefit from the changes; 
i. e. from the preferential tariff treatment to the non-preferential tariff treatment. The 
researcher argues for a positive answer but the whole issue depends much on the extent to 
which the developing countries are capable to respond to such changes and adopt their trade 
policies to function under the non-preferential system. Hence, Qatar's economic and trade 
policies on different sectors should be directed to respond to the requirements of the WTO, if 
the benefits of the multilateral trading system are wanted to be realised. Qatar has both the 
administrative and the financial capacity to do so. But, the situation for the least developed 
countries to respond to such changes and make the necessary adjustment is more difficult due 
to the lack of human and financial resources. The institutional and political instability makes 
matters more complex for these countries. 
Qatar should also realise the importance of the "negotiations" in the multilateral trading 
system. The decision making process of the WTO is based on consensus and reciprocity. The 
WTO is governed by its members and Qatar is one of these members and thus has the right to 
participate in such governance. In this respect, the WTO is different from other international 
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the WTO, power 
is not delegated to a board of directors or the head of the organization. 
Therefore, rules and decisions of the WTO are reached through negotiations. These rules 
affect the trade policies of member countries because they are enforced by them. Violating 
these rules entail important consequences including the possibility of entering into disputes 
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(WTO, 2007b). Hence, Qatar is advised to prepare well for these negotiations and unite its 
position with other countries so that its negotiating stance is directed to serve its trade and 
economic objectives (Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter (2005). This would require Qatar to invest in 
human resources as having Qatari nationals that are capable of negotiating on complex trade 
issues is a vital key factor for a successful participation in the current Doha Round. 
2.10. BENEFIT OF TIIE WTO FOR QATAR AND TILE ARAB WORLD 
As a major supplier of energy and as an important trade block, what special attention and 
benefits have derived from the Arab world from the WTO and its membership? In other 
words, how can Qatar and other Arab countries benefit from the multilateral trading system? 
This section discusses the answers to these questions. 
Qatar is the first country within the Arab world to host a WTO ministerial conference, 
bringing the WTO closer than ever before to the Arab region (Moore c, 2001c). Membership 
was primarily focused with offering the region a unique window of opportunity into the 
workings of the multilateral trading system. This was seen as an opportunity for the Arab 
region to raise awareness about the WTO and the importance of international trade, and also 
acted as an opening for the region to join hands with the rest of the international community 
in dismantling trade barriers which have so far kept nations apart. 
There are twelve countries in the Arab world - Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - 
that are members of the WTO. An additional six countries are observers - Algeria, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Yemen (WTO, 2008b). 
It is known that trade is important for Arab countries. For a long time, trade has been of 
paramount importance to the Arab world and their share of world trade is rising. According to 
Moore (2001), the merchandise exports of the Arab WTO members and observers, at that 
time, amounted to approximately US$ 220 billion in 2000, which was considered as an 
important rise in comparison with the their exports in 1999. Imports of the Arab WTO 
members, as of 2001, reached a total of US$ 146 billion. Furthermore, commercial services, 
as explored by Moore (2001), have increasingly become very important for Arab countries 
with exports at approximately US$ 31 billion in the year 2000, and imports at US$37 billion 
(Moore, 2001). 
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The multilateral trading system provides Qatar, and Arab counties, with a rules-based system 
whereby trade is liberalised, markets are opened, and jobs are created. Because of these 
advantages Qatar and the Arab countries ought to pursue more effectively liberal trade 
policies, not merely by joining the WTO but also by adopting domestic laws that support 
trade activities and facilitate imports and exports on non-discriminatory basis. Liberalisation 
of trade, via the WTO, facilitates the entry of imports and ensures that markets are opened. 
Hence, Qatar and Arab countries can gain access to new markets for their exports and help 
them achieve their diversification objectives. In addition to being obliged to keep their 
markets open via the WTO, Qatar and its Arab partners can also attract substantial foreign 
investment and benefit form the new technologies of other investors. 
Qatar as well as other Arab countries should realise that it is only through the multilateral 
trading system that their rights are protected via the dispute settlement system. No matters 
how big or small the other country against which the dispute is raised, the multilateral dispute 
settlement system guarantees Qatar and its fellow Arab countries that their rights can be 
restored. In turn, Arab countries must abide by the WTO regulations. They have to establish 
the necessary mechanisms in their domestic laws to ensure that WTO obligations are met and 
its regulations are implemented. 
Therefore, another benefit of the multilateral trading system for Qatar and its Arab partners 
relates to the transparency aspects guaranteed by the WTO regulations. Arab countries can 
adjust their trading policies and direct their trading activities according to the obligations of 
other WTO members. The MFN and national treatment principles of the WTO assure Qatar 
that its trade with other members will not be affected by protective policies that may seek to 
subjectively promote national industries as the expenses of Qatar's products and services. In 
other words, Qatar ensures that its trade and investment are protected by the WTO 
transparent and non-discriminatory regulations. 
It is known that the multilateral trading system has played a direct and important role in 
improving the living the standards and conditions of people on earth. As Mike Moore (2001 c) 
puts it; "freeing trade boosts economic growth, and so helps to alleviate poverty. Thus, it 
helps pay for the things we value most: jobs, health, education, a cleaner environment. In 
addition, it promotes freedom and buttresses our security and peace". 
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2.11. THE FUTURE OF THE DOIIA AGENDA NEGOTIATIONS IN RELATIONS 
TO QATAR AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES 
2009 is an important time for the multilateral trading system. The international economy is 
looking breakable. In addition, in spite of many years of high growth, the economy number 
one (the U. S. economy) is contracting. Similarly, the European economy has also suffered 
from the current financial crisis that has been confronting the world financial services and 
Japan's economy is in the doldrums. Developing countries are very vulnerable to a global 
recession. Thus, the Doha Round with its Development Agenda would help to stabilise the 
situation and send a powerful message that governments do not intend to let the huge gains 
from freer trade slip away (WTO, 2008e). 
The danger is that an increase in trade protectionism will turn a global downturn into a global 
bust. Even during the good times in the 1990s, there has been a distressing increase in anti- 
dumping and anti-subsidy investigations - in developed as well as developing countries. 
According to Mike Moore (2001b), over 400 investigations were launched in 1999, up from 
only 166 in 1995. And the OECD has noted that producer support estimates for agriculture 
are rising again. 
The situation could become very complex if businesses and companies which are now facing 
substantial financial pressures manage to induce their governments to pursue more 
protectionists' policies as a means of survival. If such lobbies became successful and 
governments started to adopt protective measures that would affect foreign companies and 
work against the non-discriminatory principles of the WTO. Hence, the benefit of trade 
liberalization and economic growth could all too easily become badly damaged, which would 
lead to the stagnations of the world trade. 
This could ultimately jeopardize the multilateral trading system itself. A global rules-based 
system based on non-discrimination could disintegrate as a result of the pervasiveness of the 
discriminatory protective trade policies adopted by governments as well as regional trading 
blocks. This would make the whole world suffer from economic recession and would likely 
lead to high levels of unemployment. 
Therefore, it is important that all WTO members work in the opposite direction to trade 
protectionism if they want to overcome the current financial crisis. The concerns and feelings 
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that have begun to dominate many developed as well as developing countries about their 
economies and the fear of being submerged in long-term recession should be utilised to act as 
incentives for collective efforts to overcome the consequences of the financial crisis. Only via 
free trade and open market policies can such consequences be overcome. All WTO members 
ought to realise this issue. Hence, the concerns of being affected by the consequences of 
financial crisis could potentially encourage greater co-operation among governments and lead 
to a greater belief in the multilateral trading system as the best system governing international 
trade and the most suitable means for overcoming the consequences of the financial crisis. 
History has taught us that the resort to protectionism, as happened in the 1930s when trade 
protectionism prevailed and became the tool for governing international trade, led the whole 
world into recession and caused substantial harm to the world economy. Such bad 
experiences must be learnt from and must not be repeated. 
Therefore, Qatar and Arab counties, as the rest of the world, should have strong incentives to 
overcome the consequences of the financial crisis by focusing on trade and identifying the 
best negotiating positions in the on-going Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Qatar should 
organise its negotiating position with other Arab countries to achieve their trade and 
economic ambitions. 
The DDA is focused on many issues and sectors. Thus, Qatar and its Arab partners should 
thoroughly assess the impact of these issues on their economies and adopt a collective 
negotiating position. To elaborate, freer trade in agriculture is vitally important for all Arab 
countries, be they food exporters - such as Mauritania - or net food importers - such as 
the Gulf States. Further liberalisation of trade in services is also another important element of 
the DDA. Financial and telecom services are perhaps the most important sectors whereby 
Qatar and other Arab partners should seek to liberalise through the WTO regulations. This is 
because by opening these sectors, further development, as facilitated by the DDA, would 
attract foreign investment and help the diversification ambitions of Qatar and its Arab 
partners. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that perhaps reaching a common negotiating stand 
amongst the Arab countries that are members of the WTO may not be an easy task. This is 
because of the differences between these countries on many issues and the diversity of their 
economies. If it is proven that reaching a collective negotiating stance amongst all Arab 
countries that are members of the WTO proves impossible due to the many differences in 
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their trade and economic objectives and policies, Qatar may find itself obliged to restrict its 
cooperation to the GCC countries. In other words, Qatar's negotiating stance on the DDA 
could perhaps be developed via the GCC umbrella rather than the wider Arab world. 
However, Qatar has to assess all of these possibilities and seek the best negotiating approach 
via which it could achieve its objectives. 
During the Doha Conference, a strategy for the Arab Region was developed. Arab countries 
should resort to this strategy as guidance for their mutual cooperation in the DDA 
negotiations. The principal objectives of the strategy are: 
" To raise awareness in the Arab world of the WTO. It is important to explain to the 
Arab world what the WTO is, what it does, and what to expect of its upcoming 
ministerial talks. Awareness must also be raised on the importance and significance of 
international trade for economic growth. 
" To facilitate the flow of information. There is, of course, an undeniable language 
barrier confronting Arab members of WTO in the day-to-day work of the 
organization. Another barrier to information flow is the dearth of Arab authors, and 
Arabic language publications, on the WTO. These barriers must be overcome through 
improved information flow. 
" To assist the Geneva based missions of Arab delegations, particularly small 
missions, in dealing with the very demanding work of the WTO. The WTO is an 
organization in which large numbers of meetings can run simultaneously, and whose 
meetings require careful preparation as well as follow-up. Missions must be assisted 
in confronting this workload. 
" To prepare Arab countries for a potential round. If the Doha Round re- 
commences, much work will be needed to help Arab countries seize the opportunities 
it provides. 
Qatar could play an important role in bringing Arab countries together. What Qatar and the 
Arab world need to consider is how best to tailor the DDA strategy to suit their needs and 
achieve their objectives. It is this ambitious objective that all Arab WTO members should 
work for. 
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2.12. CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that the GATT/WTO has come to liberalize trade and remove trade barriers. 
From its inception to the present time, the WTO has attained some of its goals because firstly, 
the membership increased from 23 in 1947 to 153 in 2009 (WTO, 2008b) and succeeded in 
reducing tariffs substantially between member countries resulting in a $6.5 trillion per year 
increase in world trade (WTO, 2007b). 
The WTO is fulfilling its role by having countries agree to reduce barriers to trade and to 
conduct their trade activities (exports, imports, trade in services) in line with agreed rules. 
The agreements laid the foundation of the multilateral trade system upon which the member 
countries are committed, which is to attain the overall social goals of improved standards of 
living, full employment, expended production and trade in goods and services, and to 
enhance the share of developing countries in world trade (Narlikar, 2005). The purpose of the 
agreements that were negotiated - i. e. to increase international trade which could create 
employment opportunities in developing countries by contributing to reduction in poverty 
and thus improving the standard of living for those people. In the same vein, developed 
countries can also have a wider outlet for their manufactured goods and even their companies 
can relocate to developing countries where they can take advantage of the availability of 
abundant, cheap labour. There is no question that the reduction in tariff levels or its total 
elimination will help facilitate and expedite the global trade in goods and services. 
It can be argued that the principles of the trading system have enormous benefits for all the 
WTO member countries. The advantage of a reduced tariff level will certainly enable poor 
countries to fully participate in the export trade, particularly when these countries have 
standardization problems. At the same time, businesses in developed countries whose 
markets are saturated - particularly with agricultural by-products - can help ease 
prevailing food shortages by exporting these goods to countries that cannot produce enough. 
More importantly, it will also help reduce food prices. Allowing the export of raw materials 
would help both developed and developing countries alike; developed countries can access 
raw materials from developing countries at the world market price, while developing 
countries such as Qatar can also access raw materials that they do not have for their budding 
manufacturing industries. Exemptions from a tax burden may also be more beneficial to 
developing countries as that could help bring in industries, which would subsequently result 
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in the generating of employment. By acceding to these agreements, the only obligation on a 
member is to accord the same benefits, unconditionally, to provide similar products or 
services to all members once these have been given to any country (Das, 1999). 
Furthermore, the idea of treating foreigners and locals equally - which is an agreement afore 
detailed as `national treatment' - would help reduce the impact of globalization on 
developing countries by introducing fair competition. A foreign company that enters into a 
local economy will have to adhere to the norms of the local environment within which local 
companies operate. That means, like their local counterparts, they will also give priority to 
local job applicants, and also conform to gender equality legislations. Likewise, businesses 
from developed countries that relocate to developing countries in search of cheap labour will 
not be confronted with any hostility. Above all, with lower trade barriers, customs duties, 
import bans or duties that restrict quantities selectively being curtailed, trade is able to 
become freer and flow more smoothly. 
Smooth-flowing trade also helps people all over the world become wealthier (WTO, 2003). 
Because of financial and resources constraints faced by developing countries, the WTO 
agreements make leeway for countries to introduce changes gradually. Developing countries 
in particular are usually given a longer time to fulfil their obligations. This is a good measure 
which can help resource strained nations, and the WTO can be sure of compliance on 
commitments. Countries that bind their commitments must stick to it, unless negotiations 
with its trading partners dictate otherwise. To ensure compliance and settle any disputes that 
may arise from countries wanting to circumvent their commitments, the WTO have a trade 
policy review mechanism and dispute settlement agreement in place to check and balance the 
trading system. The trade policy review mechanism (TPRM) and dispute settlement are not 
arbitrary agreements. Rather, the purpose of TPRM is to get members to adhere to rules, 
disciplines and commitments made under the trade agreements, and to serve as a basis for the 
enforcement of certain obligations under the agreements or dispute settlement procedures. 
This procedure is unique in that, as a means of settling disputes, the rules can be enforced and 
make the system become more effective, stabilizing the global economy as a result. The 
procedure is a fair, welcome approach as the rulings could only be adopted by consensus and 
could only be rejected by consensus. 
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The agreements of the WTO - sometimes called the WTO trade rules - are agreements 
negotiated by governments, and the negotiations are ongoing which is why the new 
agreements are now being negotiated under the DDA. The major issues, which concern 
developing countries - such as the implementation of agreements and some agricultural 
issues - will be negotiated at Doha. `The agreements, if taken at their face value, show 
promise of reshaping trade relationships throughout the world' (Verhorn, 2003, p. 106). 
Finally it is a true assertion to state that the multilateral trade system has become a means to 
an end. The role of the WTO is to serve as a forum for negotiations, the settlement of trade 
disputes and the review of trade policies to check non-compliance. It is, in other words, a 
noble attempt by governments to liberalize the global trade to allow all of us to benefit. 
This chapter has addressed the issue of the historical background of the WTO and the various 
developments which eventually led to its birth, from the final act of the Uruguay Round, 
which included the multilateral trade agreements, to the formation of the WTO. Issues 
concerning the institutional framework of the WTO and how the objectives listed in chapter 
one are achieved were also considered within this section of the work. Listed items include 
the issue of most favoured nations, promotion of fair competition etc. The study shows the 
organization has traded a tortuous path to attain its present status, which, at present has 
resulted in the organization controlling a significant proportion of international trade. 
As petroleum and natural gas are the chief export products of Qatar, the organization helps to 
create markets for Qatar, as the major obstacles to trade were dismantled, which made Qatar's 
oil much more marketable. The MFN treatment considerably eased discrimination, and 
quantitative restrictions on Qatari products were removed. This, the later part of the study 
will reveal, has enabled Qatar to surpass Indonesia as the world's major supplier of natural 
gas, and most Eastern countries are importing from Qatar since the country has been able to 
access more markets. The contribution of the energy sector towards the attainment of WTO 
goals was addressed and it has shown how subsidies, investments and technology transfer are 
vital tools for the attainment of WTO objectives. The mechanisms in place designed to 
guarantee protection from unfair competition among the developing countries, proved to be 
of benefit to the Arab world through their WTO membership. WTO strategies for the Arab 
world, which the Arab countries need to consider, were also be addressed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: QATAR'S POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the analysis of the previous chapter by addressing the various policies 
being utilized by Qatar in order to maintain economic relationships with its trading partners. 
This will bring to light how the WTO membership has assisted Qatar in developing legal 
instruments to address issues which will enhance economic development through trade. An 
example of these instruments is the most favoured nation (MFN) concept, which aims to 
discourage discriminatory practices. The crux of the research is to ascertain whether, since 
becoming a WTO member, the economic activities of Qatar have been significantly 
influenced by the WTO rules and regulations or not. The chapter will also address the issues 
of success or failure of the policies. 
The chapter begins with analysing how the main principles of the WTO help Qatar, followed 
by a discussion of how Qatar met the objectives of the WTO in its policy for international 
economic relations. The main objectives of the WTO are to help trade flow smoothly, freely, 
fairly and predictably. One aim of this investigation is to enquire whether or not Qatar's 
macroeconomic variables have been influenced by its WTO membership, and if they have 
been influenced, in what direction; positive or negative. 
The economic relationships of a country centre on its international trade, foreign direct 
investments and capital flows. In this chapter, the researcher shall present and discuss the 
Qatar's regional trade, the production and the supply side of the Qatar's economy, aggregate 
expenditure analysis, international trade activities and foreign investments. The supply side 
of the economy here means Qatar's population, the real output and the capital formation, 
while the demand side refers to the aggregate expenditures of the economy. 
In the regional and international trade analysis, the researcher will identify the trading 
partners of Qatar and analyze the trade distribution of Qatar. That is, we want to establish the 
pattern of Qatar's trade distribution. The study shall also discuss Qatar's tax policies in 
particular and the economic laws of Qatar in general. To analyze the Qatar's economy, the 
study investigates changes in some relevant macroeconomic variables in each of the 
aforementioned topics, following the steps explained in the next section. Hence, as already 
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indicated, the objective is to know whether or not the economic activities of Qatar have been 
influenced by its WTO membership, and if they have been influenced positively. 
3.2. QATAR'S ECONOMY UNDER THE MFN PRINCIPLE 
The MFN principle which is made the cornerstone of the WTO agreements, as was 
previously explained, implies that Qatar must treat all foreign products and services equally. 
Qatar is not allowed to discriminate or favour the products or services of a particular WTO 
member without extending this treatment to all other members. The idea is to make all 
imports subject to the same regulations. This provides important assurances for foreign 
products, businesses, and services that they are not discriminated against in the Qatari market. 
Thus, the WTO membership benefits Qatar in the sense that it makes the market of Qatar an 
attractive place for foreign investors in different fields and sectors as these investors are 
guaranteed that they will entertain similar treatment with other countries. 
Also, the MFN principle could be looked at from the angle of Qatar being the exporting 
country. This implies that Qatar's exports and services to other countries are treated equally 
with other foreign products in external markets. If Qatar's exports suffer from any illegal 
discrimination and are placed at disadvantageous position or placed out of business in 
external markets due to unfair competition Qatar can resort to the multilateral dispute 
settlement system to regain its rights. 
However, the MFN principle is not too rigid as the WTO agreements entail some exceptions 
where Qatar can favour imports and services of some members without extending such 
discriminatory treatment to other countries. These exceptions can be found in Article 24 of 
the GATT and Article 5 of the GATS, which both permit WTO members to establish trading 
blocks or enter into free trade agreements. Through these special arrangements countries 
which are members to the particular FTA or trading blocks are able to provide each other 
with special and favourable treatment but without extending such treatment to other WTO 
members. This is the case with the GCC where Qatar is allowed to discriminate in favour of 
the products and services provided by the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, 
but without extending such favourable treatment to other countries. 
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3.2.1. Qatar's Economy Under the National Treatment 
There is, however, no concession with regards to the national treatment principle, which 
implies that Qatar is no longer able to provide its domestic products and services with special 
treatment. This is because doing so is against the obligations of national treatment. Thus, 
Qatar's domestic products and services must compete evenly against other imported products 
and foreign services. This is a big challenge for Qatar as a small developing country that 
seeks to promote its industries and products. 
However, this challenge should not be regarded as a negative aspect of the WTO 
membership, but rather as an important opportunity for Qatar to be a free market where 
competition is the driving force for its economy. Rather than being spoilt by the Government 
protection and acting as burdens on the Government budget, Qatar's domestic products and 
services would be able to compete, on their own account, against other foreign products and 
services. When this takes place, Qatar's economy would be sustainable and would be able to 
function via the forces of the free markets. Domestic businesses and corporations would be 
competitive and can survive not only in the national market but in other international 
markets. Qatar seems to have managed to achieve some development in this direction and the 
examples of Qatar Airways and Qatar Gas Company demonstrate. 
3.2.2. Reducing trade barriers and predictability 
In order to benefit from trade, Qatar should continue with its current open economic policies 
and seek further trade liberalisation and encourage more trade with other countries. This is 
simply because lowering trade barriers (such as customs duties, imports restrictions or quota 
applications) is one of the most important means of supporting trade and increasing its 
activities (WTO, 2007b). Qatar has already moved in this direction as only a5 percent tariff 
is applied on imports. 
Under the WTO, reducing trade barriers is the main objectives of the GATT and the GATS 
and other agreements (see Chapter Two). This reduction is stipulated in the main bodies of 
these agreements as well as in the schedules of commitments. As is discussed earlier, the 
multilateral trading system seeks to make the business environment in the markets of WTO 
members stable and predictable. When countries agree to liberalise trade and reduce barriers 
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and open their markets for foreign goods and services, they `bind' their commitments. For 
goods, these bindings mean that customs tariffs can not go beyond the bound level stipulated 
in the country's schedule. As a member of the WTO, Qatar is subject to such commitments as 
stipulated in its schedule. Qatar can only change these commitments through negotiating with 
other trading partners, a process that may oblige Qatar to compensate these countries for loss 
of trade. Qatar is obliged to make its schedules of commitments under WTO agreements in 
the public domain (see Victoria, 1991). 
Hence, the schedules give foreign investors the necessary information about a particular 
market and help assess their market opportunities in that market. Also, as it is made very 
difficult to change the commitments stipulated in members' schedules, foreign investors can 
establish clear plans about their investment objectives in a particular country (Centre for 
Trade and Development, 2007). This is another benefit of WTO membership to Qatar. 
3.3. ANANLYSING QATAR'S ECONOMY AND TRADE IN LIGHT OF ITS WTO 
MEMBERSHIP 
The analysis of Qatar's economic and trade performance in relation to its WTO membership 
is carried out in nine steps. The first step is analysing Qatar's real GDP per capita before and 
after joining the WTO in 1996. The second step evaluates Qatar's trade activities, 
performance, components, and main trading partners. The third step focuses on the analysis 
of the supply side of the economy of Qatar. The fourth step looks into the demand side of the 
economy. The fifth step analyses the cost of living in Qatar as an important factor for 
investors and consumers. The sixth step looks into foreign investment issues. The seventh 
step focuses on Qatar's tax regulations. The eighth step describes the main legal provisions 
applied in Qatar that have direct effect on trade and investment in Qatar's economy. The ninth 
step analyses Qatar's economic and trade policy from the perspective of the WTO. In all of 
these aspects, the researcher attempts to link the performance of Qatar's economy to the WTO 
membership. 
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3.3.1 First step: Analysing Qatar's GDP 
3.3.1.1. Qatar's GDP before joining the WTO (1980-1995) 
Official statistics, as demonstrated in Table (3.1), show that the real GDP of Qatar per capita 
remained steady throughout most of the period from 1980 to 1995 at a level of around QR 
30,000 (Qatar Business Directory, 2009). The only exception was in 1986 when this value 
declined noticeably to less than QR 20,000, perhaps mainly due to the sharp decline in oil 
prices in international markets during this period (Qatar Directory, 2009). However, the 
annual increase in the level of the GDP, as is shown in Table 3.1 below witnessed sharp 
declines from 31.4 percent in 1980 to as low as -17.9 percent in 1986. However, the increased 
level of the GDP started to witness some modest improvements after that, albeit with some 
exceptional declines as in 1991 and 1993 where this declined reached to -6.5 percent and -5.9 
respectively. 
Table 3.1: Qatar's real and annual GDP growth before WTO accession 
Year Real GDP per capita 
(QR) 
Annual change in real GDP 
per capita percent) 
1980 28631 31.4 
1981 31527 10.1 
1982 27652 -12.3 
1983 23542 -14.9 
1984 25008 6.2 
1985 22398 -10.4 
1986 18393 -17.9 
1987 19825 7.8 
1988 21979 10.9 
1989 23616 7.4 
1990 26792 13.4 
1991 25056 -6.5 
1992 27832 11.1 
1993 26183 -5.9 
1994 26843 2.5 
1995 29622 10.4 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2007). 
-65- 
3.3.1.2 Qatar's GDP after joining the WTO (1996-2006) 
Unlike the period before 1995, there has been a more significant and rapid overall increase in 
the real GDP per capita since Qatar's membership in the WTO. Compared to 1995, total GDP 
increased by 547.8 percent in 2006 to almost QR 192,000. These results confirm that GDP 
has significantly increased since Qatar's membership to the WTO, and an overall positive 
influence of this global organisation to Qatar's economic activity (Trade Policy Review 
Report by Qatar, 2005). Hence, it can be argued that GDP has been influenced by Qatar's 
WTO membership to a great extent as a result of the trade policies enacted. These policies 
were framed to promote the economic growth of the private sector following membership. 
Objectives of the aforementioned policies range from economic resilience, competitiveness, 
and diversification, to forming improving the investment conditions in the market. 
Contents of trade policies include free trade by reducing tariffs and reductions as mentioned 
earlier within the policies and also promoting multiple usages of free trade agreements 
(FTAs) (Trade Policy Review Report by Qatar, 2005). Per capita GDP growth as highlighted 
in table 3.2 below has been increasing over the years since Qatar's WTO membership in 1996 
to 2006 on an average by 19.5 percent per year. GDP per capita increased by 21.6 percent in 
2003 as opposed to a marginal increase of 9.2 percent in 2002, and additionally according to 
the Trade Policy Review Report in Qatar (2005), the oil and gas, and non-oil and gas sectors 
rose by 12.9 percent and 3.2 percent respectively. 
Nevertheless, it may also be argued that the overall performance of the economy and the 
improvement of Qatar's GDP cannot be solely attributed to Qatar's membership to the WTO. 
Although the latter has played an important role in improving the economic and legal 
environment for businesses to effectively function in Qatar, the substantial improvement of 
exports of oil and gas was the most important direct factor for the overall improvement of 
Qatar's economy. In this respect, it is important to emphasise that oil and gas exports are not 
affected by WTO membership, as there are no import duties by consuming countries on 
energy. However, there are domestic taxes on oil and gas in the countries to which Qatar is 
exporting, but these are matters of domestic policy outside the remit of the WTO. 
Also worth-noting is the volatility of oil prices in conjunction with reductions in oil reserves, 
prompting government to diversify investment into non-oil sectors of the economy and also 
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capitalise on the substantial reserves of Qatar's natural gas. To sum it up Qatar has been 
seeking to diversify its revenues by reducing its reliance on oil export revenues, although a 
significant portion of GDP still remains very dependent on oil revenues. 
Tables 3.2: Qatar's real and annual GDP growth after WTO accession 
Year Real GDP per capita 
(QR) 
Annual increase in real 
GDP per capita percent) 
1996 32976 11.3 
1997 41124 24.7 
1998 37330 -9.2 
1999 45111 20.8 
2000 64646 43.3 
2001 64579 -0.1 
2002 70500 9.2 
2003 85700 21.6 
2004 115500 34.8 
2005 154600 33.9 
2006 191900 24.1 
Source: Ministry of Business and "Trade in Qatar, 2UU7 
3.3.1.3 Summary and Forecast of Qatar's GDP growth rate 
Zawya (2008) forecasts GDP to grow by 14.3 percent and 13.5 percent in 2008 and 2009 
respectively, and by 11.5 percent on average per annum, in article related to Qatar published 
on March 13,2009. Qatar is also mentioned in the article as the most rapidly growing 
economy among the GCC, largely because of its LNG industry as increased capacity leads to 
increased exports. Regarding its output, as natural gas condensates rise, petrochemicals 
increase. The extension of the financial services and construction industries also led to 
increased demand which boosts economic growth as a result. Additionally, exports are 
predicted to rise as Qatar plans to invest over $90bn in its gas sector by 2012 raising its 
capacity to almost 1.1 million barrels per day. Hence, Qatar's over reliance on oil exports 
should reduce significantly once oil production reaches peak levels by 2010 in conjunction 
with the continuity in rising condensates' exports and the growing production of low-sulphur 
diesels. LNG and condensates are expected to account for 54 percent of Qatar's hydrogen 
exports, whilst crude oil will decline to 24 percent. Furthermore, it is suggested that the 
government is most likely to remove the obstacles on the current greenfield gas projects by 
2010 (initialized in 2005), leaving much room for brand new projects. 
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Additionally, fiscal surpluses are likely to be registered in 2008 by the government; which 
will enable it to continue to increase expenditure. However, inflationary pressures have arisen 
with the rate reaching 11.5 percent as a result of restrictions on capacity, rising rents, 
amplified demand and increased wages. Inflation is expected to decrease in 2009 as supply- 
side pressures are reduced. The risk of a deterioration of geopolitical conditions in the region 
and/or lower oil and gas prices are highlighted as potential unfavourable factors. Geopolitical 
conditions have remained stable, but oil and gas prices should revive once global recovery 
comes. 
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Table 3.3: Qatar: Macro Data and Forecasts 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* 
GDP 
Nominal GDP ($Bn) 23.2 32.1 42.4 52 63.8 74.1 89.4 
Real GDP percent) 6.5 6.5 9 9.6 13.8 14.3 13.5 
Expenditure on GDP percent Real Chan e 
Private consumption 6.4 33.6 28.3 16.0 14.5 12.5 10.0 
Government consumption -1.1 -3.7 12.5 10.0 8.5 8.2 8.1 
Gross fixed investment 84.3 3.1 51.0 12.5 12.7 10.1 8.8 
Population and income 
Population (Mn) 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.2 
GDP per capita (nominal $) 33,141 45,850 53,192 61,173 70,884 78,157 74,569 
Recorded unemployment (av. 
percent) 
2.5 2 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Fiscal indicators percent of GDP 
Central Government Revenue 35.4 47.9 42.4 42.3 44.1 43.2 38.8 
Central Government Expenditure 31.5 31.4 31.2 33.6 34 34.9 32.2 
Central Government Balance 3.9 16.5 9.2 9.7 7.5 8.3 6.6 
Net Public Debt 41.3 27.9 19.5 15 12.7 11.2 9.8 
Prices and financial indicators 
Exchange rate R/$ (end-period) 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 
Consumer prices (end-period 
percent) 
2.5 7.1 8.9 12.8 12 11.5 9.8 
Broad money supply M3 5 20.8 42.9 39.6 43.3 35.1 29.7 
Lending Interstate Rate (av. 3 
percent) 
4.7 4.9 6.4 7.3 7.7 7.7 8.1 
Current account $Bn 
Goods exports 14.7 20.7 27.4 38.8 50.3 65.6 79.3 
Of which: crude oil 7.5 9.7 14.1 17.8 22.7 26.1 24.8 
LNG and related exports 4.6 6.5 8.7 13.3 18.2 20.8 19.9 
Goods imports 6.7 8.3 13.3 21.3 26.7 36.4 48.1 
Current account balance 5.9 7.1 14.2 16.4 22.3 27.5 30.2 
External debt ($Bn) 
Debt stock 13.4 15.6 22.4 28.6 33.1 39.5 44.6 
Debt service paid 3.9 1.9 2.8 3.1 3.8 4.1 4.8 
Principal rea ments 3.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.6 
Interest 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.7 
International reserves ($Bn) 
Total international reserves 3.0 3.4 4.6 5.4 10.2 11.9 12.4 
Net foreign assets ($Mn) 
Qatar Central Bank 2,873 3,359 4,555 5,410 6,496 7,398 8,102 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008b). ° 
*forecast. 
8 Central Bank data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former is used in this thesis as it is a country 
study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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3.3.2 Second step: Qatar's trading activities 
Qatar is a high-income country. It had a GDP per capita of US$ 70,884 in 2007, and ranked 
47`h out of 177 countries on the UNDP Human Development indicators. The economy of 
Qatar, as already indicated, heavily relies on petroleum and gas, which, together, accounted 
for 56.1 percent of its GDP. Hence, trade is the backbone of Qatar's economy; it has to trade 
with the outside world in order to improve its wealth and subsequently raise the standard of 
living for its citizens. Exports form, on average, 54 percent of the GDP of Qatar, while 
imports form an average 32 percent of the GDP over the researcher's observation period of 
1980-2007 (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2008). Table 3.4 below illustrates the development of 
Qatar's trade activities (exports and imports) for 27 years (1980-2007). In 1980 Qatar's 
exports as a percentage of GDP registered a high level of 75 percent, due to the 
unprecedented increasing boom in oil exports. However, this percentage steadily dropped in 
the following 10 years to 45 percent in 1995 (the same year when the WTO was established). 
However, Qatar's imports as a percentage of GDP increased progressively from 28 percent in 
1980 to 45 percent in 1995, thus reflecting the increasing integration of Qatar's trade 
activities with the global economy. With the increasing level of exports, particularly of oil, 
gas, and petrochemicals sectors, Qatar's exports as a percentage of GDP increased 
substantially from 45 percent in 1995 to reach 71 percent in 2007. On the other hand, 
however, imports as a percentage of GDP decreased sharply from 45 percent in 1995 to 28 
percent in 2002, but increased in 2007 to 36 percent. 
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Table 3.4: Trade activities (imports and exports) of Qatar (1980-2007). 
Year Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP 
1980 75 28 
1981 68 29 
1982 60 37 
1983 55 36 
1984 56 30 
1985 51 30 
1986 40 32 
1987 41 31 
1988 39 29 
1989 42 29 
1990 52 31 
1991 49 32 
1992 50 35 
1993 46 34 
1994 45 33 
1995 45 45 
1996 45 40 
1997 49 38 
1998 51 40 
1999 60 27 
2000 68 22 
2001 66 29 
2002 60 28 
2003 61 29 
2004 64 29 
2005 69 33 
2006 70 34 
2007 71 36 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008a), Ministry of Business and Trade (2007). 9 
3.3.2.1 Qatar's main exports 
Qatar's main exported products are: 
" Petroleum and Related Products 
" Gas- Natural and Manufactured 
" Chemicals and Related Products: plastics, fertilizers and others 
" Iron and Steel and Related Articles 
" Others 
" Re-Exports 
9 Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
-71- 
Therefore, Qatar's economy thrives on exporting the fuels that power the engines of world 
industries, with fuels constituting 89.3 percent of the total Qatar exports. This clearly shows 
that Qatar has demonstrated the main objective of the WTO, which is to `help trade flow 
smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably' (WTO, 1995b). 
Table 3.5: Qatar's oil exports 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Oil exports (thousand, 
barrel/day) 
602.2 607.6 754.1 701.4 689.0 
Values petroleum 
exports (million $) 
8,814 11,694 17,585 24,290 27,801 
Total values of exports 
(million $) 
13,193 18,426 25,339 30,595 37,962 
Oil / total exports (%) 66.8 63.4 69.3 71.3 73.2 
Source: OPEC (2008e), Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2008. 
As Table 3.5 above shows, oil exports increased from 602.2 thousand barrel per day in 2003 
to 607.6 thousand barrel per day in 2004, and further jumped to 754.1 thousand barrel per day 
in 2005. However, oil exports declined to 701.4 thousand barrel per day in 2006, with a 
further decline in 2007 to 689 thousand barrel per day. As a result, the values of petroleum 
exports increased from U. S. $ 8,814 million in 2003 to $11,964 million in 2004, and then to 
$17,585 million in 2005. Although the quantity of Qatar's daily oil exports declined in 2006 
and 2007, the values of these exports increased to $24,290 million in 2006 and then to 
$27,801 million in 2007. This is attributed to the substantial increase in oil prices in 
international markets during this period. This ultimately meant that the crude oil production 
of Qatar constituted a high percentage of Qatar's total values of exports during these periods. 
In 2003, the crude oil production constituted 66.8 percent of the total values of exports, which 
reached to 73.2 percent in 2007 due to the high increase in oil prices internationally. 
When looking at Qatar's total exports as a percentage of total GDP, as is demonstrated in 
Table 3.6 below, we find that these exports witnessed noticeable fluctuations during the 
period 1999-2004, registering the highest increase of around 66 percent in 2000 which 
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dropped dramatically to 56 percent in 2002. However, these exports, as a percentage of total 
GDP, witnessed almost steady performance for the period 2005-2007. 
Table 3.6: Total Export (FOB) as % GDP 
Total exports (fob) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
as % of GDP 65.28 61.28 55.71 56.70 65.67 60.67 59.98 59.15 
Source: Embassy of Qatar in Washington D. C., (2005) and IMF (2009) 
Therefore, one can realise that the total exports as a percentage of total GDP has levelled at 
60.5 percent on average over these periods, highlighting just how crucial Qatar's exports are, 
contributing over half of GDP on an annual basis. Even with WTO membership, export levels 
have fluctuated slightly, but still remained at significant levels. 
Another way of analysing Qatar's exports is by looking at its total exports as a percentage of 
non-oil GDP. Table 3.7 below shows that Qatar's total exports -- as a percentage of non-oil 
GDP -- fluctuated during the period (1999-2007), registering its peak in 2004 of around 173 
percent. However, this percentage declined in the subsequent years and reached around 136 
percent in 2007. Total exports have always outweighed non-oil GDP, a testament of Qatar's 
rather low non-oil GDP, highlighting as mentioned earlier, that the bulk of Qatar's GDP is 
concentrated within Qatar's oil and gas sector. 
Table 3.7: Total Export (FOB) as % of Non-Oil GDP 
Total exports (fob) as 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% of non-oil GDP 164.97 142.51 128.84 137.73 173.51 150.06 440.9 9136.02 
Source: Embassy of Qatar in Washington D. C., (2005) and IMF (2009) 
As far as Qatar's destination markets are concerned, the US and Europe have only a limited 
share in Qatar's exports, with the majority of Qatar's exports going to Asia, with Japan and 
the Republic of Korea topping the list of the recipients of Qatar's exports (Qatar Central 
Bank, 2007d). Over-reliance on Asia increases the destination risk of the exports. From 1998 
to 2003, its trade surplus with the world increased 4.64 fold. In 1998, Japan topped the 
countries with which Qatar maintained a trade surplus, followed by the Republic of South 
Korea and Singapore, and this ranking did not change in 2003 (Qatar Central Bank, 2005). 
This indicates that Qatar's trade activities are in accord with the Breton Woods Agreements, 
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which was designed as an integrated effort by the international community to encourage trade 
liberalization and multilateral economic cooperation. 10 
3.3.2.2 Qatar's imports 
Qatar's main imported products: 
9 Base Metals and Mechanical Appliances 
9 Vehicles and other transport equipment 
" Cement, Iron Ore, Earth and Stones 
9 Food Products 
" Optical, Photographic and Measuring Equipment 
" Textiles and Textile Articles 
" Furniture 
9 Aircrafts and Parts 
" Plastics and Related Articles and Others 
Statistics, as demonstrated in Table 3.8 below, show that Qatar's total imports as a percentage 
of total GDP increased gradually over the years. This percentage was as only 16.5 percent in 
2000, which then increased in the following year (2001) to around 19 percent. However, this 
percentage decreased slightly in 2002 and 2003 by around 0.5 percent. After that it increased 
significantly until it reached around 28 percent in 2007, which demonstrated the increasing 
interaction of Qatar's economy and its trading activities with external markets. As Qatar's 
exports have increased in recent years so have its imports, which reflects the increasing level 
of openness of Qatar towards international markets, mirrored in Qatar's WTO membership 
(see the section below on Qatar's economic openness). 
Table 3.8: Total Imports (FOB) as % of GDP 
Total imports (fob) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
as percent of total 
GDP 
16.50 19.08 18.52 18.69 19.01 21.35 26.09 27.90 
Source: Embassy of Qatar in Washington D. C., (2005) and IMF (2009). 
10 See Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Amendments on Supplementary Financing Facility of the I. M. F. 8 Int'l 
Legal Materials 137 (1979). 
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As is the case in the exports analysis above, one way of analysing Qatar's imports is by 
examining its total imports as a percentage of non-oil sector GDP. It can be realised from 
Table 3.9 below that Qatar's total imports as a percentage of non-oil sectors GDP increased 
gradually from around 40.69 percent in 2000 to reach a high level of 64.17 percent in 2007. It 
is interesting to note that this percentage did not witness any decline during the analysis 
period (2000-2007), as it kept increasing from one year after another. This further supports 
the above-mentioned views that Qatar's economy and trade have become increasingly 
integrated in the international economy, not only in regards to its oil and gas exports, but also 
in relations to its imports, which further reflects the increasing level of the openness of 
Qatar's economy. 
Table 3.9: Total Imports (FOB) as % of Non-Oil Sectors GDI' 
Total imports (fob) as 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
percent of non-oil 
sector's GDP 
41.69 44.38 42.84 45.41 50.23 52.79 60.93 64.17 
Source: Embassy of Qatar in Washington D. C., (20U5) and IMF (2UU9). 
It is also important to note that trade statistics for 2007 shows that the U. S. ranked number 
one in Qatar's import lists by (13.3 percent), followed by Italy (10.8 percent), Japan (8,9 
percent), Germany (7.3 percent), the UK (5.7 percent), and South Korea (5.6 percent). Qatar's 
neighbour, UAE, ranked number five in Qatar's list of imports by 5.1 percent, while Saudi 
Arabia ranked sixth (4.3 percent) (see Table 3.10 below). All these figures provide important 
indications about Qatar's economy in relation to its trade activities. Firstly, the figures 
demonstrate the increasing integration of Qatar's economy in the international trade, as many 
of its imports come from internationally remote markets. Secondly, they also exhibit the 
diversification aspect of Qatar's imports, as they are not concentrated on one country but 
diversified amongst different powerful economies. Thirdly, the geographical proximity factor 
does not seem to be a determinant factor for Qatar's imports, as the regional economies of the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia are not major exporters to Qatar, despite being members of the GCC. 
In short, all these factors demonstrate the fact that Qatar's economy has become more 
internationally orientated in the last few years. 
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Table 3.10: Qatar's main imports partners for 2007. 
Imports Partner Imports (%) 
United States 13.3 
Italy 10.8 
Japan 8.9 
France 7.9 
Germany 7.3 
United Kingdom 5.7 
South Korea 5.6 
United Arab Emirates 5.1 
Saudi Arabia 4.3 
Source: Index Mundi, Qatar Imports - Partners, 2008. 
3.3.2.3. Economic openness 
The economic openness of Qatar's economy is driven by international trade as it averaged 
around 85 percent per annum of GDP over the observation period (1980-2007), which 
implies that only around 15 percent of the GDP is not related to international economic 
activities. Thus, it was not a matter of choice, but a must for Qatar to join the World Trade 
Organization. Table 3.11 below illustrates this point as it shows that Qatar addressed the 
central question underlying the WTO objectives by wisely responding to pressures falling on 
the WTO system, while ensuring the preservation of a trading system which has led to 
unprecedented growth. It is interesting to note that the level of openness of Qatar's economy 
reached its peak in 1980, thus reflecting Qatar's endeavour at that time to construct itself as a 
modern country and attract foreign investments from different parts of the world to help build 
its infrastructure; roads, schools, government buildings, and hospitals. Although this very 
high level of openness witnessed some declines in the following years, it continued to be 
substantially high as it kept fluctuating between 97 percent to around 72 percent during the 
period (1981-1999), which demonstrates very clearly the liberal aspect of Qatar's economy 
both before joining the WTO and after. The level of openness of Qatar's economy witnessed 
consistently steady increase from 2000-2007, registering the highest level of 107 percent in 
2007. These figures clearly reflect the unswerving aspect of the openness of Qatar's economy 
from one year after another based on its adherence to free trade and WTO principles. 
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Table 3.11: Economic openness of Qatar 
Year Level of openness (% GDP* 
1980 103 
1981 97 
1982 97 
1983 91 
1984 86 
1985 81 
1986 72 
1987 72 
1988 68 
1989 71 
1990 83 
1991 81 
1992 85 
1993 80 
1994 78 
1995 90 
1996 85 
1997 87 
1998 91 
1999 87 
2000 90 
2001 95 
2002 88 
2003 90 
2004 93 
2005 102 
2006 104 
2007 107 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008a), Ministry of Business and Trade (2007)U 
* Note: Exports + Imports / GDP 
3.3.2.4. Qatar's trade in the last few years (2005-2007) 
Table (3.12) below demonstrates the excellent performance of the economy of Qatar during 
the period (2005-2007). For example, GDP grew at a high rate of 33.8 percent and 33.7 
percent in 2005 and 2006 respectively. But, this growth rate declined to 12.5 percent in 2007. 
The share of the oil sector grew at a rate of 46.3 percent in 2005 but then declined in 2006 to 
28.6 percent and then to 9.3 percent in 2007. The Government's total revenues reached 
QR64,984 million in 2005 which further increased to QR84,998 million in 2006 due mainly 
to the sharp increase in the oil and gas prices in international markets during this period. As a 
" Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
-77- 
result, the Government registered notable surplus of QR14,151 million in 2005 which 
increased to QR18,642 million in 2006. However, the data for 2007 indicate a deficit of 
QR727 million due to the increase in Government expenditure from QR50,833 million in 
2005 to QR69,987 million in 2007. 
A similar trend is witnessed in regards of trade balance which was in favour of Qatar 
throughout the three years (2005,2006, and 2007). The total exports increased from 
QR93,773 million in 2005 to QR123,945 million in 2006 and further to QR135,760 million 
in 2007. As indicated above, this increase was mainly due to the increase of oil and gas 
prices in international markets. The increase of Qatar's exports was also accompanied by a 
noticeable increase in imports from 32,992 to 53,911 and then to 72,158 in 2005,2006, and 
2007 respectively, which demonstrates the increasing level of Qatar's economy interaction 
with the outside world. 
Takle 3.12: Main indicators of the economy of Oatar (2005-20071 
Year 2005 2006 2007 
Population 888,451 1,041,733 1,226,211 
GDP R million) 154,564 206,644 232,485 
GDP Growth Rate percent) 33.8 33.7 12.5 
Oil Sector Share percent) 59.6 57.3 55.7 
Oil Growth Rate percent) 46.3 28.6 9.3 
Non-Oil Sector Share percent) 40.4 42.7 44.3 
Non-Oil Growth Rate percent) 18.8 41.1 16.8 
GDP per Capita R Thousand) 174.0 198.4 189.6 
CPI - Inflation percent) 8.81 11.84 13.76 
Public Finance 
Total Revenues R million) 64p984 84,998 69,260 
Total Expenditures R million) 50p833 66,356 69,987 
Deficit or Surplus R million) 14,151 18 642 -727 
Deficit or Surplus/ GDP percent) 9.2 9.0 -0.3 
Balance of Payments 
Trade Balance (QR million) 60,781 70,034 63,602 
Exports (FOB) R million) 93,773 123p945 135,760 
Imports (FOB) R million) -32,992 -53,911 -72,158 
Current Account (AC) (QR million) 27,234 34,430 20,831 
CA/GDP percent) 17.6 16.7 9.0 
Capital & Financial Account (QR million) -4,321 -20,339 19,171 
Overall Balance R million 16,319, 19,800 20,831 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, Periodical Statistical Bulletins (June, 2008a). " 
12 Central Bank data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former is used in this thesis as it is a country 
study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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In light of the above analysis of Qatar's exports and imports, it can be realised that Qatar 
membership in the WTO has had significant impacts on its international activities such as 
imports and exports ranging from oil and gas products to services such as travel, 
transportation, finance, to real estate as mentioned further in section 3.10.6. International 
transport in the form of maritime, air, or land such as Qatar Airways and other forms of 
international activities exist within Qatar's distribution system. This system also includes 
telecommunications. The exports and the openness trends have become steeper after the 
WTO membership than before; while the imports have become flatter after the membership 
than before as highlighted in illustrations previously; probably due to the fact that the 
diversification of Qatar's revenue base, a feature of WTO policy, have been well adopted, 
which involves reducing a heavy reliance on oil. Diversifying into other sectors directly 
reduces imports because it would include producing more items that would normally have 
been imported. This shows that Qatar's membership in the WTO has improved and boosted 
its international trade activities. This is a good conclusion for the membership of Qatar in the 
WTO since Qatar's economy is on average 85 percent dominated by international trade 
activities. 
3.3.3. Imports and non-oil GDP 
The above-mentioned results are backed up by the regression analysis carried out by the 
researcher to determine the extent to which Qatar's economy has been influenced by WTO 
membership. This analysis is provided in Appendix C, which demonstrates that the 
performance of the economy of Qatar has improved following the integration of Qatar's trade 
activities with the global economy via WTO membership. Specifically of interest is the 
relationship between imports and non-oil GDP. Qatar's export sector contributes only 
marginally to employment creation, but imports result in business opportunities for Qatari's 
and significant employment creation. Qatar's domestic economy is consumer orientated and 
retail establishments are owned by local citizens, and although at present many of the 
employees are expatriates, in the longer term a thriving retail sector creates employment 
opportunities for local citizens. Import liberalization should therefore be viewed positively, 
and WTO membership has facilitated this liberalization. 
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A regression run with non-oil sector GDP as the dependent variable and imports as 
percentage of GDP as the independent variable shows a significant figure of 0.133. The 
analysis of variance with the degree of freedom of I on the regression shows that the non-oil 
sector and the imports as percentage of GDP has a high positive correlation, as the linear 
graph shows on page 2 of Appendix C. 
The second regression, which is a normal p-p plot regression standardized residual, is the 
expected cumulative probability on the observed cumulative probability. The standard 
deviation is 0.949, similar to the previous result as the graphs are bell shaped, and not stewed. 
The regression line shows a high relationship between the two variables. 
Although oil and gas GDP is not directly related to Qatar's membership to the WTO, there 
would appear to be on impact an non-oil and gas GDP. The regression shows that Qatar's 
WTO membership has been of immense benefit in promoting trade and therefore responsible 
largely for the improved economic performance the country has enjoyed. For further details, 
see the Tables 3.13 and 3.14 below and Appendix C. 
Table 3.13: Imports and non-oil GDP 
Model Description 
Model Name MOD 
-4 Department Variable 1 Non-oil sector GDP 
Equation 1 Linear 
2 Growths 
Independent Variable Imports as % of GDP 
Constant Included 
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in 
Plots Unspecified 
a. The model requires all non-missing values to be positive. 
Table 3.14: Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Decendent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Equation Model Summa Partner Estimates 
R Square F dfl Df2 Sig. Constant 61 
Liner 
Growth . 
942 
. 923 
97.859 
72.157 
1 
1 
6 
6 . 
000 
. 000 
7.619 
3,095 
2.043 
. 039 
The independent variable is Imports as % of GDP 
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3.3.4. Third Step: Supply Side Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the real output, population and capital formation of the Qatar. It is 
a supply side analysis in the sense that we have assumed real output is determined by capital 
and labour. Although employment data is not available, the population variable used here is 
to substitute for the labour variable. 
As is explored in the analysis on trade activities (exports and imports), the economy of Qatar 
is dominated by crude and gas production, which are, in turn, driven by the demand for oil 
and gas. That is, the higher the demand for oil and gas products, the higher the investments 
into oil and gas production, and the higher the economic output of Qatar. The investments, 
which, in turn form the capital, could be more relevant for the determination of Qatar's real 
economic output than Qatar's labour force. Thus, investments alone which lead to oil and gas 
production will determine the aggregate supply of Qatar's economy. The real GDP of Qatar 
over the period 1980-2007 witnessed some fluctuating growth. Before 1994, the economy 
exhibited unstable situations of recession and substantial economic downturn; that were 
clearly reflected in the very low level of real GDP growth. However, from 1993 onwards this 
level started to improve registering the highest 18 percent rise in 1996. But, this percentage 
declined in the subsequent years due to the decline of oil prices in international markets. The 
level of real GDP growth witnessed noticeable but fluctuating improvement from 1997 
onwards (Table 3.15 below). 
-81- 
Table 3.15: Real GDP growth rate 
Year Real GDP growth 
1980 7 
1981 -4 
1982 0 
1983 3 
1984 -1 
1985 4 
1986 1 
1987 4,7 
1988 5 
1989 3 
1990 .0 ,8 
1991 10 
1992 -0,9 
1993 3 
1994 4 
1995 5 
1996 18 
1997 12 
1998 5 
1999 8 
2000 3 
2001 7 
2002 4 
2003 21 
2004 6 
2005 10 
2006 12 
2007 15 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008a), Ministry of Business 
and Trade (2007). 13 
The growth rates before 1994 were negative of the time, while after 1994 the lowest growth 
rate was 3 percent. In 2007, the real GDP growth was 15 percent. As investment is a key 
determinant of GDP growth, Table 3.16 examines per capita GDP growth and per capita 
investment growth. 
1' Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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Table 3.16: Real per capita GDP and per capita investment 
Year Per capita GDP growth rate Per capita investment growth rate 
1980 -0,8 -- 
1981 -11 2 
1982 -13 27 
1983 -5 -30 
1984 -10 -31 
1985 -7 -15 
1986 -6 -20 
1987 0 -18 
1988 0.2 7 
1989 -1 -1 
1990 -3 30 
1991 8 -3 
1992 -3 17 
1993 0 -4 
1994 2 32 
1995 4 31 
1996 17 28 
1997 9 21 
1998 1 -21 
1999 5 -32 
2000 -3 45 
2001 0 11 
2002 -3 28 
2003 12 18 
2004 1 27 
2005 7 42 
2006 10 44 
2007 13 43 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2U08a), Ministry of Business and Trade (2007). " 
The per capita capital formation has demonstrated high variations. The per capita investment 
growth had a lowest rate change in 1999 at negative 32 percent. It had an average rate of 
change of 7.35 percent and a standard deviation of 24.11 percent over the period of 1980- 
2007. Looking at Table 3.16 above, we can see that the capital formation were very unstable, 
and that substantial increases in the capital induce small changes in the real per capita GDP. 
In fact, the per capita GDP growth reached its highest level in 1996 when it registered 17 
percent. However, it then sharply declined in the following six years to a negative 3 percent 
in 2000. This decline was due to a substantial decrease in the energy prices in international 
markets around that time which also coincided with the increase in Qatar's population. 
Nevertheless, as Qatar's energy exports (oil, gas, and petrochemicals) improved substantially 
14 Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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and their prices became higher in international markets, the per capita GDP growth increased 
in the period 2001-2007 to register 13 percent in 2007. A similar fluctuating trend is 
witnessed in regard to the per capita investment growth in Qatar. The best result was 
achieved in 2000 when the per capita investment growth registered a high level of 45 percent. 
However, this percentage dropped sharply in the following year 2001 to 11 percent. But, a 
noticeable improvement is observed for 2003-2007. 
To conclude the supply side analysis, it can be determined that the real GDP has been 
growing following the increases in investments. To induce even small changes in the real 
GDP, the capital formation has to increase substantially. The increases in the population 
have, in many instances, have eaten away the growth rates of the per capita GDP. 
3.3.5. Fourth Step: Demand Side Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the demand side of the economy of Qatar. This demand side 
constitutes the components of nominal GDP, and they are, from the national accounts, 
consumption expenditures, investments, Government purchases and net exports. From this 
analysis, we shall observe and derive insights from the behaviour of Qatar's aggregate 
demand. 
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Table 3.17: Nominal GDP and Consumption 
Year Nominal GDP growth rate Consumption growth rate 
1980 10 -- 
1981 -12 20 
1982 -14 9 
1983 7 -3 
1984 -10 4 
1985 -18 -4 
1986 9 -2 
1987 10,2 18 
1988 8 0 
1989 14 19 
1990 -5 -3 
1991 10,3 7 
1992 -5 8 
1993 3 0 
1994 10 -5 
1995 11 19 
1996 25 -5 
1997 -10 4 
1998 21 1 
1999 42 1 
2000 -1 3 
2001 10 0 
2002 21 31 
2003 35 9 
2004 34 43 
2005 36 42 
2006 37 43 
2007 38 45 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008a), Ministry of Business and Trade (2007), 
Qatar Business Directory (2009). '5 
Consumption and nominal GDP have, on average, grown at an approximately similar rate of 
8 percent per annum (Table 3.17). Both variables (consumption and nominal GDP) witnessed 
fluctuating ups and downs for the period 1980-2003. However, they both witnessed 
substantial and steady increase from 2003 onwards; thus reflecting a more stable relationship. 
While government purchases are the major driving force of the nominal GDP, it has only 40 
percent of the time having growth rates higher than that of the nominal GDP. Again, we 
observe that the investments which contribute to capital formation to a great extent determine 
the economic output of Qatar. As is demonstrated in Table 3.18 below, Government 
consumption increased substantially from QR11,783 million in 2002 to QR33,614 million in 
2007. This is due to the increase in Government's developmental projects which became 
15 Central Bank, Ministry of Business and Trade, and Qatar Business Directory data is not always consistent 
with IMF data, but the former is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than 
making inter country comparisons. 
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more feasibly to carry out as a result of substantially improved energy prices in international 
markets. The increase in Government consumption witnessed a parallel significant increase in 
the Government investments during the same period (2002-2007) from QR4,122 million in 
2002 to QR29,703 million in 2007 (see Table 3.18). 
Table 3.18: Government Consumption and Investment 
In million Qatari Riyals 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Government consumption 11,783 13,197 15,094 17,769 30,088 33,614 
Government investment 4,122 4,475 6,995 15,468 17,550 29,703 
Source: IMF (2009). 
The net exports have been in surplus for the observation period (2002-2007). This surplus 
began to soar after 1998. That is, foreign exchanges generated by the exports have been 
contributing positively to the aggregate demand of Qatar; the net exports have shown an 
average annual percentage change of 38 percent; from QR24,320 million in 2002 to 
QR88,133 million in 2007 (see Table 3.19 below). This gives Qataris high purchasing power 
to finance their increasing demand for goods and services, which justifies the increasing 
Government consumption and investment as discussed above. 
Table 3.19: Net Exports in million Qatari Riyals 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Net exports in million 
Qatari Riyals 
24,320 29,225 44,925 58,728 63,732 88,133 
Source: Qatar Economic Review (2008) 
3.3.6. Fifth Step: Cost of Living 
In this section, the researcher discusses and analyzes the issue of the cost of living in Qatar's 
economy by analysing the inflation rate from 2004 onwards. Table 3.20 below clearly 
demonstrates that the inflation rate in Qatar has increased from one year after another. In 
2004 the inflation rate was 6.8 percent, which was already high. This percentage increased to 
8.8 percent in 2005, and then to 11.8 percent. In 2006 and 2007, the inflation rate increased 
further to 13 percent and 15 percent respectively. These high rates were attributed to the high 
increase in the prices of international commodities and the unprecedented increase in oil 
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prices, which reached the highest of $150 per barrel. Hence, ironically, while Qatar earned 
high revenues from oil exports, as is demonstrated in table 3.5 above, during the period 2004- 
2007, this period witnessed an unprecedented increase in the prices of commodities, which 
has become at the expenses of those living in Qatar. This has ultimately meant that living in 
Qatar has become very costly. It also demonstrates the increasing interlinks between Qatar 
and international economy. 2009 and 2010 are projected by the IMF to witness a substantial 
decrease in the inflation rate in Qatar to 9 percent and 8.4 percent respectively. This is mainly 
due to the sharp decrease in oil prices in international markets which is expected to continue 
in the remaining months of 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, whether such estimation will be 
realised in the immediate future remains to be seen. 
Table 3.20: Inflation rate of Qatar 
Year Inflation 
2004 6.8 
2005 8.8 
2006 11.8 
2007 13.8 
2008 15.0 
2009* 9.0 
2010* 8.4 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, 
Washington, May 2009. 
Note: * Projected. 
The effect of oil and gas prices on inflation in Qatar is largely indirect however, rather than 
being through commodity price increases. When oil and gas revenue increases, government 
spending rises, generating demand driven inflation. The inflation results from supply 
constraints, especially in the real estate sector. However, in 2008 and 2009 as oil and gas 
prices fell, and government expenditure was constrained and real estate prices started to fall, 
reducing inflation. 
3.3.7. Sixth Step: Foreign Investments 
The annual inflow of foreign investments into Qatar was below $50 million for the period 
from 1970 to 1991. From 1992, the inflows began to peak, and also became highly 
fluctuating and erratic. They increased from $100 million in 1995 to $300 million in 1996. 
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They continued rising to over $400 million in 1997. This phenomenon with regards to 
increases and jumps in the FDI inflows were then followed by plummeting falls from $400 
million in 1997 to just $110 million in 1999 (Qatar Central Bank, 2008a). The inflows then 
again began to rise, hitting $631 million in 2002, before again dropping down to $400 million 
in 2003. Over the period of 1991-2003, the FDI inflows averaged $240 million but with 
considerable fluctuations (see Table 3.21 below). 
Table 3.21: FDI inflows into Qatar (1991-2003) 
Year FDI inflows into atar U. S. million) 
1991 30 
1992 34 
1993 70 
1994 120 
1995 100 
1996 300 
1997 410 
1998 350 
1999 110 
2000 260 
2001 300 
2002 631 
2003 400 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2007). 
More recent data for the period (2004-2007) demonstrates that the FDI flow into Qatar 
jumped to much higher levels than the previous period, with the exception of 2006. To 
elaborate, in 2004 the FDI inflow into Qatar registered $1,199 million which then increased 
to $1,298 million in 2005 but dropped in 2006 to $159 million, before taking off again in 
2007 to register $1,138 million. This proves that Qatar has managed to promote itself as an 
important destination for foreign investment (see Table 3.22 below). 
Qatar has not only depended on the inward FDI flows into its territory, but sought to utilise 
its surplus revenues from oil and gas production to diversify its investment in international 
markets, which helps Qatar integrate itself in international economy. In 2004, Qatar's outward 
investment registered $438 million but this investment decreased to $352 million in 2005 and 
to $127 million in 2006. This was perhaps due to Qatar's policy to intensify its revenues in 
local projects and domestic infrastructure. However, Qatar's outward investment rocketed to 
an unprecedented level of $5,263 million in 2007, which reflects Qatar's determination of 
being an important key player in the international community. It can be noticed that the 
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outward investment of Qatar in 2007 was much higher than the inward FDI flows into Qatar's 
territory for the same year ($1,138 million) (see Table 3.22 below). 
Table 3.22: FDI flows for Qatar (inward and outward) for 2004-2007 
Detail FDI flows (million US$) As a percent of gross fixed capital 
formation 
Year 1999-2000 (anu/av) 2004 2005 2006 2007 1999-2000 (annu/av) 2005 2006 2007 
Inward 169 1,199 1,298 159 1,138 6.2 9.1 1.0 5.4 
Outward 11 438 352 127 5,263 n/a 2.5 0.8 24.8 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2008) 
Furthermore, Qatar's share in the FDI inflows into West Asia remained fairly stable, as Table 
3.23 illustrates, and very low - below 2 percent of the total FDI inflows in West Asia - for 
the period of 1971-1993. After 1993, Qatar's share in the FDI inflows into West Asia started 
to soar, reaching 10 percent of the total FDI inflows in Western Asia in 1997. However, this 
percentage fell down in 1998 and 1999 to 8 percent and 6 percent respectively. This period 
coincides with the substantial decline in oil prices in international markets. But as the price of 
oil started to increase, the FDI into Qatar as a percentage of total FDI inflows into West Asia 
started to rise as well, with the latter period (2005-2007) witnessed the highest FDI inflows 
into Qatar of over 30 percent of the total FDI inflows into West Asia (see Table 3.23). This 
very high level of FDI during the 2005-2007 period reflects the increasing investment in 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, which has resulted in Qatar's becoming the world's 
largest LNG exporter. 
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Table 3.23: FDI inflows into Qatar as a% of the total FDI inflows into West Asia 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2008a); Ministry of Business and Trade (2008). 16 
Year FDI inflows into Qatar as a% of the total FDI 
inflows into West Asia 
1971 2 
1972 4.2 
1973 0 
1974 1 
1975 1 
1976 0 
1977 0 
1978 0 
1979 0 
1980 0 
1981 0 
1982 0 
1983 0 
1984 0 
1985 0 
1986 0 
1987 0 
1988 0 
1989 -2 
1990 0 
1991 0 
1992 1 
1993 1 
1994 1 
1995 8 
1996 7.5 
1997 10 
1998 8 
1999 6 
2000 11 
2001 17 
2002 7 
2003 17 
2004 10 
2005 30 
2006 32 
2007 34 
The above analysis on foreign investment demonstrates that Qatar has become an important 
destination for foreign investment from different countries around the world. Also, Qatar's 
outwards investment has increased in recent years, which reflects the fact that Qatar has 
16 Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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managed to establish itself as an important economic player in international context, not only 
as one of the major exporters of liquefied natural gas but also as a big investor. Hence, 
because of these realities, Qatar had great interests to be a member of the WTO. This is 
because of several important factors. Firstly, as an exporter of oil and gas products, Qatar has 
the interests that its exports gain market access to external markets without being harmed by 
discriminations or strict protective measures from importers. Members' Schedules of 
Commitments for goods and services under the GATT and the GATS respectively that are 
published in the WTO website, provide Qatari businesses with the necessary information and 
details about all WTO members' commitments. These include, as in the GATT, tariffs and 
non-tariff commitments. And, as in GATS, the types of services and level of market access 
that each member permits services suppliers from other WTO members to provide in its 
territory. Being aware about each member commitments under the WTO is important for 
Qatari businesses and their exports. It is this predictability aspect of the multilateral trading 
system is what should make Qatar supportive to the WTO. 
Secondly, if it has been proven for Qatar that its exports have been affected as a result of 
discriminatory measures applied by importers, it has the rights to complain to the WTO and 
resort to the well-structured dispute settlement to safeguard its interests. It is important to 
note in this context that Qatar has never been involved in any disputes against any other 
WTO member, either as a complainant or as a respondent. This can be perceived both as a 
positive and a negative signal. As a positive signal, it implies that Qatar has been 
implementing its obligations and applying the non-discriminatory principles effectively. 
Thus, there is no complain has been made against Qatar since its accession to the WTO in 
1996. As a negative indication, the non-involvement of Qatar in the dispute settlement of the 
WTO implies that Qatar perhaps has not fully understood and utilised the advantages of the 
multilateral dispute settlement. Given the increasing interactions with the world economy 
through trade activities (exports and imports), Qatar's exports may suffer from some 
discrimination in international markets. In other words, with the increasing interaction with 
the world economy, it becomes more likely that Qatar enters into trade disputes with other 
countries. Hence, it is important for Qatar to be aware of the details of the dispute settlement, 
its functionalities, and the technical and legal assistance that it is entitled to receive from the 
WTO as a developing country. With more interactions with the world economy, this 
awareness about the WTO dispute mechanism becomes even more important. 
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Thirdly, the Doha Round with its Development Agenda (DDA) provides Qatar with the 
opportunity to lobby for further opening of international markets towards investments coming 
from developing countries as well as encouraging developed countries to allow financial 
inflows into developing countries. This can be carried out by building coalitions with other 
developing countries and in particular those of the GCC, which share similar interests of 
Qatar. In its report to the WTO - prepared for the Trade Review in 2005 - Qatar made this 
point very clear, as paragraph 56 of the report states that: "Qatar has called on developed 
countries to liberalize trade at a faster rate by removing the various obstacles that have so far 
deprived the developing countries of their right to enjoy international trade relations on equal 
opportunities. Moreover, Qatar has indicated that there should be agreement on specific 
measures to ensure efficient financial flows to developing countries, especially FDI, to assist 
in building the production capacity they need to compete on the world market" (WTO, Trade 
Policy Review by Qatar, 2005a). 
3.3.8. Seventh Step: External Economic Relations, Tax and 
Other Economic Laws of Qatar 
Qatar policy for international external economic relationships centres around five objectives, 
which are liberalization of the economy and trade, reduction of tariffs, alignment of its 
standards with WTO commitments, export diversification and access to the world market. 
The country has taken various calculated steps towards achieving these five objectives, 
Legal instruments that back up trade practices are already in place and working. What are 
these instruments? A legal framework has been created for the purpose of promoting trade 
and economic liberalization. There are ten laws which constitute the legal framework for 
trade activities in Qatar, laws which have been developed to be sustainable, pragmatic and 
transparent. Tariffs have also been dramatically reduced to 5 percent; a rate which applies to 
each of its trading partners indiscriminately except in relation to the members of the Gulf Co- 
operation Council. Qatar has realized its WTO commitments of removing restrictions which 
are not in line with WTO Agreements. 
To access the world markets and promote economic cooperation and integration with 
different countries, Qatar has adopted several measures. Prominent among these measures is 
the establishment of a Custom Union with the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council in 
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2003, the establishment of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area in 2005, the preparation to 
institute a free trade agreement with the United States, and the preparation to institute similar 
arrangements within the European Union. Efforts are also underway to establish Free Trade 
Areas with Singapore, China, India, Pakistan and Australia and MERCOSUR. 
The realization of these detailed measures will offer Qatar unlimited access to the world 
market and integrate Qatar's economy into the world economy. An example of Qatar's 
pragmatic economic laws is the Income Tax Laws, which are enshrined in the Decree-Law 
No. (11) of 1993. The law provides definitions in Chapter One, where a tax-payer is defined 
as `any natural or judicial persons subject to taxation in accordance with the provision of this 
law, and the taxable year is defined as `a period of twelve months starting from the first day 
of January and ending on the thirty-first of December of the same year'. Thus, the taxable 
year is not just any 12 months of activity. This chapter also defined the taxable income as `the 
remaining income from the gross income after deducting all expenditures and costs, in 
compliance with the provisions of this law'. 
Chapter Two of the law illustrates the sources of income, and eight different sources of 
income were identified. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, computation of taxable income 
was explained and specified, and also specified tax deductible and non-tax deductible 
expenditures for the computation of taxable income. Qatar does not take any income tax from 
individuals either nationals or foreigners. This, in itself, makes Qatar a very attractive 
destination for foreign people to work in. 
Chapter Six of the Income Tax Law of 1993 specifies tax exemptions. The tax exemption 
Committee receives and studies applications for exemption from income tax. There are tax 
laws offered to investments, particularly small and medium-scale industrial projects. These 
projects can have 5 years exemption from income tax, exemption from customs duties on 
equipment, machinery and spare parts, in addition to the remittance of profits and funds 
outside the country. These exemptions are provided for under the Law No. 19 of 1995 on the 
Industrial Organization. Chapter Seven sets the procedures for Appeal while Chapter Eight 
specifies the offences and penalties, and Chapter Nine finally presents the general provisions. 
In addition, another law that deals with the tax legal aspects in Qatar is the Tax Law No. (9) 
of 1989. This law deals with the parity of citizens of the Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation 
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Council in taxation matters. It states in Article (1) of the Law No. (9) of 1989 that `Citizens 
of the Arab states of the Gulf Co-operation Council shall receive reciprocal treatment as 
Qataris so as to realize parity between them in taxation dealings upon practicing their 
permissible economic activities including the free crafts and profession in compliance with 
the Unified Economic Agreement and the Resolutions of the Supreme Council of the Arab 
States of the Gulf Co-operation Council, and Laws issued in execution thereof. That is, what 
Qataris receive in the Arab States of GCC is what the citizens of Arab States shall receive in 
Qatar as far as taxation is concerned. It is important to mention that Law No. (6) of 1991 
exempts some foreign companies dealing with the ministries of Defence and Interior from the 
income tax. Tax policies of Qatar are clear and easy to interpret and implement, and the laws 
are friendly and conducive to promoting economic activities in Qatar. 
The economic environment in Qatar is becoming freer and more conducive to trade. The 
Heritage Foundation ranked Qatar's economy as the world's 72`' freest economy in 2007; 
and the economy is on average 60.7 percent free. This provides a promising indication about 
Qatar's endeavour to take the necessary steps to open up its economy and liberalise trade 
which are the ultimate objectives of the WTO. Among the 10 indicators of economic 
freedom, the fiscal freedom topped the list, it was 99.9 percent. Qatar has no corporate tax on 
Qatari companies, which are 100 percent owned by Qatari nationals. Qatar does not levy 
wealth taxes or consumption taxes. 
Qatar's monetary and fiscal policies have been perceived by different global institutions to be 
amongst the most liberalised in the world. However, investment freedom in Qatar has been 
perceived as quite protective. This is perhaps because foreign investments require local agent 
representation and some sectors -- apart from agriculture, industry, health, education, tourism 
and properties in natural resource development -- limit foreign ownership with prior approval 
to 49 percent. For investment, foreign holdings are restricted to 25 percent of the issued 
capital of almost all is listed companies on the Doha Securities Market. This is perhaps to 
allow Qatari investors the opportunity to remain in business and not to be superseded by 
foreign investors. However, such protective policy is not in line with the free trade and open 
economy principles. During the discussions of its Trade Policy Review Report on 21 and 23 
February 2005 Qatar was urged by different WTO members to further open up its economy 
and increase foreign investment in Qatar's enterprises. For instance, Canada asked Qatar to 
continue its economic "reforms, including on tariffs and privatization, and further 
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improvement of Qatar's multilateral commitments on goods and services". Canada further 
added that: " services were crucial in Qatar's economic diversification, and showed particular 
potential given its efforts to become a regional centre for specific services like health, 
education, sports tourism, and air transport" (WTO, Trade Policy Review: Qatar, Minutes of 
Meeting, 2005e, paragraph 36). 
Similar comments were made by Japan which expressed its hope that Qatar would continue 
to further liberalize its banking, insurance, and commercial sectors, in which foreign 
investment was excluded. Japan added that Qatar "had room for further commitment; for 
example, it had not tabled an initial offer on services, and was neither a signatory nor an 
observer to any of the WTO agreements". (WTO, Trade Policy Review: Qatar, Minutes of 
Meeting, 2005e, paragraph 40-41). Hence, Japan is urging Qatar to start negotiating 
membership to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which is a plurilateral 
agreement that only applies to its signatories. If this took place it would mean that Qatar 
would have to open the procurement of its government entities to foreign suppliers and 
would no longer be able to favour its national suppliers. Thus, Qatar has to establish a clear 
strategy about all of these issues as pressures from other WTO members are expected to 
increase in the Doha Round negotiations. 
Hence, it can be realised that although Qatar has enacted and implemented different 
economic laws to propel its economy into high gears of economic modernization and to be in 
tandem with its WTO membership, much work needs to be done as further liberalisation is 
required. The legal and institutional framework of Qatar have to be continuously shaped and 
refined so as to make Qatar as a committed member of WTO. As is explained above, Qatar's 
liberalisation efforts already seem to be paying its dividends in terms of increased foreign 
direct investments, the increased role of manufacturing sector in the economy of Qatar and 
reduced dependence on crude oil sales. More importantly, Qatar's economy has become 
increasingly open and free, making its economy a highly attractive and competitive business 
to employ a local agent. But, as is indicated before, more liberalisation in important services 
sectors such as banking, insurance, telecommunications is required. This should not be seen 
as discrediting the already achieved liberalisation, but it is a recommendation to further 
enhance the efforts made in this direction. In other words, Qatar's economy is already 
credited and complimented for its transparent financial regulatory system which complies 
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with international standards but further liberalisation is required (Arab Political Systems, 
2005). 
3.3.9. Eighth Step: Foreign Trade Control: Legal Analysis 
How is international trade regulated in Qatar to ensure consistency with WTO obligations? 
This section seeks to discuss this important question by looking at the relevant regulations 
related to trade activities (imports and exports) in the legal system of Qatar's economy. 
3.3.9.1. Imports Regulations 
Pork and derived products are prohibited, while the imports of alcoholic beverages, firearms, 
ammunition and certain drugs are subject to licensing. Import licenses may be obtained from 
the Ministry of Business and Trade. But, what are the documents required of importers? 
These are discussed below. 
Import Documentary Requirements are as Follows: 
Commercial Invoice: 
Two original commercial invoices and at least one copy must be submitted. The exporter 
should check with the customer for the specific number of copies required. The invoice 
should contain a full description of the contents along with the name of the supplier and the 
consignee, quantity, marks and numbers of goods, origin of goods, accurate description of the 
merchandise, value of the goods, CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) or otherwise itemizing all 
expenses and the name of the vessel and the date of departure. The commercial invoice 
should be signed by the exporter or an authorized representative, and certified by the 
appropriate chamber of commerce (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). 
Certificate of Origin: 
The original and one copy of the certificate of origin. The latter should indicate the name and 
address of the manufacturer or the producer of goods, as well as the name of the vessel, 
which is required for shipment to Qatar. Shippers must also include a notarized statement 
certifying the document to be true and correct. Exporters should contact their importers to 
ascertain the number of document copies required. The appropriate chamber of commerce 
must certify the certificate of origin, which must also be legalized by a consular service 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). 
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Bill of Lading: 
There are no regulations specifying the form or number of bills of lading required for 
shipments. Bills of lading should show the name of the shipper, the name and address of the 
consignee, port of destination, description of the goods, the listing of freight and other 
charges, the number of the bills of lading in the full set, the date and signature of the carrier's 
official acknowledging receipt on board of the goods for shipment. The information should 
correspond with that shown on the invoices and the packages. Expenses are generally paid in 
advance. The airway bill replaces the bill of lading on an air cargo shipment (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2008). 
Pro Forma Invoice: 
If required, a pro forma invoice stamped and signed by the supplying company or the 
exporter must be submitted. The delivery period and validity of the quotations must be 
indicated. The serial numbers of the goods mentioned in the invoice must conform to the 
numbering system of the Qatari government order sheet. 
Having explained the main regulations related to imports, the section now turns to look at the 
exports regulations requirements in Qatar's Commercial law. 
3.3.9.2. Exports Regulations 
Exports Documentary Requirements are as Follows: 
Insurance Certificate: 
The insurance companies supply the insurance certificate. When the exporter carries out the 
shipment, the insurance certificate must state that the insurance company is not included in 
the so-called `black list'. This insurance must be certified by the appropriate chamber of 
commerce and presented to the consular section of the embassy for legalization. Qatari 
offices require the original and one copy, and then the original will be returned to the shipper. 
Steamship Company Certificate: 
The Steamship Company supplies the steamship certificate. It must state that the ship is not 
an Israeli vessel and will not call at any Israeli port. The appropriate chamber of commerce 
must certify this certificate, which must be presented to the embassy for legalization. Qatari 
offices require the original and one copy, and then the original will be returned to the shipper. 
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Health Certificate: 
Shipments of frozen foods must be covered by an inspection certificate in duplicate which 
has been issued by the health authorities of the country of the origin. Imports of plants and 
plant materials must be coupled with an official health certificate stating that they are free 
from diseases. The legalization of the certificate is compulsory, and the original is returned to 
the shipper. 
Phytosanitary Certificate: 
Two phytosanitary certificates are required for the shipments of flour, rice, wheat seeds and 
other agricultural seeds. The legalization of the phytosanitary certificate is compulsory, and 
the original will be returned to the shipper 
3.3.9.3. Other Formalities and Documents: 
The legalization of the certificate of origin costs $42. When the value of a shipment exceeds 
$274,725, the legalization fee is 0.4 percent of the merchandise value while the legalization 
of the commercial contract costs $28 (Ministry of Business and Trade, 2007). 
Labelling: 
Labelling in Arabic and English is recommended for products entering Qatar. Food 
containers must show the country of origin, the name and address of the exporter, the name 
and kind of commodity, the net weight of contents, the date of packaging (day, month and 
year), and the name and address of the consignee. 
Marking: 
All identifying marks - including the consignee's marks and port's marks - must be clearly 
inscribed on the packages in order to facilitate the arrival of the shipment. Packages should be 
marked legibly. 
Packing: 
Goods should be packed securely to withstand rough handling and pilfering. 
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Having explained the relevant regulations of Qatar's trade activities (imports and exports) in 
Qatar's legal system, the discussion now turns to focus on the financial sector and the 
regulations that affect this sector in Qatar. 
3.3.9.4. Financial Regulations of Foreign Trade Operations: 
Exchange System 
The Central Bank of Qatar is the exchange authority. The value of Qatari Riyal has been 
pegged to the U. S. dollar at a fixed rate of US$1= 3.6415 QR since the mid-1980s (Qatar 
Central Bank, 2009). This has provided Qatar's economy and trade with the necessary 
stability and security that are required for Qatar's economic development. Being pegged to 
the most important currency in the world (U. S. $), the Qatari Riyal has enjoyed a strong 
reputation in international markets and helped Qatar gain strong confidence of foreign 
companies to invest in Qatar and use the Qatari Riyal as the means for their financial 
transactions and exchange rates. This trust and confidence are what helped Qatar move 
forward in implementing its ambitious projects in different sectors. Also, the strong linkage 
with the U. S. dollar has helped Qatar market its exports of oil, gas, and petrochemicals 
effectively and helped the Qatari Riyal to become a strong currency in international trade. 
Methods and Means for International Settlement 
There are no payment restrictions in place for authorized imports, and foreign exchange may 
be freely obtained from authorized banks. There are no maximum or minimum credit terms 
on import payments. 
3.3.9.5. Customs Taxation: 
Applicable Duties and Taxes 
Customs Duties: 
The Government maintains lists of goods which are subject to higher taxes to protect local 
industries and of goods exempt from duties. Steel imports are dutiable at twenty per cent; 
those of alcohol and tobacco vary between thirty and fifty per cent. 
Fifteen products are exempted from customs duties: live animals, poultry and birds, fresh 
fruit and vegetables, trees and roots, sowing seeds, food for cattle, natural fertilizers, Portland 
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cement, raw sand, stones and clay, basic food products (rice, wheat, sugar, milk, flour, oil), 
printed matters, school books, marketing and advertising articles, unrefined gold and silver, 
and natural pearls not originating from the Gulf. 
Preferential Duties: 
Qatar is member of the Arab League Trade and Payments Agreement, which apply 
preferential tariffs among member states. Preferential tariffs are also applied between Qatar 
and the GCC countries. This is in line with the second foundation stone of the GATT, 
`national treatment'. This is stipulated in Article III that, internal taxation and domestic laws, 
regulations and requirements, imported products shall be accorded treatment `no less 
favourably' than that accorded to domestic products. While the MFN applies to all policies, 
national treatment is applicable only to non-discrimination of imports, and not exports. In 
other words, a state can also impose higher taxes on products for export than for domestic 
consumption (see Pauwelyn, 2001). An example of this is that exporting countries could 
exempt oil and gas surpluses in accordance with Article VI: 4. 
3.3.9.6. Special Provisions 
Samples of no commercial value are imported duty-free. Customs inspectors are not required 
to accept the value of merchandise as declared on documents presented by the importer for 
assessing customs duties. 
Foreign Trade Logistic: 
What auxiliary role does transport plays in the economy of Qatar? 
International Transport: 
Maritime Transport: 
The main ports of Qatar are the following: Doha port (General Cargo), Umm Said port 
(industrial and oil products) and Ras Laffan port. Most of them are deepwater ports and are 
provided with berths. Besides, most containers enter from Dubai. 
Air Transport: 
The international airport is located in Doha, 6km from the city. The national airline company 
is Qatar Airways, which has expanded rapidly in the last few years and become an 
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internationally competitive airline. Qatar Airways operates a hub and spoke network linking 
over 80 international destinations; thus playing an important role in Qatar's outwards 
economic and trade openness and helping integrate Qatar into the global economy. Qatar 
Airways has expanded average of 35 percent annual growth for the last ten years and has 
orders for more than 200 aircraft worth over US$30 billion. Qatar Airways will operate a 
fleet of 110 aircraft by 2013, i. e. almost double the existing size (Qatar Airways, 2009). It 
has become one of the only five airlines worldwide to have been awarded a 5-star rating by 
Skytrax, an independent aviation industry monitor, besides Kingfisher Airlines, Cathay 
Pacific, Asian Airlines, Malaysia Airlines, and Singapore Airlines (Qatar Airways, 2009). 
Other airlines serving Doha International Airport include Air France, Air India, Alyemda, 
Balkan, Binan, Bangladesh, British Airways, Egyptian Airlines, Iran Air, KLM, Kuwait 
Airways, MEA, PIA, Royal Jordanian, Saudi, Sudan Airways, Syrian Arab, TWA and 
Yemeni, as well as budget airlines based in the GCC. 
However, it is useful to highlight that the airline market in Qatar is still strongly monopolised 
by Qatar Airways. Much of the government businesses are conducted via Qatar Airways, 
even though the latter's services are more expensive than other regional airlines. Not only 
that, but Qatar Airways has for long enjoyed strong encouragement and financial support 
from the government. Increasingly substantial amount of government investments have been 
put into Qatar Airways to develop it and qualify its operations as a competitive international 
airline that is capable of surviving in very competitive international airline markets and being 
able to secure substantial profits. Such government investments, as is indicated above, are in 
line with the government diversification objectives. Nevertheless, the monopoly of Qatar 
Airways of the airline market in Qatar and the very supportive aid programmes of the 
government do not go along with Qatar's WTO obligations and its liberalisation objectives. In 
fact, they seem to contradict the free trade and open economy principles that Qatar claims to 
be adhering to. 
Therefore, the researcher argues that the Government of Qatar should endeavour to make a 
more liberalisation effort in the airline market by reducing its shareholding in Qatar Airways, 
decreasing its financial help and other aid programmes. There are many advantages that can 
be achieved from doing that. Firstly, such liberalisation will bring new competitive players in 
the market which will work for the benefit of consumers and will go in tandem with the 
establishment of the very ambitious new airport that is currently built in Doha and expected 
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to finish after few years from now. Secondly, Qatar Airways will have to learn how to 
compete effectively against other players and operate on the basis of non-discriminatory 
principles, as required by the WTO. Thirdly, reducing government reliance will help achieve 
sustainability as Qatar Airways will become able to survive and operate on its own without 
being backed up by the government. Fourthly, reducing government financial aids and 
liberalising the airline market are in line with WTO objectives. Finally, the airline market will 
be released from the monopoly of Qatar Airways and will become more competitive. 
Because of all of that, Qatar is advised to break up the monopoly of Qatar Airways and allow 
the establishment of new national airline companies by joint investment between Qatari 
businesses and foreign investors. Such a tactic will not only be in line with the WTO 
obligations but will make Qatar's market more competitive, which will in the end help 
consumers and reduce the financial burden from the government shoulders. 
Land Transport 
The road network used to link Doha with two GCC neighbours: Saudi Arabia at Abu Samra 
and to the United Arab Emirates at Sauda Nathil. These direct connections helped Qatar's 
trade with GCC countries. The direct border with the UAE at Sauda Nathil was in particular a 
very useful gateway for Qatar's imports. Hence, the UAE border connections helped Qatar's 
integration with the outside world and kept road transportation costs competitive. 
Nevertheless, this is no longer the case at the present time, as the border with the UAE has 
been closed by Saudi Arabia. Some few years ago, Saudi Arabia claimed to have sovereignty 
over the Sauda Nathil border and the surrounding territorial area. As a result, the dispute 
ended up by the UAE giving away this area to the Saudis. Consequently, Qatar has lost its 
direct link with the UAE and it now only has one land border with Saudi Arabia. This means 
that all Qatar's exports and imports via land transports must come via Saudi Arabia. This has 
adversely affected Qatar's trade flows via land transport. Qatar has attempted to overcome 
this problem via intensifying its trade activities with outside world via sea and air, and it 
seems to have been quite successful in that, but if the direct land link to the UAE was re- 
opened it would save transit costs, even if the link continued to be through territory retained 
by Saudi Arabia. 
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Telecommunications 
Qatar is a member of Intelsat for international communications. Telephone, telex, fax, 
telegrams and broad band services are available in Qatar, with direct lines linking Qatar to 
more than 170 countries (Qatar Business Directory, 2009). Until recently, Qtel was 
monopolising Qatar's telecom market. However, the government of Qatar has decided to 
open up the telecom market and reduce the Qtel monopoly, which reflects its strong 
adherence to the principles of open economy and free trade. This has resulted in a licence 
being granted to Vodafone to provide mobile services in Qatar. As a result, the Vodafone 
Qatar Company was established which is a joint venture between different shareholders: 
Vodafone Group Plc, Qatar Foundation, Military Pension Fund, Military Staff Loan Funds, 
and Health and Education Endowment. In 2009,40 percent of the share capital of Vodafone 
Qatar was issued on the Doha Securities Market which was subscribed by Qatar private 
investors. Obviously, providing mobile services by an internationally well-known company 
such as Vodafone will benefit consumers as they will have more choices with lower prices. 
This should lead to healthy competition between Qtel and Vodafone Qatar. It will also benefit 
Qtel, as the national telecom provider, learns how to compete and survive in a real 
competitive environment without relying on the help of the Government. 
Distribution System 
The Qatari Government is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the country. The 
distribution network includes importers which supply the national market, wholesalers which 
carry out the distribution of imported products either to retailers or directly to consumers 
through their own points of sale, middlemen who receive a commission, and, finally, 
retailers. Such a distribution is gradually being oriented towards the creation of supermarkets 
and commercial centres. 
3.3.10: Ninth Step: Qatar's Economic and Trade Policy from the WTO Perspective 
Qatar's policy for economic relationship centres around five objectives, which are the 
liberalization of the economy and trade, reduction of tariffs, alignment of its standards with 
WTO commitments, export diversification and access to the world market. 
The Trade Policy Review of Qatar has provided a better understanding of its trade and related 
policies, and of the challenges it faces. The country report that was prepared by Qatar has 
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provided a useful opportunity for the domestic review of trade policies - and the 
comprehensive assessment by the WTO Secretariat has provided the Qatar Ministry of 
Business and Trade with a valuable reference. The dialogue with Qatar has further 
contributed to understanding through direct exchange between WTO members. Discusssions 
over Qatar's economic and trade policy between the WTO team and Qatar was stimulated by 
the full and open engagement of the high-level Qatari delegation led by I!. E. Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Ahmed bin Jassim Al-Thani, Minister of Economy and Commerce, as well 
as the insightful comments by the discussant, and the thoughtful interventions by other 
delegations. 
As is stated in the Trade Review Report on Qatar, WTO members, over the past few years, 
have commended Qatar for its impressive economic performance. This was perceived as a 
result both of its macroeconomic reforms and development strategies implemented since the 
mid-1990s, and of high oil and natural gas export earnings as from mid-1999. Members also 
appreciated Qatar's efforts to diversify its economy away from crude oil, and for ensuring 
intergenerational equity in the exploitation of its non-renewable resources, through health, 
education and infrastructure projects. Recent measures taken by Qatar to improve the 
business environment and liberalize its investment regime were also welcomed by WTO 
members, although some members such as Canada and Japan, as is previously indicated, 
noted that Qatar remains restricted in certain key activities, such as banking, insurance and 
commercial services, some of which continue to be dominated by public companies. 
The Review Report further indicated that WTO members appreciated Qatar's hospitality 
during the fourth Ministerial Conference - where the Doha Development Agenda was 
launched - and encouraged it to increase its participation in WTO activities, and to fully 
meet its notification requirements. Qatar's market for all products is quite open, and the bulk 
of its trade has taken place on an MFN basis. However, it was indicated that a slight increase 
in the protection of certain industries followed the application of the GCC common external 
tariff, although the tariff was fully WTO compatible. Concerns were also expressed about the 
imposition of a5 percent commission on imports from non-GCC trading partners of certain 
products, and the enforcement of the WTO provisions on customs valuation. 
Furthermore, some members asked about Qatar's intention to adopt legislation on 
contingency trade remedies and competition policy. They encouraged Qatar to amend its 
government procurement regime to remove, inter alia, the local agent requirement, and the 
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price preferences for domestic and GCC products. Members also sought further clarification 
on: preferential trade negotiations; import restrictions (prohibitions, licensing); incentive 
schemes and price controls; TBT and SPS measures; protection of intellectual property rights; 
agriculture (food security and state support); oil, natural gas and electricity (state intervention 
and further diversification); manufacturing ('Quality Qatarization' Programme); and services 
(GATS commitments, financial, telecoms, transport, and tourism). 
Members appreciated the responses provided by the Qatari delegation, including the 
clarifications provided with respect to customs valuation procedures. 
The Review Report concludes that Qatar should be encouraged to pursue the implementation 
of its already agreed economic reforms, including further improvement of its multilateral 
commitments with a view to enhancing the transparency, predictability, and the credibility of 
its trade regime, and adherence to the WTO principles. The Report further emphasises that 
Qatar should be helped by providing adequate technical assistance - including trade 
capacity building - and by further opening their market for products towards which Qatar is 
diversifying its exports. 
Therefore, the researcher argues that Qatar should consider the 2005 Trade Policy Review of 
the WTO as the basis of its future economic and trade strategy. The Report has raised both 
compliments and weaknesses. With the increasing of efforts of liberalisation and its 
endeavour to shift its economy more into a free and open one, Qatar's authorities should 
carefully study the content of the Report and work out the best means to achieve its 
recommendations. As the negotiations on the Doha Round is still continuing, Qatar has a 
great opportunity to link the Report's recommendations to the status of the negotiations in 
different areas: agriculture, non-agriculture, telecoms, banking, education, insurance, and so 
on. 
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3.11. CONCLCUSION 
This chapter reviewed Qatar's economic activities and performances, specifically focusing on 
Qatar's international trade and investments, regional trade, the production and the supply side 
of the Qatari economy, and aggregate expenditure analysis. Also covered were Qatari tax 
policies and the commercial laws. To analyze the Qatari economy, the chapter also 
investigated changes in some relevant macroeconomic variables in each of the 
aforementioned topics. 
It is clear that the economy of Qatar relies heavily on oil and gas, which, together, accounted 
for 56.52 percent of its GDP in 2007. As most oil and gas is exported rather than used for 
domestic consumption this implies that Qatar is therefore driven by international trade. Qatar 
however cannot control its export revenue, as this is largely determined by developments in 
international oil and gas markets. 
The WTO membership has, however, offered Qatar opportunities to diversify its exports 
destinations and increase its supply capacity. The exports and the openness trends have 
become more marked after the WTO membership than before, while the imports have 
become freer after the membership than before. This shows that Qatar's membership in the 
WTO has improved and boosted its international trade activities. 
Following the increases in the investments the real GDP has been steadily growing. It has 
been proven that, in order to induce even the smallest changes in the real GDP, the capital 
formation has to increase substantially. The increase in the population has, in many instances, 
eaten away the growth rates of the per capita GDP. The cost of living has risen substantially 
although this cannot be attributed to WTO membership. 
One of the accomplishments of this chapter is the examination of Qatar's performances in the 
implementation of the WTO trade policies. The five main policies, which are the focal points 
of the economy, are: the liberalization of the economy, reduction in tariffs tailoring the 
country's standard with WTO requirements, export diversification and access to the world 
market. The issue of treating other people and nations equally (MFN) contributed 
significantly towards Qatar's economic advance. 
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The diversification of the economy was made possible by the access it has to world markets, 
and trade has increased as Qatar has the opportunity to trade with more nations than ever 
before. Factors which determine the Qatar's trade were investigated, including real output, 
population and the capital formation in the economy. On the demand side, the national 
accounts, consumption expenditures, investments are among the determinants found to be 
influencing the demand for Qatar's exports. Both the supply and demand sides are, to a very 
large extent, beyond the control of Qatar hence its membership of the WTO, which has 
assisted in cushioning the effects of the substantial fluctuations which would have otherwise 
rocked the economy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: QATAR'S ENERGY SECTORS (OIL, GAS, AND PETROCHEMICALS) 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is specifically dedicated to analyse the three main essential components of 
Qatar's exports; namely oil, gas, and petrochemicals. Reference is made, wherever 
appropriate, to the relations of these three sectors to the WTO regulations. The chapter 
addresses how the various targets set out by the Government have been met and the degree of 
success attained. The sustenance and maximization of returns from gas reserves will show 
how Qatar is open to international investments as a direct result of its membership of the 
WTO. The factors affecting both short- and long-term demand for oil and natural gas in 
relation to the activities of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), is 
also an essential part of the analysis of this chapter. 
Therefore, the chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section explores the main 
WTO regulations that may affect Qatar's energy sectors (oil, gas, and petrochemicals). The 
second section looks into Qatar's oil production, exports, and reserves. A specific analysis of 
the activities of the OPEC, of which Qatar is a member, is also made in this section. The third 
section analyses Qatar's gas production, exports, and reserves. A specific analysis is made of 
the main factors affecting gas prices in international markets. The fourth section looks into 
petrochemicals as an important and growing sector in Qatar's exports structure. The section is 
concerned with the nature of this sector, its main components, and the enterprises involved. 
The fifth section looks into Qatar's energy sectors from the WTO perspectives and how 
Qatar's interests in these sectors could be promoted under the current Doha Round. 
4.2. WTO REGULATIONS IN RELATION TO QATAR'S ENERGY SECTORS 
The WTO agreements which are directly relevant for the cross-border energy trade include 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, the Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) Agreement and the Agreement on Government Procurement. 
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The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of the GATT applies to trade in energy and 
means that `like' energy products and materials cannot be discriminated against on the basis 
of their origin (imports) or destination (exports) in terms of customs duties, charges, or any 
import or export regulations and formalities. 
The national treatment requirements exist with respect to internal taxes and charges, laws and 
regulations. Internal taxes for imported energy material and products should not be higher 
than for like energy material and products of domestic origin. 
Quantitative restrictions are prohibited through Article XI. This prohibition equally applies to 
the energy trade. The most relevant exception from this prohibition for the energy sector is 
the provision that allows temporarily invoked export prohibitions in order to relieve critical 
shortages of products essential for the exporting country (WTO, GATT, 1995c). 
WTO members are able to use Article XX exceptions in order to introduce measures in 
pursuit of certain policy objectives, which would otherwise have been WTO-inconsistent. 
The measures under Article XX(b) need to be `necessary' in order to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, in order to be in line with the GATT. Article XX (g) allows measures 
`relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption' (WTO, 
GATT, 1995c) (see also Selivanova, 2007). 
Therefore, these WTO agreements should be reflected in Qatar's energy policy. Oil, gas, and 
petrochemicals are three great growth poles for the Qatar economy. It was crude oil sales 
which were powering and financing the economic growth of Qatar until very recently, when 
sales from the natural gas and petrochemicals began to contribute their part to the economic 
growth of Qatar. In 2005 Qatar has overtaken Indonesia to become the world's largest natural 
gas exporter. It now has one of the world's biggest natural gas reserves (Oil and Gas Journal, 
January 1,2007). 
The extraction of petroleum and natural gas has made a major contribution to Qatar's 
economy, resulting in the increase of gas-intensive industries over the years, such as 
petrochemicals and fertilizers. Simultaneously, the shares of agriculture and services have 
fallen. The country aims to become a leading power in world gas markets through its role as 
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the most important producer and exporter of both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and gas-to- 
liquids (GTL), and this movement looks to strengthen significantly in the future. However, 
other sub-sector services; particularly tourism and financial trade, are now being promoted in 
order to lessen the country's dependency on crude oil. 
Qatar Petroleum (QP), a state-owned corporation, is directly responsible for the management 
of oil, natural gas, as well as petrochemicals activities, and in some cases enters into joint 
ventures with foreign enterprises through production-sharing or development, as well as 
fiscal agreements. These practices are in line with the WTO rules, which are designed to 
address practices by state enterprises. In Article XVII of the GATT, members undertake to 
ensure that state trading enterprises act in a manner consistent with the general principles of 
non-discrimination as prescribed in the GATT for governmental measures affecting imports 
or exports by private traders. '? The main issue related to the obligations of the WTO 
members in the energy sector, lies in the conditions of energy transportation and, in 
particular, in third-party access to pipelines. 
The coverage of Article XVII is, however, not limited to state enterprises, and state 
ownership is not the main criteria. Most importantly, Article XVII applies to any enterprises 
that possess exclusive or special privileges granted by the state, `including statutory or 
constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales 
and/or the level or direction of imports or exports' (WTO, Para. 1 of the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT - 1994). 
Finally, it is important to state that the oil, gas, and petrochemicals sectors benefit from 
Qatar's WTO membership indirectly rather than directly. Specifically, the fact that Qatar is 
subject to international laws and regulations increases the confidence of oil, gas, and 
petrochemicals importers in supplies from Qatar. They are thus willing to invest in the 
development of Qatar's energy resources. In contrast, Iran, as an important oil and gas 
producer, is not a WTO member and does not abide by international laws and regulations 
regarding trade. Therefore, there has been minimal interest in recent years in the development 
17 Article XVII. 1(a) of GATT states: "Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a 
State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special 
privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for 
governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. " 
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of its oil and gas resources. In other words, WTO membership has made Qatar a more 
attractive destination for oil, gas, and petrochemicals investors and importers; an advantage 
that is not enjoyed by Iran, which is not yet a WTO member. 
4.3. QATAR'S OIL SECTOR 
Table 4.1 below shows total exports and estimated GDP alongside crude petroleum, natural 
gas, and others (non-oil and gas) within periods of 2001-2007; when Qatar has already been a 
member of the WTO. Regarding oil and gas, steady and significant increases have been 
witnessed during Qatar's membership of the WTO. To elaborate, Qatar's crude oil exports 
increased substantially from QR 20,422 million in 2001 to QR 58,171 million in 2006 and 
further to QR 69,820 million in 2007. This sharp increase is mainly attributed to the very 
favourable prices in international markets. The same trend is noticed in regards to natural gas 
exports which reached QR 53,859 million in 2007 in comparison with QR 14,921 million in 
2001 (Qatar Central Bank, 2006). 
Table 4.1: Total estimated GDP, exports, crude petroleum, natural gas liquids and 
others non- oil and gas 
Years (In 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 
Million Q1 Avg 
QRs) (Q 1X4) 
Total estimated 63,840 70,484 85,663 115,512 154,564 206,644 258,591 84,306 337,224 
GDP 
Total exports 39,571 39,960 48,711 68,012 93,773 123,945 152,951 N/A N/A 
(FOB) 
Crude 20,422 20,488 24,449 31,046 46,749 58,171 69,820 N/A N/A 
Petroleum 
Natural Gas 14,921 12,756 15,447 23,497 28,899 43,121 53,859 N/A N/A 
Liquids 
Others (Non- 3,625 5,963 8,125 12,619 16,585 20,224 27,346 N/A N/A 
Oil and Gas 
Sources: Qatar Central Bank (2008a), Ministry of Business and Trade (2008), '° 
A similar trend of increase is witnessed in regards to other non-oil and gas exports, albeit at a 
lower level. These exports were QR 3,625 million and then kept increasing noticeably every 
year until they reached QR 27,346 million in 2007. Hence, although the bulk of Qatar's 
18 Central Bank and Ministry of Business and Trade data is not always consistent with IMF data, but the former 
is used in this thesis as it is a country study using time series data rather than making inter country comparisons. 
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exports over the period 2001-2007 was dominated by oil and gas products; which reflects the 
huge reliance of Qatar's income on oil and gas, non-oil and gas exports show substantial 
improvement as well. 
However, as a percentage of total exports, Qatar's crude oil exports, as is demonstrated in 
Table 4.2 below, declined quite noticeably during the period (2001-2007). This parentage 
was 51.6 percent in 2001 but then kept declining at different fluctuating levels in the 
subsequent years to reach 45.6 percent in 2007. This decline can be seen as a positive 
indication for the success of Qatar to diversify its exports away from oil. However, despite 
this decline, crude oil exports still constitute a very substantial percentage of Qatar's overall 
exports and more efforts are required to reduce this reliance on oil and reach the overall 
diversification objectives. 
Table 4.2: Crude Petroleum as a% of total Exports 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Crude petroleum as a 
s % of total export 
51.6 51.3 50.2 45.6 49,9 46.9 45.6 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2008) 
The above results are also supported by Table 4.3 below which illustrates Qatar's crude 
petroleum as a percentage of total estimated GDP. This percentage was almost 32 percent in 
2001 but declined in the subsequent years at different fluctuating levels to reach 27 percent in 
2007; i. e. 5 percent different from 2001. This clearly demonstrates that Qatar's economic 
efforts have been driven towards reducing their dependence on crude petroleum as a main 
contributor to their GDP, although crude petroleum export levels have been increasing in 
absolute terms, especially since Qatar's membership of the WTO. In other words, there has 
been a positive correlation between total crude petroleum exports and total crude petroleum 
as a percentage of total estimated GDP. Hence, although crude petroleum is dominating total 
exports, with the WTO membership being partially responsible for this because of reducing 
barriers to trade, it is not the sole contributor to the economy as a whole. 
Table 4.3: Crude Petroleum as a% of total estimated GDP 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Crude petroleum as a 
% of total GDP 
31.99 29.07 28.54 26.9 30.25 28,15 27.0 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2008) 
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Furthermore, Table 4.4 below highlights a slightly more volatile movement in terms of total 
fuel activities as a percentage of Qatar's estimated GDP. Apart from 2003; which witnessed a 
steep reduction by 8.19%, there was a rejuvenated momentum in total fuel activities on GDP 
until 2006, before a 1.19% drop in 2007. Within the WTO objectives is the call for 
diversification which can be classed as expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services. By keeping maintaining these aforementioned figures at acceptable minimum levels 
whilst optimising GDP, Qatar can be viewed as meeting such objectives. 
Table 4.4: Total fuel output as a% of Qatar's Estimated GDP 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total fuel output as a% of 
Qatar's estimated GDP 
55.36 47.17 46.57 47.2 48.94 49.02 47,83 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2008). 
The petroleum in Qatar is produced through both onshore and offshore fields as well as 
through fields operated under long term agreements, in which QP has a share. The most 
important of these fields are Dukhan, Bul Kanine, and Maydan Mahzam. Table 4.5 below 
provides comprehensive details about Qatar's oil production, exports, reserves, and prices. 
Qatar's oil production increased substantially since its accession to the WTO. To elaborate, in 
1995 Qatar's oil production was around 390 thousand barrels per day, which kept increasing 
in the subsequent years. Perhaps, the only exception to this increasing trend is 2002 when oil 
production decreased to around 569 thousands barrels per day from around 633 thousands 
barrel per day in 2001. However, from 2003 onwards oil production witnessed steady 
increase and reached 845 thousand barrels per day in 2007. These increases are mainly the 
consequences of the exploration efforts carried out by Qatar and the application of advanced 
technology in oil production. 
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Table 4.5: Crude oil production, exports, reserves, and price, 1995-2007 
Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
OPEC 378 378 378 640 593 692 601 562 635 700 726 735 N/A 
Quota 
000b/d 
Production 389.8 393.1 405.1 618.1 608.5 648.2 632.9 568.9 676 755.3 765.9 802.9 845 
000b/d 
Exports 333 367 465 572.4 580,5 617.6 605.5 580.8 540.7 542.7 677.3 620.3 615,1 
000b/d 
Reserves 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 13,157 15,207 15,287 15,207 15,207 15,207 15,207 15,207 
(million 
barrels) 
Price 16.86 20.29 18.68 12.28 17,47 27.6 23.12 24.36 28.1 36.05 50.64 61.08 69.08 
US$/b 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin (2003 & 2007). 
As a result of the increase in oil production, Qatar's oil exports increased substantially. In 
1995 oil exports were only 333 thousands barrel per day, which kept increasing in the 
subsequent years reaching its peak of 617.6 thousands barrel per day in 2000. These exports 
then declined in the following three years reaching a level of 540.7 thousands barrel per day. 
But, this number then took off again quite noticeably until it reached around 615 thousands 
barrel per day; thus once again demonstrating the increasing importance of the oil sector for 
Qatar's economy. 
A similar increasing trend is witnessed in regard to oil reserves which were estimated to be 
3,700,000 in the period (1995-1999). This number increased substantially to over 15,000,000 
from 2000 onwards, thus providing a very promising picture about the continuous 
significance of oil sector in the future of Qatar's economic developments. In addition, Qatar is 
pursuing a rigorous investigation to increase its reserve base, so as to develop the lifetime of 
its petroleum reserves and increase its production capability. 19 
The above-mentioned increases in Qatar's oil production, exports, and reserves took place 
under very favourable conditions in international markets as prices of oil witnessed sharp 
increases from one year after another. These prices were only around U. S. $16.86 per barrel in 
1995 and reached U. S. $69 per barrel in 2007, thus explaining the substantial improvements in 
Qatar's economy during these periods. 
19 According to the WTO Secretariat, Qatar's current petroleum depletion rate (ratio of reserves to production) is 
7%, and the objective is to increase it to 10% (WTO, Trade Policy Review, 2005b). 
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In parallel, in spite of its smallest contribution amongst OPEC members Qatar's oil 
production quota increased substantially. This quota was only 378 thousands barrel per day in 
the period (1995-1999), but then increased to 692 thousands barrel per day in 2000.11owever, 
corresponding to OPEC attempts to increase the oil prices in international markets, OPEC 
members' quota were reduced. For Qatar, the quota was reduced in 2001 to 601 thousands 
barrel per day, which further went down to 562 thousands barrel per day in 2002. But, from 
2002 onwards Qatar's quota increased gradually reaching a level of 735 thousands barrel per 
day in 2006. This increased production has helped in stabilizing the world oil markets, 
although the world's demand for oil exceeded OPEC forecasted production. Qatar's increased 
oil production quota was 2.6% of OPEC's total oil production ceiling, and was bound by the 
organizations ceiling allocations. 
Qatar was producing very close to its maximum capacity; this amounted to 2.9% of the 
OPEC's total production in July 2004. At that time the authorities had proposed to increase 
production further as long as oil prices were still rising above U. S. $30 per barrel. Due to an 
interrupted increase in demand, growing political instability - such as in Iraq - has 
occasionally hindered and halted production, explaining the rise in prices from U. S. $12.28 
per barrel in 1998 to U. S. $43.16 per barrel, as in August 2004. The upward trend kept 
continuing to reach over $140 in 2008, although this was largely due to increasing Asian 
demand rather than driven by fears of supply strategies due to political instability (OPEC, 
2008). 
Qatar's crude oil is mostly imported by Asian countries, ranging from Japan and Korea, 
China and the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and even India. Also Qatar's refined 
production - including gasoline, kerosene and distillates - increased substantially from 
42.1 thousands b/b in 2001 to 131.8 thousands b/d in 2007 in order to increase the value of oil 
production and link it up with the extraction and processing of hydrocarbons Table 4.6. 
The trend of increasing total production of oil in Qatar was accompanied by an increase in 
total local consumption during the period (2001-2007). In 2001 the total consumption of oil 
refined products were 25.4 thousands barrel per day, but this consumption kept increasing in 
the following years until it reached 100 thousands barrel per day in 2007. This increase in the 
level of total consumption of oil reflects the increasing processing activities and rising 
demand for oil in Qatar's internal market (Qatar Petroleum, 2008b). 
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Table 4.6: Production and consumption of refined products, 2001-2007('000 b/d) 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 
production 
42.1 43.1 115.2 118.6 119.1 131.8 131.8 
Gasoline 11 40.7 39.9 38.4 39.7 45.7 
Kerosene 6.7 20.2 21.5 19.9 24.4 24.0 
Distillates 11.9 20.2 21.1 19.4 20.6 21.0 
Residuals 7.8 7.9 8.0 9.4 13.6 7.8 
Others 5.7 26.2 28.0 31.9 33.4 33.3 
Total 
Consumption 
25.4 32.9 43.7 68.9 73.2 92.6 100.0 
Gasoline 12.5 15.8 13.4 14.3 16.7 19.1 20.0 
Kerosene 4.2 6.7 5.9 10.3 10.7 16.8 17.0 
Distillates 7.5 8.8 10 14.6 15.3 20.9 25.2 
Residuals ..... .... 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.4 14.4 
Others 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.65 17.4 22.5 23.5 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin (2UU3 & 2UU7). 
Recent published data shows that the total of Qatar's oil production reached 860 thousands 
barrel per day in December 2007, which is optimistically estimated to increase to 1,080 
thousand barrel per day by December 2010, due to expectations of new oil discoveries and 
the advancement of technology applied in extraction and production. The list of companies 
that operate in Qatar is quite diversified as there are several local and foreign companies 
responsible for operating different oil fields in Qatar, which demonstrates the openness of 
Qatar's economy. For instance, Qatar Petroleum operates the oil fields of Dukham, But 
Hanine, and Maydan Mahzam. Of these three, Dukham is the most important as, according 
to data in December 2007, it produces 281 thousands barrel per day, whereas Bul lianinc 
produces 52,200 thousands barrel per day and Maydan Mahzam produces 36,700 thousands 
barrel per day. Occidental operates the two fields of Idd Al-Shargi in the North and South 
Dome. Maresk Oil operates the most important and productive Al-Shaheen oil field which 
produces 306 thousands barrel per day see Table 4.7 below. 
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Table 4.7: Qatar's Current Crude Oil Production and Projected 
Field (bpd) Operator Production 
December 2007 
Projected prdouction 
December 2010 
Dukham QP 281,000 281,000 
Bul Hanine P 52,200 37,000 
Madan Mahzam QP 36,700 27,000 
Idd Al-Shari North Dome Occidental 111,200 115,000 
Idd Al-Shari South Dome Occidental 3,600 19,000 
Al-Shaheen Maersk Oil 306,000 525,000 
Al-Khali' Total Fina 39,400 45,000 
Al-Ra an Occidental 10,500 10,000 
Al-Karkara PD 5,200 8,000 
El-Bundu BOC 14,000 13,000 
Total 860,000 1,080,000 
Source: Qatar Petroleum (2008b) 
Having analysed Qatar's oil productions, exports and reserves, it is important to examine the 
nature of the activities of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
the influence of its member countries, including Qatar, to determine the price of oil in 
international markets. As being a member of OPEC, Qatar's oil exports are directly 
influenced by the objectives and policies of this organization. Hence, not only Qatar's trade 
activities are subject to WTO regulations but OPEC is also an important key factor for Qatar. 
Thus, it is important to review the main objectives of OPEC and how its policies are made. 
The remainder of this section is dedicated to discuss these issues. 
4.3.1. The nature of OPEC activities and its determinations of oil prices in international 
markets 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is perhaps one of the most 
important organisations in the current global economic activities. OPEC consists of 13 oil- 
producing and exporting countries, from three different continents; Asia, America, and 
Africa. Qatar is an OPEC member along with Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (OPEC, 2008c). 
For all of these countries, including Qatar, oil is the main source of income and a necessary 
element for their economic and social development. Hence, revenues from oil are not only 
used by Qatar and its OPEC partners to expand their economic and industrial base, but also as 
a source of governments expenditures and a key element for creating jobs, and providing 
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education and health care services and improving the living standards of their nationals 
(OPEC, 2008c). But, what are the objectives that the OPEC seeks to achieve? The answer is 
discussed below. 
4.3.1.1. The Organization's Principal Objectives 
There are three main objectives that OPEC seeks to achieve. The first is to organize and unify 
the petroleum policies of the member countries, and to determine the best means for 
safeguarding their individual and collective interests. Hence, Qatar's petroleum policies are 
much influenced and tied with other OPEC's members' petroleum policies. The second 
objective of the OPEC is to seek all possible means to ensure the stabilization of prices in the 
international oil markets, and seek to eliminate damaging and unnecessary fluctuations of the 
oil prices. The third objective is to provide an efficient economic and regular supply of 
petroleum to consuming nations, and a fair return on capital to those investing in the 
petroleum industry (OPEC, 2008a). But, to what extent is the international oil market really 
influenced by OPEC? The answer is discussed below. 
4.3.1.2. OPEC'S Influence on the Oil Market Stability 
The international oil market is characterized by a high level of price instability and 
unpredictability. At many different times, crude oil prices have reached very high levels. In 
the 1970s, some analysts predicted that crude oil prices would reach US $100 a barrel by the 
year 2000. But, prices collapsed below $10/b in the 1980s. Another sharp decline occurred in 
the 1990s in the aftermath of the economic turn down in south-east Asia. The very recent 
trend of the sharp increase in the oil prices from 2001 to 2008 that reached unprecedented 
level of around $149 per barrel further demonstrates the fluctuating trend of the oil prices in 
international markets. But these levels declined substantially to around $50/b in the current 
year because of the financial crisis that has affected the global economy (see Thompson, 
2009). As an oil producing country and a member of the OPEC, Qatar has been much 
influenced by all of these fluctuating trend of oil prices. 
Such fluctuation poses, by their nature, a challenge to the policy making process of Qatar, as 
an oil producing country. Although gas is an important source of income for Qatar, the prices 
of gas in international. markets are much influenced by the fluctuating trends in oil prices. 
The volatility of the oil internal markets poses a serious concern to Qatar and all other oil 
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producing countries as it becomes difficult to implement the economic and social 
development plans, when the price of oil is reduced to unexpectedly low levels. Hence, Qatar 
has many interests to continue collaborating with other OPEC members to stabilise the oil 
prices at high levels, perhaps beyond the current $50 per barrel. 
Therefore, due to the continuous fluctuation of oil prices in international markets Qatar, as 
well as other OPEC members, are always placed in the difficult situations of being concerned 
about the impact of a particular decline of oil prices and the concern about the extent to 
which this decline will affect their economic plans and industrial and social projects. The 
situation may become even more complicated for oil producing countries when the oil prices 
declined sharply to a very low level that not only affect the country's future social and 
industrial projects but obstruct it from being able to run the on-going ones. This is the case of 
Qatar and other GCC countries which have been affected very much by the current trend of 
oil declines as many projects have been postponed for many years to come. The fear is that 
this trend would continue in the future and would affect Qatar's economic planning. Perhaps, 
the situation for Qatar is less damaging than is the case with other GCC countries such as 
Oman or Bahrain. This is because Qatar's energy sector is more diversified to entail gas and 
petrochemicals. 
These kinds of concerns are addressed by the OPEC. Hence, it is in Qatar's utmost interests to 
continue associating its petroleum polices with those of the OPEC, as through this 
organisation the prices of oil can be stabilised, particularly at the time when the prices of oil 
are in substantial decline. The problem lies in the fact that the volatility of the oil 
international markets is not only determined by the supply and demand factors but other 
political factors can also affect the price of oil in international markets. 
Furthermore, the instability facing the oil industry since 2004 attracted the attention of 
different scholars and analysts about the possible impact of the unprecedented trend of 
increasing oil prices on the global economy as a whole. There was the evident inclination to 
compare the rapidly developing situation with that of the 1970s. Subsequent analysis has, 
however, shown big differences between the recent trend and that from the situation of the 
1970s, with a significantly reduced impact on world economic growth and oil demand. This 
was due to different factors such as much lower oil strengths of the consuming countries and 
higher taxation levels, a more diverse energy mix and the fact that the transportation sector - 
with its low price elasticity - now has a much larger share of the international oil market. 
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Essentially, the recent situation of the sharp increase in oil prices was mainly demand-driven, 
resulting from the strong economic growth, rather than supply-driven, as was the case in the 
1970s (Okogu, 2003). 
These fluctuating trends demonstrate the importance of the stability of the oil market for the 
global economy. Hence, it is of high importance for Qatar, as any other oil producing 
country, to achieve stability in oil market. Such stability enables Qatar's authorities to achieve 
sustainable growth. Stability in oil markets is a "win-win" game as it not only benefits oil 
importing countries as they also do not want to be subject to increasingly unaffordable prices. 
Therefore, it is in the interests of Qatar through OPEC to work with other oil importing 
countries to achieve global stability for oil prices. 
To elaborate further, stability provides another important benefit to OPEC member countries 
and other oil-producing countries, particularly those from the developing world where 
petroleum export revenue can account for a very large proportion of the total export revenue 
- about 73%, on average for OPEC in 2005 (OPEC, 2006). Revenue from oil sales is the 
very essential element for financing their economic and social development programmes. 
Revenues from oil are also essential investment for upstream projects and the development of 
the oil sector. Hence, it is in the best interests of Qatar and its OPEC partners to ensure that 
every possible measure is taken to support market stability at all times, so that the optimal 
benefit can be derived from their limited oil resources and shared among present and future 
generations. 
This explains why OPEC is so committed to achieving and maintaining market stability, a 
commitment which goes back to its inaugural meeting in Baghdad in September 1960. The 
very first declaration of OPEC stated that "members shall study and formulate a system to 
ensure the stabilization of prices" (Shojai, 1995); a statement that has become the cornerstone 
of OPEC Statute, which was adopted in January 1961, and continued to be a crucial guiding 
principle of OPEC since then, `The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilization of prices in international oil markets, with a view to eliminating harmful and 
unnecessary fluctuations' (Desta, 2003). 
This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed in different OPEC documentation, such as 
OPEC's two Solemn Declarations, which concluded summits of member countries' Heads of 
State and Government in 1975 and 2000, and the Long-Term Strategy (LTS), which was 
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adopted by the OPEC very recently (Daukoru, 2006). Indeed, the LTS clearly reflects the 
concerns of OPEC members concerning oil price volatility, stating that this `renders all the 
more difficult the interpretation of price signals, whether they are an indication of structural 
change or a reflection of temporary phenomena, and thereby affecting the ability to support 
longer-term market stability' (Regulatory and Business Strategy Division, Australia, 2007). 
The LTS also stresses the significance of fair prices, the security of regular supply to 
consumers, and the security of world oil demand. These objectives are also reflected in OPEC 
Statute: `Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to 
the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic 
and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their capital to 
those investing in the petroleum industry' (see Lukman, 2008). 
It has become commonly accepted that the vibrant and sustainable development of global 
civilization and the improvement of the conditions of human lives depends on securing 
consistent access to energy. This access can best be secured via continuous cooperation and 
mutual understandings between energy producing countries and oil consuming countries. 
Each party has great interests in securing and stabilising energy markets and thus they all 
have the interests of reaching common agreements, which can be achieved through dialogue 
and cooperation. 
Therefore, securing oil demand is very essential for Qatar and its OPEC partners. But, this 
security can only be achieved through security of supply as a means of achieving market. 
This is because oil market stability can never be achieved without being confident about the 
predictability and reliability of demand for oil. Once this confidence is achieved the 
necessary investments to promote oil production are guaranteed. But, the question which 
imposes itself in this context is "how OPEC goes about to carry out its commitments of 
achieving stable and sustainable market security? 
4.3.1.3. Achieving OPEC's objectives 
Achieving the above-mentioned objectives of securing market stability, Qatar and its OPEC 
partners should focus on analysing the very recent phenomenon of the sharp increase of oil 
prices to unprecedented levels of over $150 per barrel; a phenomenon that was a cause of 
serious concerns to the whole world including OPEC countries. Although high level of oil 
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prices could benefit oil producing countries in the short run as it leads to increasing 
governments' revenue, but this benefit is not sustainable. If prices are too high or too low they 
are not sustainable and reflect the fragility the oil international markets. OPEC has 
subsequently sought to moderate oil prices, although its influence was somewhat limited as 
the unprecedented increase was mainly due to the supply and demand factors and beyond the 
control of the OPEC. 
Decisions taken at the OPEC Conferences were by actions of its member countries to 
stabilise the situation. But, as is mentioned above, oil markets themselves are subject to 
unexpected and sudden developments. What really remains as a credit for the OPEC is it did 
the best it could and took important decisions to reduce the prices of oil to normal levels. 
Other unexpected factors were beyond its control. 
The outcome of the OPEC's decisions to stabilise oil prices during the Asian boom was to 
make its member countries, including Qatar, increase production by around 4.5 million barrel 
per day since 2002. Therefore, it can be argued that there were no actual supply shortages. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that stocks have increased to levels above their five-year 
average in the OECD area, particularly in the U. S. In addition, Qatar and other OPEC 
member countries adopted plans to bring on-stream new production capacity in order to meet 
the continued demand and growth, and to re-establish a comfortable cushion of spare 
capacity. 
Although OPEC had very modest influence over recent destabilizing factors, it is believed 
that OPEC has clearly demonstrated its will to seek the best possible means to stabilise the 
situation, for the benefit of the international community. In other words, the OPEC's 
decisions to increase oil productions to mitigate oil prices sent a strong signal to the market 
concerning the OPEC's views on a particular set of events, and that this, in itself, can have a 
stabilising effect on market sentiment. For instance, in 2005, the OPEC's assurances of 
continuing with the healthy supply of oil accompanied by similar positive expressions from 
the International Energy Agency, helped to prevent the output disruptions caused by 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from developing into a major crisis that could have gone out of 
control. Over the past year, OPEC has also taken the initiative in providing assurances 
concerning adequate crude supplies after the outbreak of hostilities in the Lebanon region, 
and again after the partial closure of the Prudhoe Bay oilfield in Alaska (Ryan, 2004). 
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Hence, OPEC's increase of oil productions and its sincere will to stabilise the situation in 
international markets has provided assurance to oil importing countries that the trend of 
ample production and sufficient spare capacity will continue for years to come, benefiting 
producers and consumers alike and enhancing stability. 
In addition, despite being traditionally associated with upstream oil activity, Qatar like other 
OPEC member countries, has also increased investment in downstream projects, both on their 
own and in partnership with others. Current estimates demonstrate that there will be a 2.5 
million billion barrel per day of additional refinery capacity by 2010, with more being 
considered (Whipple, 2008). However, the ultimate fact remains that downstream investment 
is principally the responsibility of consuming countries, and the indications are that the sector 
could remain an essentially key source of price volatility for some time to come, with 
expansion lagging behind demand growth. 
Therefore, OPEC did as much as it could in order to restore price stability at levels acceptable 
to the market at large. Other responsible parties also responded to varying degrees and in 
accordance with circumstance and capabilities. However, there are some areas where much 
more needs to be done in regards to the international efforts to stabilise the price of oil. One 
aspect of these needs relates to "speculation", which since from 2004 inflated prices far 
beyond primary levels, as was argued by different analysts. Appropriate and sustainable 
action to overcome this obstacle should be sought as early as possible because speculation is 
a direct main cause for price volatility and disruption within the market. Such disruption 
caused serious problems to the international markets and oil producing and importing 
countries but these problems are caused by factors (speculations) that arc beyond the control 
of oil producing countries. 
As for OPEC, it is inclined to establish a clear mechanism of anticipating oil prices during the 
time. Since the 1980s, the OPEC has used its own World Energy Model in order to construct 
scenarios describing possible paths of market development extending up to two decades or 
more ahead. This has been done as part of the extensive research activities that take place at 
its Secretariat in Vienna, Austria. The purpose of this has been to support its member 
countries in handling the many and varied challenges and opportunities they face in the 
industry. Such efforts should continue with cooperation between OPEC and other oil 
consuming countries. 
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OPEC forecasts that over the next 20 years, world energy supply will continue to depend 
primarily on fossil fuels, with oil retaining its leading position, which the latest projections 
put at close to 40% during this period. A reference case scenario forecasts a 30 million barrel 
a day rise in demand by 2025, to reach 113 mb/d, constituting an annual average increase of 
1.5 mb/d. This assumes, among other things, that no dramatic changes in energy and 
environmental policies in consuming countries will occur. The transportation sector will be 
the main source of future oil demand growth, while developing countries - especially from 
Asia - are set to account for four-fifths of the rise, with consumption almost doubling to 53 
mb/d. However, in 2025, Economically Developed Countries (EDLs) will remain the 
dominant oil consumer and will continue to use, on average, five times more oil per person 
than developing countries (Daukoru, 2006). 
Many different well-informed and reputable organizations recognise that the global resource 
base is sufficient in dealing with the forecasted increases in world oil demand. Estimates of 
global ultimately recoverable resources for conventional oil have been increasing due to 
different factors such as technology, successful exploration, and enhanced recovery from 
existing fields. In addition, there is a vast resource base of non-conventional oil to develop. 
Equally important, Qatar should realise that in the medium-term, non-OPEC supply has the 
potential to rise substantially with growth projected at 6 mb/d in the present period of 2005- 
2010. However, this is eventually expected to reach a plateau after 2015, at an estimated 58- 
59 mb/d. Therefore, in the longer-term, it is expected that the OPEC - with nearly four- 
fifths of the world's proven crude oil reserves - will be greatly relied upon to supply most of 
the incremental barrel of demand. Hence, it is important for Qatar's authority to realise that 
most of the new demand will be met by non-OPEC countries in the short-to-medium term 
and by the OPEC in the longer-term. Projections in this reference case show that OPEC 
production levels - including natural gas liquids - would rise to 54 mb/d by 2025, which 
would be slightly below that of non-OPEC (Barkindo, 2006). 
The OPEC's readiness and ability to supply the incremental barrel demonstrates the its 
willingness to achieve oil stability and security. But, this is not any smooth route to pursue. 
There are many uncertainties concerning future levels of oil demand which translate into a 
wide range of possible levels of necessary investment in OPEC member countries. These are 
caused by, in particular, uncertainties over world economic growth, advances in technology, 
and policy measures in consuming countries. Even over the medium-term to 2010, there is an 
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estimated range of uncertainty of $50 billion for required investment, and by 2020 this will 
go up to as much as $240bn. Thus, there is a heavy burden of risk for these countries, with 
the huge amounts of capital that must be committed up front (Barkindo, 2006). 
This explains why OPEC repeatedly calls for more transparency in the evolution and 
implementation of policies among consuming countries, so that better evaluation can be made 
to undertake the appropriate capacity expansions, and prevent wasting valuable financial 
resources. 
By and large, in strict market terms, stability has many dimensions to it, and OPEC sees its 
role as trying to accommodate these as much as possible. But, there is more to it than just 
quantities; there is also the qualitative aspect, addressing the growing need for energy 
services to integrate better with the broader-based challenges facing mankind - in both rich 
and poor nations alike. 
For instance, there is the issue of the "environment". The oil industry has a long history of 
successfully improving the environmental credentials of oil, addressing concerns of local 
pollution and improving air quality, and OPEC's member countries have also been at the 
forefront of many important new developments over the years. But, there is also the need to 
meet the challenges imposed by possible climate change, where technological options which 
allow the continued use of oil and gas in a carbon-constrained world must be considered. 
One promising example is Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), applied to large stationary 
sources of C02 emissions, such as power stations and industrial sites, which account for over 
half the energy-related CO2 emissions. CCS can also be used in conjunction with C02 
enhanced oil recovery, which offers a win-win opportunity by not only storing C02, but by 
also increasing oil reserves in mature fields. If CCS is to be used on a scale that would make 
a significant impact upon net CO2 emissions, it could be developed into a significant business 
opportunity for the oil industry. However, the developed countries should take the lead in the 
area of providing cleaner oil and gas technologies by promoting large-scale demonstration 
projects - including the use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in accordance 
with the principle of `common but differentiated responsibilities' and respective capabilities 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008). 
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As they seek access to modern energy services to improve their economic and social 
conditions and sometimes overcoming poverty, clean and safe energy is a vital requirement 
for developing countries. Without outside help, many appear to have no means of escaping 
this type of poverty trap. Poverty eradication is the first UN Millennium Development Goal, 
and a comprehensive and balanced approach to implementing the three pillars of sustainable 
development - economic development, social development and environmental protection - 
is required. Energy security applies to all nations of the world, and the eradication of energy 
poverty demands urgent attention, and is everyone's business and responsibility. 
In order to reach prosperity and improving standards of living for human being, these 
qualitative aspects require as much stability as possible in the world energy market. This has 
provided a powerful additional incentive for member countries to work towards this 
fundamental objective - oil market stability - which, as previously indicated, was adopted 
at the very first meeting of the OPEC Conference 46 years ago, and was enshrined in the 
OPEC Statute shortly after, serving as one of its guiding principles ever since (OPEC, Third 
OPEC Summit, 2007). 
The various agreements decided upon are the result of the search for a new price band which 
would be both fair and acceptable to producers and consumers, and which provided sufficient 
returns to the International Oil Companies (IOCs). Such returns would encourage them to 
explore for oil and expand their oil producing capacity. 
Merrill Lynch's report published in April, 2004 attributes the failure to secure oil investments 
to the incapacity of the capital expenditures by both national and international oil companies, 
in order to keep pace with the increased cost of oil exploration, which has snowballed at an 
average annual rate of 10% since the mid-1990s. To stimulate investment in the oil industry, 
the price of oil had to be raised so as to preserve the reasonable average rate of return at 13%. 
In the mid-1990s, the investment needed to secure a production capacity equal to one barrel 
per day over a period of ten years was estimated to be $14,600. The capital cost of finding 
and developing oil was approximately $4 per barrel, accommodating the 13% rate of return, 
based on the 1990s prevailing price of $18. From 2001 to 2003, the volume of investment 
required to secure the same production capacity surged to $25,600, raising the capital cost of 
finding oil to $7 per barrel. This necessitated a price elevation of $28 in order to maintain the 
13% rate of return (Abdullah, 2006). 
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While global demand for oil is anticipated to increase from the current 85 million barrels per 
day (mbd) to 125 mbd by 2030, the investments needed over the next 25 years in order to 
expand oil and gas production in the Middle East is estimated at $750 billion. This prompts 
the question of what price will suffice to encourage investment in expanding oil production 
capacity towards serving consumer needs, and guarding against price shocks. 
The price of oil of OPEC jumped from an average of $25 per barrel over the period 2000- 
2003 to $36 per barrel in 2004 and to $50 in 2005, and then continued to increase to reach 
unprecedented level of $140 per barrel. Geopolitical factors in the Middle East - especially 
the US occupation of Iraq accounted for this sharp increase. Under normal geopolitical 
conditions, the ORB price should be permitted to gradually increase over time in accordance 
with an annual rate determined by three principles previously adopted by agreements with 
IOCs (Vail, 2008). 
Two of these agreements were endorsed in the 1971 Tehran Agreement between OPEC and 
IOCs. First, a gradual 2.5% annual price increase is permitted to cover inflation; second, an 
annual increase of $0.05 as a special allowance in light of the fact that oil is a non-renewable 
resource which will soon be depleted due to heightened demand. In 1971, the $0.05 
represented 2.5% of the price of oil, which hovered at around $2 per barrel. Hence, the 
yearly rate of increase undertaken by the Tehran Agreement was approximately 5% 
(Abdullah, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2006). In spite of the fact that the Tehran Agreement is no 
longer applicable, these two principles are still valid. 
The third principle is embodied in the first Geneva Agreement of 1971 with IOCs. It 
stipulates correcting oil prices in accordance with value variations of the US dollar, which is 
used to post oil prices, vis-ä-vis, and other major currencies. After the decision to float the 
US dollar on 15 August, 1971 - and its subsequent official devaluation on 17 December, 
1971 - the price of oil accordingly rose by 8.5% on January20,1972. When the US dollar 
was devalued again on February12,1973, the second Geneva Agreement - concluded in 
June, 1973 - endorsed an approximate price increase of 11.9%, and provided for monthly 
price adjustment in light of the currency's fluctuations (Abdullah, 2006). 
These three principles should be taken into account in the estimation of the nominal annual 
increase in oil prices. Even if the US dollar fluctuations, other major currencies eventually 
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equalize in the long-run, and the annual rate of price escalation would not be less than 5% 
over the past thirty years, according to the two principles of the Tehran Agreement. 
Price escalation needs to start at a basic year. The price of $11.65 as adjusted after the 
October War is a fair price suitable to serve as a basis for gradual escalation, as well as a 
means to compensate for the erosion of the real price of oil. Therefore, on the basis of the 
above three principles for estimating the composite annual rate of price increase over the 
past thirty three years - of 5% - the nominal price of ORB should not fall below $58 at 
present. However, due to troubled geopolitics and/or stock, and seasonal fluctuation of oil 
demand and supply, the price of oil may be driven to a much higher level depending on the 
severity of the effect. 
This new price of $58 under normal conditions - and upgradeable over time according to 
the three principles of the inflation rate, demand growth rate, and fluctuation of the US dollar 
value - stands to offer international oil companies with a fair profit to support expanded 
investment, and the proprietors of oil reserves with a reasonable share of oil rent to 
compensate them for the ultimate depletion of oil - their only source of primary income 
(Abdullah, 2006). 
4.4. QATAR'S GAS SECTOR 
While oil constitutes an important source of income for Qatar and is one of the driving forces 
for its economy, a significant area of growth for Qatar is natural gas. Natural gas exports have 
grown in parallel to the increasing trend of the crude oil exports in the recent years, as Qatar 
overtakes the world's largest natural gas exporter, i. e., Indonesia (South-East Asia). As is 
already explained in Table 4.1 above, Qatar exports of natural gas liquids increased 
significantly from one year after another. These exports accounted 15,447 million in 2003 but 
then jumped to 23,497 million in 2004, a trend that continued in the subsequent years 
reaching 53,859 million in 2007. This trend is expected to continue into the future as the 
world demand for natural gas continues to rise. 
As a percentage of total exports, LNG constitutes over 30 percent of Qatar's total exports, 
thus demonstrating the importance of the gas sector in Qatar's exports structure. It may be 
noticed that this percentage was the highest in 2001 at 37.7 percent, but fell in subsequent 
years reaching the lowest in 2005 of 30.8 percent. Nevertheless, this percentage increased 
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noticeably in 2006 and 2007 registering 34.8 percent and 35.2 percent respectively of total 
exports (see Table 4.8 below). These figures further demonstrate that the increasing 
importance of LNG exports in the last few years. These LNG exports are expected to further 
increase in the upcoming years; perhaps exceeding oil exports in the future, probably due to 
the fact that LNG is emerging as the preferred fuel and an ideal substitute to oil as an energy 
source that complements economical and environmental issues currently on top of a world 
agenda and burning issue for green house gases. 
Table 4.8: Natural Gas Liquids (LNG) as a% of Total Exports 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Natural gas liquids 37.7 31.9 31.7 34.5 30.8 34.8 35.2 
(LNG) as a% of total 
exports 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade (2008) 
Therefore, Qatar has managed to maintain its position as the leading exporter of LNG on a 
worldwide scale, despite being a minor OPEC producer, at an approximately 860,000 bpd 
level of output (Oil and Gas Exploration News, 2008). This is clearly reflected in the income 
statement of the Qatar's Liquefied Gas Company. The statement, as is summarised in Table 
(4.9) below, demonstrates the growth in the natural gas exports in earnings from year 2001 of 
482,010.00 to 2007 reaching its peak of 946,900.00 in 2007. 
Table 4.9: Qatar's Liquefied Gas Company Limited Annual Reports (2001-2007); 
Statements of Income and Distributions (US $'0001 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Net income 
for the ear 
482010 231859 233854 242590 351469 436242 946900 
Source: QLGC, Annual Report (2008). 
The strength of the gas sector for Qatar is not only related to the increasing level of 
production for the last few years, but more importantly on the huge amount of gas reserves, 
as Qatar is registered to have one of the largest gas reserves in the world. The issue goes back 
to as early as 1991 when a strategic plan was drawn up by the Government following the 
discovery of the gas reserves, which resulted in the formation of the Ras Laffan industrial city 
in 1996. 
Qatar gas and Rasgas bound together, and their main joint aim was to become the leading 
supplier of LNG and compete at an international on a worldwide level. Most of the gas 
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reserves in Qatar, as demonstrated in Table (4.10) below, are concentrated in the North Field, 
in which the gas reserves grew over years from 376.8 trillion cubic feet in 2000 and reached 
892 trillion cubic feet in 2004 due to the intensive exploration efforts and new discovery of 
gas reserves. 
There are other fields which have gas reserves but in a far lesser quantity of 14.4 trillion 
cubic feet, a fraction of that of the North Field. The total reserves of gas in Qatar in both the 
North Field and other fields were estimated to be 906.4 trillion cubic feet in 2004 (sec Table 
4.10). 
Table 4.10: Qatar's reserves of associated and non-associated gas, during 2000-2004 are 
shown in below table. 
(Trillion standard cubic feet) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
North Field 376.8 496.0 495.0 900 892.0 
Other fields 16.7 16.3 16.3 14.7 14.4 
Total 393.5 512.3 511.3 914.7 906.4 
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review: Qatar (2005). 
More recent data shows that Qatar's proven reserves of gas was estimated to be 910 trillion 
cubic feet in 2007, thus making Qatar the third biggest country in the world after Russia and 
Iran in regard of proven gas reserves. Russia's proven gas reserves arc estimated to be 1,680 
trillion cubic feet and Iran's proven gas reserves are estimated to be 974 trillion cubic feet as 
of 2007 (see Table 4.11 below). 
Table 4.11: Top Proven Natural Gas Reserves as of 1" January , 2007 
Country Proven natural gas reserves 
trillion cubic feet 
Russia 1,680 
Iran 974 
Qatar 910 
Saudi Arabia 239 
United States 204 
United Arab Emirates 198 
Nigeria 182 
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, January 1,2007 
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Given the increasing importance of the gas sector for Qatar and having looked into Qatar's 
gas production, exports, and reserves, the questions which now impose themselves in this 
context are; what are the main factors that could affect Qatar's productions of gas? And, can 
these factors be controlled and directed for the benefit of Qatar's economy? How can WTO 
membership affect, both positively and negatively, the gas sector of Qatar? The remaining of 
section is dedicated to discuss these questions and Section 4.6 will discuss . 
4.4.1. Factors Affecting Demands for Natural Gas 
4.4.1.1 Demands for natural gas 
The demand for natural gas has traditionally been very stable and predictable although it 
depends for natural gas depends highly on the time of year, and changes from season to 
season for obvious reasons. In the past, the recurring character of the demand for natural gas 
has been comparatively simple and clear-cut. To elaborate, demand increased at the highest 
level during the coldest months of winter and dropped to the lowest level during the summer 
period (see Wells, 2006). The key driving force for this cycle of natural gas demand is the 
need for housing and commercial heating. Thus, heating requirements fluctuate throughout 
the year depending on the fluctuation of demand. This has resulted in demand for natural gas 
increasing substantially in January and February, and declining during the months of July and 
August. Base-load storage capacity is designed to meet this recurring demand. In other 
words, base-load storage withdrawals naturally take place during the winter in order to meet 
the increased demand, while storage injection takes place in the summer months, so that 
excess gas can be restored in preparation for the next up cycle. (Natural Gas. org, 2008) 
However, the above traditional cyclical behaviour has changed as a result of the recent shift 
towards the use of natural gas for the generation of electricity. Although needs for natural gas 
heating decreased during the summer months, demand for space cooling increased during this 
warmer season. Electricity, provides the primary source of energy for residential and 
commercial cooling requirements, leading to an increase in demand for electricity. In 
addition, because natural gas is used to generate a large portion of electricity in developed 
countries such as the United States, increased electrical demand often automatically lead to 
increased natural gas demand, with the demands forming a obvious connection (Sillin, 2004). 
Therefore, natural gas demand witnesses its most definite increase during the coldest months 
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but, as the consumption of natural gas for the generation of electricity increases, the scale of 
the demand for natural gas during the summer peak is expected to become more distinct 
(Shipp, 2009). 
However, the cyclical demand for natural gas is not the only factor that determines the prices 
of natural gas but there are other important factors that play an active role in determining the 
demand for natural gas particularly in the short-term. As a gas producing country Qatar 
should realise all of these factors that may affect the price of gas, as is explained below. 
4.4.1.2. Seasonal factors 
As is mentioned above, demands for natural gas naturally reaches its peak level during the 
coldest months of thee winter but substantially declined during the warmer months, with 
some increase during the summer to meet the demands of electric generators. However, this 
cyclical demand for natural gas can be affected b any climate changes during any particular 
season. The colder the weather during the winter, the more obvious the winter peak will be. 
On the other hand, a warmer winter may result in reducing the demands for gas but, b the 
same effects, a very hot winter may result in greater demands for gas (Wells, 2006). 
4.4.1.3. Fuel Switching 
The short-term prices for natural gas are determined by the supply and demand in the 
marketplace. But, this can also work in another way round. For some customers, the price of 
natural gas can affect its demand. This is particularly true for those consumers who have the 
capacity to switch the fuel upon which they rely. While most residential and commercial 
customers rely solely on natural gas to meet many of their energy requirements, some 
industrial and electric generation consumers have the capacity to switch between fuels. For 
instance, during a period of extremely high natural gas prices, many electric generators may 
switch from using natural gas to using cheaper coal, thus decreasing the demand for natural 
gas (Ables et al, 2009). 
4.5 PETROCHEMICALS 
Besides the oil and gas sectors, petrochemicals are also another important element in Qatar's 
production and exports structure that have grown in importance over recent years. The 
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petrochemicals sector in Qatar is mainly administered by Qatar Petrochemical Company 
(QAPCO), which was established in 1974 with the purpose of utilising associated ethane gas 
from petroleum production. QAPCO is a joint venture between Industries Qatar (IQ) with an 
80 percent share and Total Petrochemicals of France which holds a 20 percent stake 
(QAPCO, 2009). The IQ was found in 2003 with a paid-up capital of QR 5 billion, divided 
into 500 million shares of which 30 percent are held by the public and non-profit 
organisations. It is worth-noting that the IQ is the largest listed company on the Doha 
Securities Market in terms of market capitalisation and holds a diversified portfolio of 
subsidiaries in the petrochemicals, fertilizers, fuel additives and steel sectors. These include 
QAPCO, QAFCO, and QASCO. As for Total Petrochemicals, it is known to be "the largest 
publicly-traded integrated oil and gas company in the world and a renowned chemicals 
manufacturer" (QABPCO, 2009). 
The industrialisation and manufacturing aspects of the QAPCO have substantially developed 
and improved throughout the time. It is now involved in manufacturing quality ethylene, low 
density polyethylene (LDPE) and other petrochemical products. It is worth-mentioning that 
the QAPCO is currently the largest producer of the LDPE in the Middle East with a capacity 
of thirty-six thousand metric tons per annum (MTA). This is besides its production of five 
hundred and twenty five thousand MTA of ethylene and seventy thousand MTA of sulphur. 
Qatar's LPDE products are marketed world wide and serve more than four thousand 
customers from over 70 countries in the Middle East, Asia, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, 
the Americas, and Europe (QAPCO, 2009). 
4.5.1. Downstream projects of QAPCO 
One distinguished aspect of Qatar's petrochemicals is its highly interlinked nature of 
processes and production via different downstream projects. These projects are owned by 
joint ventures established between very interrelated investors, as is demonstrated in the 
following examples. 
4.5.1.1. Qatar Vinyl Company (QVC) 
QVC is the first downstream petrochemical project of Qatar designed to produce 290,000 
MT/y of Caustic Soda, 175,000 MT/y of Ethylene Dichloride (EDC) and 230,000 MT/y of 
Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM). QVC is a limited shareholding company of Qatar 
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Petroleum, QAPCO, Norsk Hydro of Norway and Total Petrochemicals of France in which 
QAPCO holds a 31.9 percent stake (QAPCO, 2009). 
4.5.1.2. Qatar Plastic Products Company (QPPC; 
This QPPC is a joint company between Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Company (QIMCO) 
and the Italian Company FEBO. QPPC is established with the purpose of producing heavy- 
duty bags, plastic sheets and other plastic products for industrial purposes. The main raw 
material for producing these products is "polyethylene" which is supplied by QAPCO. This 
demonstrates the very interlinked production activities between the companies involved in 
petrochemical activities in Qatar. The plant of QPPC is designed to produce about 2,700 MT 
of FFS films, 700 MT of shrinkable films, 2 MT of top-open bags and 500 MT of recycled 
PE per annum (QAPCO, 2009). 
4.5.1.3. Qatofin 
Qatofin is another joint venture between QAPCO, Total Petrochemicals and QP, specialised 
in producing linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) whose plant is adjacent to the existing 
QAPCO plant. The LLDPE plant is expected to produce around 450,000 MT of polyethylene 
every year aimed to be exported to Asia and Europe (QAPCO, 2009). 
4.5.1.4. Ras Laffan Olefins Company (BLOC) 
The RLOC is a joint venture between Q-Chem, QATOFIN, and QP found with the aim of 
establishing an ethane cracker plant and a 120-km pipeline from Ras Laffan to Mesaiced 
(where the LLDPE and QAPCO plants are located) to transport the produced ethylene. The 
RLOC plant is located in Ras Laffan Industrial City and is regarded as the world's largest 
ethane cracker plants with the capacity of producing 1.3 MMT of ethylene every year 
(QAPCO, 2009). 
Having analysed the nature of the activities of the main components of the energy sector of 
Qatar, the following section looks into the status of these components under the WTO and 
how Qatar could address its interests on these components in the current Doha Round 
negotiations. 
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4.6. QATAR'S ENERGY SECTOR (OIL, GAS, AND PETROCHEMICALS) UNDER 
THE WTO 
The above analysis has clearly demonstrated the importance of the energy sector for Qatar's 
economy. Oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors constitute the backbone of the economy. By 
being a member of the WTO, it is important for Qatar's policy makers to be aware of how 
these sectors are affected by the WTO and the opportunities that are available for Qatar in the 
on-going multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round to improve the competitive position of 
these sectors. 
The issue of how to address and deal with energy sectors such as oil, gas, and petrochemicals 
under the WTO has started to gain more attention when the number of energy producing 
countries increased in the WTO. There have been different, and sometimes conflicting views, 
about how these sectors should be dealt with under the WTO (Ililal, 2001). 
Some people feel that the WTO arrangements have so far not paid enough attention to energy 
products and services, albeit their importance in international economy. They argue that there 
should be a new separate multilateral agreement inaugurated to deal with these sectors that 
takes the interests of producing and consuming countries altogether. They believe that the 
new agreement should be separated from the GATT and the CATS and contain its own 
regulations due to the different nature of these products and their importance for the global 
economy. The proponents of this view argue that establishing a new trade agreement tinder 
the WTO umbrella will lead to greater stability of the market and predictability of prices. 
Even geopolitical instability and tensions in different parts of the world will be reduced as the 
whole energy issues and the concerns about security of demand and prices will be governed 
via the new proposed WTO agreement (Ililal, 2001; International Forum on Globalisation, 
2009). 
However, other people do not share the above views and argue that due to the very special 
nature of energy sectors and their utmost importance for the development of the global 
economy and trade and the survival of mankind, "energy sectors" should stay out of the ambit 
of the WTO. The increasing geopolitical tensions in different parts of the world do not help 
the designing of new special arrangements for energy sectors in the WTO. OPEC was created 
with the objective to safeguard the interests of oil producing countries outside the ambit of 
the WTO and has been very successful in doing that. Qatar and other major gas producing 
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countries are organising their position and coordinating their policies to protect their interests. 
Hence, any new separate arrangements under the WTO for energy sectors may contradict 
with the outside arrangements. 
The researcher takes an intermediate stand between the above two views and feels that it will 
be of Qatar's interests, as well as other energy producing countries' interests, if more 
considerations are given to energy sectors under the WTO. This does not mean that a new 
separate agreement should be found to deal with the energy sector, but the current GAIT, 
CATS, and TRIPS regulations should be improved further to take into account the interests 
of energy producing countries. The researcher is not supportive of the idea of establishing a 
new separate agreement that deals specifically with the energy sector under the WTO, as is 
argued above. This is because external arrangements such as OPEC have proven very 
efficient in serving Qatar's interests. however, the continuing Doha Round negotiations offer 
a valuable opportunity for Qatar and its energy producing partners to seek improvements of 
the multilateral regulations to serve their interests. 
This would require Qatar, as is already indicated, to establish a clear negotiating strategy 
under the Doha Round by cooperating with other energy producing countries and in 
particular GCC countries. Their negotiations should be in line with OPEC's objectives and 
policies that are outlined above. Qatar and its partners should carefully consider what kind of 
liberalisation they want to achieve under the WTO and what are the current obstacles facing 
their energy exports and how such obstacles can be removed. 
Qatar and its partners should also consider that some developed countries such as the EU, 
Canada, and the U. S. are currently lobbying for the liberalisation of energy-related services 
under the GATS negotiations. These include exploration, production, construction, and 
transportation. These countries have a vested interest in penetrating the services markets of 
energy-producing countries, while at the same times creating major obstacles against energy 
exports to their territories (Ililal, 2001; International Forum on Globalisation, 2009). Hence, 
Qatar is advised to study the proposals of developed countries in these areas very carefully 
and develop its own negotiating strategy in coordination with other energy producing WTO 
members. 
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4.7. CONCLUSION 
Qatar's share in the world's natural gas reserves has been continuously increasing. Qatar's 
reserves of natural gas are the third largest in the world, accounting for 14.3% of the world's 
total proven reserves (OPEC, 2003). Furthermore, the country strives to become the largest 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) producer in the world by 201020. The development of gas- 
intensive industries such as petrochemicals, fertilizers, and refining key component of Qatar's 
overall diversification strategy. 
WTO regulations have been said to be applicable to the energy sector of Qatar, but far from 
being ideally suitable as a solution to trade associated problems and barriers such as excise 
taxes and export restrictions. The aforementioned taxes and restrictions have negative 
impacts on the revenues of energy-exporting countries like Qatar. Additionally, although 
whenever trade barriers are imposed, provided they are non-discriminatory, they still are in 
line with WTO regulations. Furthermore, when oil prices decrease, as currently witnessed, 
and as also experienced in 1998/99, this usually leads to calls for diversification and reducing 
dependence on oil. Gas for instance, is said to have a significantly increasing demand for 
economic and environmental reasons, and is becoming a preferred fuel (International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2006). 
According to the World Trade Report (WTO, 2007), governments should cooperate in trade 
in free markets for a number of reasons, including increasing market share and bargaining 
power. The WTO is an active organization that is promoting trade with minimal or no 
restrictions and therefore promoting capital mobility, and this issue (capital mobility as 
opposed to controls) is one of the most controversial topics in the academic literature and in a 
practical context. 
Therefore, the question is whether Qatar as a member of WTO can meet its obligations to the 
organization and at the same time maintains its control over gas? In the author's view, 
although a difficult task there should be some level of compromise. The WTO will have to 
appreciate that Qatar as a major exporter of gas needs some level of protection as trading in 
oil and gas is different from trading in other commodities. OPEC, of which Qatar is a 
20 Qatar is implementing a plan to establish a liquefaction capacity of 70 million tons per year. 
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member, has been established for the purpose of coordinating and unifying the petroleum 
policies of member countries and ensures the stabilization of the oil market in order to secure 
an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to 
producers and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry. 
In 2001, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) was established with quite similar 
objectives to that of OPEC but with regards to gas. Qatar and other members of the GECF 
are already being criticized for forming some sort of cartel and this might pose some political 
risk for Qatar and the government should be aware of such risks (Wagbara, 2006). Therefore, 
Qatar does not oppose to trading in free markets but also believes that controls on gas are 
desirable especially in the current economic situation globally. To minimize the level of 
political risk, Qatar has to promote free trade in other areas of its economy and perhaps 
implement the controls on a short term basis. Long term controls depending on the level of 
restrictions can lead to political risk and this in turn might discourage investors in the future. 
The analysis of the chapter has also revealed that exhaustible natural resources, such as 
petroleum and natural gas, are fully state-owned in Qatar. All energy policies and relevant 
legislations are determined and enacted by the Council of Ministers and chaired by the Prime 
Minister. The Ministry of Energy and Industry (MEI) represents the state in those matters 
relating to petroleum and natural gas in regional and international organizations, particularly 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (the OPEC), of which Qatar has been 
a member since 1961 (WTO, 2008d). 
The analysis also demonstrated that Qatar's crude oil and gas production and reserves have 
risen in the last few years. The chapter has also shown that the short-term factors which affect 
Natural Gas are cyclical demand, the weather, fuel switching and the US economy. While 
short-term factors can significantly affect the demand for natural gas, it is the long-term 
demand factors which reflect the basic trends for natural gas use in the future. The analysis of 
such factors which affect long-term demand across all sectors is complicated. The actual 
demand for any source of energy relies on a variety of interrelated factors, and it is very 
difficult to predict how these factors will combine to shape the overall demand. 
The factors that affect the long-term demand of natural gas are residential and commercial 
demand, electric industry restructuring, natural gas industry restructuring, demographics and 
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population growth, energy efficiency regulations, technological advancements, industrial 
demand, economics of the industrial sector and electricity restructuring, environment 
emissions regulations, electric generation demand, flexibility and capital investment, 
environmental concerns, and the transportation sector demand. 
The chapter has also highlighted the role of the OPEC in stabilizing the oil market prices, and 
the various Geneva conventions. The chapter has also explained how, through WTO-backed 
policies, Qatar has overtaken Indonesia as the main supplier of natural gas on the world 
market. The chapter examines the trend of oil export, as well as gas export and gas gross 
domestic product. These explain the increase in the statements of income the nation has 
earned since joining the WTO. Issues which are beyond the control of Qatar - but which 
determine or influence the trade pattern of the country - were considered with particular 
attention to the various activities within the United States, and their effects on world demand 
for petroleum and natural gas. These include both short- and long-term influences. 
Lastly, the chapter has discussed the contribution of oil and gas to the Qatar economic 
modernization, and the policies Qatar has formulated and implemented in order to maximize 
its gains from two important primary products, i. e. the extraction of petroleum and natural 
gas. These products made a substantial contribution to Qatar's economy, resulting in the 
increase of gas-intensive industries over the years - such as petrochemicals and fertilizers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Two data collection approaches were utilized in this research, one using questionnaires and 
another using interviews with selected experts and authorities of Qatar. 
A questionnaire was designed in order to obtain respondents' views on the four fundamental 
research questions raised in Chapter One. These questions were then developed into a five- 
item Liker Scale in which respondents determined whether they 1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 
3. Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree, 5. Have no opinion. 
Contingency tables and simple descriptive statistics - specifically simple averages - were 
employed in analysing the data. Results were presented in tabular form and pie charts, and 
subsequently analysed and discussed, as notably in Chapter Six, Part A. 
Seven interview questions were also developed and administered. This was analysed in Part 
B of Chapter Six. 
5.2. TIIE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the economic effects of Qatar's membership to the World Trade Organization? 
The study investigated the economy of Qatar with a view to determining whether the 
economy improved or not when the country became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (the WTO). This task was accomplished by the researcher considering and 
analysing three factors: Qatar's economy prior to its WTO membership; the results of the 
economic reforms which Qatar subsequently embarked on after becoming a member of the 
WTO; and the role the oil and gas polices played in it. These factors were all considered for 
the purpose of identifying the reform's strengths and weaknesses. 
The study was conducted through the use of a survey which was focused on the business 
community and through semi-structured interviews with the WTO representative, the 
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Minister of Trade and Businesses, the Minister of Energy and Industry, and various heads of 
public companies. 
The research focused on the issue of whether has Qatar economically benefited from its 
membership within the WTO. Essentially, Qatar became a member of the WTO in order to 
benefit from the free flow of trade, avenues for trade negotiations, the settling of trade-related 
disputes, the assistance that the WTO provides to developing countries regarding trade policy 
issues, the administration of trade agreements, and cooperation with other nations and 
organizations. 
The researcher is interested in this issue as since Qatar became a member of the WTO it has 
opened up to international corporations and organizations which are now conducting business 
within the country. It is an important topic as this is a new phenomenon which can have a 
significant impact on the country and its people. Therefore, by identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses, the researcher hoped the country would then be in a position to work towards 
strengthening their strengths and working towards improving the weaknesses. 
Two data collection approaches were utilized within this research. This dual method 
approach combined quantitative and qualitative elements, and used a broad range of 
participants in the study, thus providing the depth of information needed to legitimize the 
results of the study. A review of literature on this dual method is helpful in clarifying any 
doubts on its appropriateness. 
When investigating human behaviour and attitudes, it is fruitful to use a variety of data 
collection methods (Patton, 1987, pp. 144-145). A dual method approach is more likely to 
increase both the validity and reliability of the research data. By validity we mean the control 
of variables to the extent that we can make generalizations from the sample of data. For 
reliability of data, we are referring to the consistency of results i. e. would other researchers, 
on examining the same data, reach the same conclusion, or, if they carried out the research in 
the same way, obtain the same results. According to Greene et al., `the range of possible 
benefits that carefully crafted mixed method designs can yield has been conceptualized by a 
number of researchers' (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham, 1989 pp. 255). 
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Therefore, using more than one method in this study can therefore strengthen the validity of 
the results: Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches pays off in improved 
instrumentation for all data collected approaches, and it sharpens the researcher's 
understanding of the findings. 
5.3. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METIIOI) AND DESIGN 
The quantitative and qualitative data collected and utilized in this research, focused on 
measuring the views of predetermined categories of respondents. "Using categorised 
materials that can be regarded as normal descriptive data can be analysed in a statistical way" 
(Patton, 1987, pp. 9-10). It deals with numbers, uses statistical models to explain the data, and 
is considered as `hard' research, such as by using opinion-poll research (Bauer and Gaskell, 
2000). Within organizations, such data are gathered through the conducting of surveys, 
questionnaires and tests. Results are precise and easily comparable. 
The main purpose of quantitative research is to isolate causes and effects, and define 
categories precisely before further study is undertaken (McCracken, 1990). The measuring 
and quantifying of phenomena is then carried out in order to determine the relationship 
between them (Flick, 1998). It requires researchers to create research designs and construct a 
`sample' of the necessary size and type in order to allow the generalization of findings 
applying to the larger population. The advantage of quantitative research is that it gives 
objective results so that the subjective views of the researcher and participant's influence can 
be eliminated. This method is best for closed questions, which allows the respondent to 
respond readily and unambiguously (McCracken, 1990). 
On the other hand, a qualitative research design is one where data is collected in the form of 
words and observations, which can take the form of detailed descriptions of situations, 
events, people, interactions and observed behaviours, beliefs and thoughts (Vittles, 1991). 
Qualitative research is associated with research questions and phenomena of interest which 
require exploration of detailed in-depth data, aimed at description, comparison or prescription 
as explicitly summarised by Miles and fuberman (1994). 
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Qualitative research is usually exploratory, descriptive or comparative in nature, containing 
some or all of the criteria such as: a) Intense and prolonged contact in the field, b) Designed 
to achieve a holistic or systemic picture, c) Perception is gained from the inside, based on the 
participants understanding, d) Little standardized instrumentation is used, e) Most analysis is 
done with words and f) There are multiple interpretations available in the data. 
Similarly, Denscombe (1999) identifies some features of qualitative research as a) a concern 
with meaning and the way people understand things; hence human activity is seen as a 
product of symbol and meanings that used by members of the social group to make sense of 
things. Such symbols and meanings need to be analyzed as a `text' - to be interpreted rather 
like a literacy critic interprets a book, b) A concern with patterns of behaviour. Here, the 
focus is on regularities in the activities of a social group - such as in rituals, traditions and 
relationships and the way these are expected as patterns of behaviour, cultural norms and the 
types of language used. Furthermore, as per Densecombe (1999), qualitative methods focus 
on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings, so that we have a strong handle on 
what `real life' is like. 
Blackman (1993) argues that research within organizations requires largely qualitative 
methods as its techniques involve close and sustainable encounters with people, such as 
participant observation, and in-depth interviews from different categories of workers from 
different walks of life. Also, while qualitative techniques generate rich data on people's 
knowledge, attitudes and preferences, the same can be used in combination with some 
quantitative methods in order to generate questions for structured questionnaires, to add depth 
to generalizations from survey research, and to develop hypotheses for further studies. 
A related method is known as `discourse analysis' (Punch, 2005, p. 221), which captures 
participant focus, and refers to the general framework or perspectives within which ideas are 
created. As per Keith Punch, discourse analysis is not a coherent body of theory, methods and 
practices. However, it is used in several academic disciplines. As a result, discourse analysis 
"has become an umbrella term for a wide variety of different analytical principles and 
practices" (Punch, 2005, p. 221). However, selecting a sample in a research is very important. 
Black (2002) preferred randomization as a means of sample selection. 
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This research was carried out over a period of around three years (October 2006 - July 2009), 
and was based on data collected through questionnaires and interviews which targeted the 
business community, consisting of private business people and the trade and economic policy 
making process in Qatar. Data was obtained from the business community through a 
questionnaire, while semi-structured interviews were conducted with the WTO 
representative, as well as government officials from the Ministry of Business and Trade and 
the Ministry of Energy and Industry. One hundred (100) questionnaires were distributed and 
sixty-one of these were returned with satisfactory responses, which represented 61% of those 
questioned. The survey sample in all cases was selected randomly. The researcher also 
planned to interview 22 people. However, only 17 people were willing to be interviewed. 
Seven questions were posed to each of these participants, yielding varied responses. 
5.3.1. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire has been a suitable instrument used within this research as questionnaires 
which are completed by respondents themselves are one of the main instruments for 
gathering data using a social survey design, along with the structured interview (ßryman and 
Bell, 2003, pp. 482-484). 
No survey is perfect but the aim of the research in this work will be to avoid error and bias as 
much as possible, and to proceed in a logical and careful manner. For this reason, the 
researcher piloted the questionnaire during the process of questionnaire design. According to 
Bell (1999, pp. 147-149), piloting is an approach that tests how long it takes recipients to 
complete the questionnaires, to check that all questions and instructions are clear, and to 
enable the researcher to remove any item which does not yield useable data. 
Questionnaires come in many forms, from factual opinion-based and tick boxes to free text 
responses. Whatever their form, they are often viewed as quick and relatively inexpensive, as 
long as the researcher is sufficiently disciplined to abandon questions which are deemed as 
superfluous to the main task (Bell, 1999, p. 147). However, some recipients tend not to like 
questionnaires. Similarly, the chasing up of non-returns is often needed in order to ensure that 
the sample is adequate and appropriate. They may also give superficial information but their 
advantages are more if properly managed. 
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Edward and Talbot (1999) suggested the following advantages and disadvantages with regard 
to the use of questionnaires: 
Advantages 
Questionnaires have advantages as they are able to give useful background information. They 
are also able to be administered by post or to a lot of people at the same time in one setting. 
In addition, they are reliable and can be easily analyses after collection. 
Disadvantages 
Questionnaires have disadvantages as recipients tend not to like them. The descriptive data 
they produce rarely allows the researcher to fully demonstrate his skills of analysis, as they 
give only quite superficial information. Another negative aspect is how the researcher can 
end up chasing non-returns, which is often needed to ensure that the sample is adequate and 
appropriate. 
The researcher intends to overcome this discouragement by ensuring that the questionnaire is 
focused, short and easy to analyze. Moreover, the researcher personally conducted the 
interviews and administered the questionnaire. 
On balance and in summary, the advantages are more than the disadvantages. As such, 
questionnaires were used. 
5.3.2. The research questionnaire 
The survey of this research consisted of 10 questions that were designed and structured to 
ascertain the views of the business community in Qatar about the WTO and its impact on 
their companies. Some of the questions were aimed specifically to discover the participants' 
opinions on whether it would be better for Qatar's economy to function without being tied up 
by WTO regulations. 
The survey process was conducted during the period from ist December 2007 to 6 `h February 
2008. In the beginning, the researcher had hoped to get 100 responses from the business 
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community of Qatar, but in the end only 61 of them replied to the questionnaires (see 
Appendix D). 
The researcher faced some difficulties in getting the responses of the other 39 questionnaires. 
This was due to various reasons, most of which related to the lack of cooperation and 
appreciations for academic researchers. In some cases, the researcher made before-Band 
appointments with some senior people in the companies to be covered in the survey but 
unfortunately when the researcher arrived for the meeting in the company, different types of 
apologies were expressed by the secretariat either because the respondents were too busy or 
went on leave. Despite continuous attempts to meet up with these people, the researcher's 
efforts were not successful. 
In some other cases, the researcher was asked to leave the questionnaire and his contact 
details with the secretariat of the company, so that it could be completed by the person with 
whom the researcher was supposed to meet. The researcher was asked to return to the 
company the next day to collect the questionnaire. In case of any enquiry or clarification 
about any of the questions, the researcher was promised to be contacted. Nevertheless, in 
most of these cases, the researcher was never able to get the questionnaires back, either 
because they were claimed to be lost or the person who was supposed to fill it in was on leave 
or becoming even busier! 
On the other hand, however, the researcher received important and valuable cooperation from 
other people within the business community. In 28 cases (out of 61 respondents), the 
researcher received very good assistance and appreciation of the topic of the research without 
even having any prior relationship between the researcher and the respondents. This, 
somehow, painted a good picture about the awareness of some people of the importance of 
academic research. These respondents felt that this research was very important for the 
economy of Qatar and was conducted at the right time. This was because the economy was 
witnessing unprecedented growth accompanied by evident openness and encouragement of 
foreign investment. The researcher's aim to evaluate the impact of the WTO regulations on 
the performance of the private sector was much appreciated. Some respondents even 
recommended that similar research should be consistently carried out as Qatar's economy was 
evolving and would perhaps be transformed into a more developed and sustainable economy 
in few years time. 
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The remaining 33 respondents (out of 61) were already known to the researcher. The 
researcher worked as a chief employee in the section of procurement and contracts in the 
Qatar Gas Company and, because of the nature of this work, the researcher had connections 
with many people within the business community in Qatar. Perhaps, being also a 
businessman himself, the researcher was able to get hold of many people, nationals and 
foreigners, to answer the questionnaire. 
In the beginning of the each interview, the researcher explained the aim of his research and 
how important it was for the economy of Qatar. Such explanations were well-received. For 
55 respondents, all the 10 questions were very clear and they did not have any enquiry nor 
did they ask for further clarification. But for the other six interviews, clarification was sought 
for question number 8. This question was about whether Qatar should sign free trade 
agreements with other countries such as the U. S. and India, as well as being a member of the 
WTO. The respondents asked about the differences between such FTAs and the WTO. The 
researcher had to explain that FTAs were bilateral trade agreements between countries which 
had proliferated in recent years due to the difficulties facing the Doha Round. These 
difficulties drove developed countries such as the EU and the U. S. to deviate from the route 
of multilateralism to pursue the route of bi lateralism/preferentialism. The researcher further 
explained that the FTAs applied more obligations on their partners than the WTO. 
5.3.3. Interviews 
Interviews allowed the researcher to capture the perspectives of the WTO and government 
officials on the issues being investigated. There are two types of interviews used in research: 
Structured interviews, in which a carefully selected word questionnaire is administrated; and 
in-depth interviews, in which the interviewer does not follow rigid form. 
The most common method used is the in-depth interview, which is unstructured with no 
lengthy questionnaire, and individuals are interviewed in sufficient detail for the results to be 
taken as true, correct, complete and believable reports of their views and experiences (l lakim, 
1987, pp. 26-27). According to Punch (2005, p. 170), it is used to understand the complex 
behaviour of people without imposing any prior categorization which might limit the field of 
enquiry. Its main weakness, as Hakim notes, is that small numbers of respondents cannot be 
taken as representative, even if great care is taken to choose a fair cross-section of the type of 
people who are the subjects of the study. 
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According to Berry (1999,159), "interviews have been used extensively for data collection 
across all the disciplines of the social sciences and in educational research. There are many 
types of interviews, as suggested in the literature". However, we focus on one particular type 
- in-depth interviewing - and how we will use this research method to collect data for our 
study. 
5.3.4. In-depth interviewing 
In-depth interviewing - also known as unstructured interviewing - is a type of interview 
which researchers use to elicit information in order to achieve a holistic understanding of the 
interviewee's point of view or situation; it can also be used in order to explore interesting 
areas for further investigation. This type of interview involves asking informants open-ended 
questions and probing wherever necessary in order to obtain data deemed useful by the 
researcher. As in-depth interviewing often involves qualitative data, it is also called 
Qualitative Interviewing. Patton (1987, pp. 109-114) suggests three basic approaches to 
conducting qualitative interviewing: 
5.3.5. The informal conversional interviews 
This type of interview resembles a conversation, during which the informants may sometimes 
forget that they are being interviewed. These chat-like conversations come across as informal, 
and allow the participants to relax, therefore allowing unambiguous answers. Most of the 
questions asked will flow from the immediate context. Informal conversational interviews are 
useful for exploring interesting topics for investigation and are typical of `ongoing' 
participant observation fieldwork. 
5.3.6. The General Interview Guide Approach (commonly called Guided Interview) 
When employing this approach for interviewing, a basic checklist is prepared in order to 
make sure that all relevant topics are covered. The interviewer is still free to explore, probe 
and ask questions deemed interesting to the researcher. 
This type of interview approach is useful for eliciting information surrounding specific 
topics. For this reason, Wenden (1982, p. 39) considers that the general interview guide 
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approach is useful, as it `allows for in-depth probing while permitting the interviewer to keep 
the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim of the study'. 
5.3.7. The Standardized Open-Ended Interview 
Researchers who opt to use this approach prepare a set of open-ended questions which are 
carefully worded and arranged for the purpose of minimizing variation in the questions posed 
to the interviewees. In view of this, this method is often preferred for collecting interviewing 
data when two or more researchers are involved in the data-collecting process. Although this 
method provides less flexibility for questions than the other two methods previously 
mentioned, probing is still possible depending on the nature of the interview and the skills of 
the interviewers (Patton, 1987, p. 113). 
The researcher utilized the general interview guide approach as it allowed the researcher to 
keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim of the study. 
The researcher enhanced his skills in conducting interviews by considering relevant literature 
on interviewing techniques as follows: 
5.3.8. Interviewing Techniques Informed by the Literature 
One essential element of all interviews is the verbal interaction between the interviewer/s and 
the interviewee/s. Hitchcock and Hughes (1989, p. 79) stresses that `central to the interview is 
the issue of asking questions and this is often achieved in qualitative research through 
conversational encounters'. Consequently, it is important for the researchers to familiarize 
themselves with questioning techniques before conducting interviews. 
Questioning Techniques 
Individuals vary in their ability to articulate their thoughts and ideas. With good questioning 
techniques, there is greater opportunity to facilitate the subject accounts and to obtain quality 
data from them. Current literature suggests some questioning techniques, summarized in the 
following points: 
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A- Ask Clear Questions 
Cicourel (1964, p. 161) reflects that `many of the meanings which are clear to one will be 
relatively opaque to the other, even when the intention is genuine communication'. 
Accordingly, it is important to use words that make sense to the interviewees, words that are 
sensitive to the respondent's context and world view. To enhance their comprehensibility to 
the interviewees, questions should be easy to understand, short, and devoid of jargon (Kvale, 
1996, pp. 83-87). 
B- Ask Single Questions 
Patton (1987,113-115) points out that the interviewer should not put several questions 
together and ask them all as one. He suggests that researchers should instead ask one question 
at a time, addressing one point at a time. Interviewing in this way will eliminate any 
unnecessary burden of interpretation on the interviewees. 
5.3.9. The Semi-structured Interviews 
For this research, having obtained the opinions of the business community about the impact 
off the WTO on their companies and business activities through a questionnaire survey, in 
order to collect more data on this issue, it was felt to be important to measure the perceptions 
of policy makers via semi-structured interviews. By gauging the views of policy makers on 
Qatar's membership of the WTO and whether the multilateral regulations had benefited the 
economy of Qatar, the research would have covered the views of the two important elements 
of the economy; the business community and the policy-making process. The interviews were 
conducted during the period between 151h February and 29th April 2008. 
The semi-structured interviews were based on open-ended questions, with the objective of 
raising discussions around certain issues related to Qatar's membership to the WTO. The first 
three questions focused on whether the WTO regulations have benefited the economy of 
Qatar. They are designed to support the findings of the earlier chapters of the thesis, namely 
chapters two and three, as well as the data collected from the survey. The fourth question is 
about whether the remit of the WTO should be extended to cover oil and gas exports even if 
this meant that Qatar could no longer adhere to OPEC quotas. This question is designed to 
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complement the analysis of chapter four of the thesis and the data collected from the 
questionnaires. 
The fifth question focuses on foreign investment and the incentive measures that Qatar has 
been adopting for the last decade to attract investments into its markets in different sectors. 
The sixth question deals with outwards investment and the extent to which Qatar would seek 
to invest in overseas markets and the extent to which the WTO could help Qatar in this 
respect. Both questions five and six are designed to complement the earlier analysis of 
chapter three on inward and outward investments. The last question is designed to measure 
the views of the participants about the Doha Round and the extent to which Qatar supports 
the objectives of the Doha Development Agenda. The data collected from raising this 
question would support the analysis conducted in different parts of the thesis. 
The researcher was very selective in choosing the suitable candidates for the interviews. The 
target was to meet with senior government officials who are responsible for the economic 
policy and decision making processes in Qatar. Originally, the researcher attempted to 
interview around 22 senior government officials, but ended up interviewing 17 of them (see 
Appendix E). The other five respondents did not appear to be available for the interview. One 
of them was spending his annual leave outside the country and the other four apologised for 
not being able to discuss the policy-making processes given their sensitivity. 
Surprisingly, although the purpose and the topic of the interviews were all about the economy 
of Qatar in relation to the WTO, some interviewees appeared to be quite reserved and not 
transparent enough. At some stages, the researcher found it difficult to discuss the political 
economy of the country with some interviewees. Five interviewees refused to have their 
names listed with the other respondents. Two of them claimed that they did not want to be 
caught discussing the policy of the Government. The researcher had to emphasise 
occasionally that the whole purpose of the research was academic and the outcome of the 
research would benefit policy making. Interestingly, when the researcher assured some 
interviewees that their names would be kept anonymous, they appeared to be more 
transparent and less conservative in expressing their views. 
Nevertheless, many other interviewees were, on the other hand, very transparent and 
appeared to be ready to help the researcher. They were very cooperative and answered all the 
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questions. Some of them helped the researcher to get in touch with other senior government 
officials which resulted in the end in satisfactory interviews and useful responses. However, 
in all the 17 interviews, interviewees did not like the idea of recording the interviews and the 
researcher had to agree with their wishes. 
Overall, the interviews were conducted in a very friendly manner. Most interviewees were 
quite well-informed about Qatar's economy and trading activities. But, for other interviewees, 
WTO related issues were not very familiar. Although they appear to know some basic ideas 
about the WTO and its main principles, issues such as the Doha Round, intellectual property 
rights, and dispute settlement were not known to them. 
5.4. DATA HANDLING AND ANALYSIS 
Qualitative and quantitative data analysis was used in order to analyze the collected data. 
According to Keith Punch (2005, pp. 234-244), this method involves the reduction and 
display of data in tables and charts, enabling the researcher to understand the items so that he 
can interpret and present his findings to others. Additionally, the information presented in the 
previous chapters was highlighted with a view to further enhancing the understanding of the 
issue. 
5.5. ETHICS OF THE RESEARCH 
In consideration of the participants in this research, the researcher abided by the following 
code of behaviour: 
" Individual respondents are not named in the research report; 
" Participants are given a copy of the research protocol explaining their contribution 
and how the research findings would benefit the country; 
" The researcher further assured the respondents that any discussion of individual cases 
would remain confidential to the researcher. 
When looking into people's behaviour and attitudes in the final analysis, it is useful to use a 
variety of data collection methods. As Patton (1987, p. 144) puts it; "the overlapping of data 
collection and analysis improves both the quality of the data collected and the quality of the 
analysis". Using more than one method when studying the same phenomenon can strengthen 
- 152 - 
the validity of the results; combining quantitative and qualitative approaches provides an 
improved instrumentation for all data collection approaches, and sharpens the researcher's 
understanding of the findings. 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the methodology of the research as based on two different, yet 
complementary methods; namely, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. This mixed 
quantitative and qualitative methodology was found to be very suitable for this research, as 
the researcher was able to directly collect primary data from the business community and 
policy and decision making processes on Qatar's membership to the WTO and whether or 
not, this membership has worked for the benefit of Qatar's private sector and economy. The 
findings of the data collected from both questionnaires and semi-structured interviews are 
explained and discussed in chapters six and seven respectively. 
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CHAPTER SIX: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSIONS OF SURVEY DATA 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the findings obtained from the questionnaire survey. The survey was 
conducted with the objective of attaining quantitative responses from the business community 
in Qatar about the WTO and its impact on their companies. The survey sought also to 
ascertain the views of the business community about whether it would he better for the 
economy of Qatar to function without being subject to WTO obligations. The second section 
of the chapter provides the researcher's discussions and interpretations of' the quantitative 
results obtained from the survey. The analysis of the questionnaires responses shows that the 
business community supports the Government's open market and free trade policies and 
believes that Qatar's membership of the WTO helps their businesses and encourages them to 
increase efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. These findings support the earlier 
analysis of the background chapters of the thesis. 
6.2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONAIRES 
OUTPUT TABLES 
Has the WTO membership been beneficial for your company'? 
Answer 1 2 3 
Strongly Agree Disagree 
Agree 
# of Respondents 11 33 5 
% of Total 18 54 8 
45 
Strongly No opinion 
Disagree 
0 12 
0-- 20 
20% 18% 
0% 
8% 
54`, 
  Strongly agree   Agree D Disagree Q Strongly Disagree   No opinion 
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A substantial proportion (54%) and 18% respectively hold the view that the W'IO 
membership has been beneficial to Qatar, which suggests that the move has been a welcomed 
development among Qatar's business community. However, there was a relatively high 
proportion of participants who could be considered as "sitting on the fence" as they 
responded with a 'no opinion' answer (20%), which may be as such due to many of these 
people not being aware of the effect of WTO membership on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
or on their line of position . 
In addition, they could perhaps be in business within sectors 
which exclusively focuses on the domestic market, hence they face less competition with F DI 
or competing fellow exporters. 
Have the requirements to comply with the WTO procedures resulted in an increased 
administrative burden for your company? 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 5 17 20 6 13 
% of Total 8 28 32 10 22 
8% 
22%, 
28% 
10% 
32% 
  Strongly agree   Agree Q Disagree Q Strongly Disagree   No opinion 
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The responses here are relatively well-distributed among rejecters and endorsers. Ilowever, 
there is a definite veer towards the latter groups, suggesting that the overwhelming majority 
of 64% of Qatari businesses face no extra burden in complying with the WTO rules. 
Do you agree that it would be better if Qatar was free to determine its own rules and 
regulations in trade and commerce, as opposed to being bound by the W'I'()? 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 15 23 16 5 2 
% of Total 25 37 27 8 3 
8% 3% 25/. 
27% ti 
L. Strongly agree   Agree Q Disagree Q Strongly Disagreed No opinion 
The array of responses to this question suggests somewhat contradictory majority perceptions 
concerning the impacts of the WTO regime: Whilst in Question I above, most respondents 
admitted that Qatar's accession to the WTO has been beneficial to the country, the answers to 
this question display another majority view which is contradictory, stating that Qatar would 
be better off if left alone to determine its own trade and commerce rules! 
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A plausible explanation for this could be that, as far as the Qatari businesses are concerned, 
portions of the WTO rules which promote the FDI and open up more developed markets are 
welcomed, but a laissez-faire trade atmosphere will harm locals as powerful foreign 
competitors may crowd them out! 
Qatar's competition in the banking and financial services sectors would be beneficial fier my 
company. 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No op 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 28 24 2 1 6 
% of Total 45 40 3 2 1( 
3% 
2% V 10°; 
" Strongly agree   Agree c Disagree Q Strongly Disagree   No opinion 
111011 
It is not surprising that the majority of participants agreed with this statement, with 45`%o and 
40% of the respondents respectively 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree', these respondents realise 
that they stand to substantially gain from the ensuing stiff competition among investors 
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within the capital markets, which will force interest rates down and result in numerous client- 
friendly products - both of which are of immense benefits them! 
The WTO should not get involved in interfering with conditions of employment and 
remuneration. 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 16 21 15 7 2 
% of Total 27 33 25 12 3 
12% 3% 27% 
25` = 
33% 
2 Strongly agree. Agree Q DisagreeQ Strongly Disagreem No opinion 
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As with the previous question, it is not surprising that most of the Qatari businesses prefer 
non-compliance with the WTO conditions on local employment and remuneration (27% 
stated that they `Strongly agree' and 33% stated that they `Agree'). Compliance will simply 
introduce heavy financial and social responsibility burdens on such businesses, hence their 
unattractiveness to them. 
The WTO is concerned with the problem of intellectual property rights, including trademarks 
and patents. Do you agree it should play a role in these areas? 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 13 24 14 1 9 
% of Total 22 38 23 2 15 
15% : 12% 
2% 
23% 
38% 
  strongly agree   agree Q disagree Q strongly disagree   no opinion, 
To a lesser extent, this question yielded similar answers to those in the previous questions; 
Qatari businesses seem to resent the domestication of the WTO rules on intellectual property 
rights, such as trademarks and patents. It appears that the respondents fear that with a 
developing economy, it will take time for operators in Qatar to master the skills or know-how 
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of the implementation required for such stringent and highly technical measures at this stage 
of the country's development. However, a really sizeable chunk (23%) stated that they 
'Disagree', while another 15% were deemed to have `no opinion' on the issue. 
Is membership of the GCC more important for Qatar than being a member of the W'I'O? 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 11 18 14 6 12 
% of Total 18 29 23 10 20 
20 
10% 
23% 
" strongly agree " agree p disagree Q strongly disagree " no 
This question produced the best distribution of responses with the model group only (29%) 
"Agreed", closely followed by those who 'Disagreed' (23%), while (20%) held 'no opinion' 
on the argument. At the same time, (18%) 'Strongly agree' which additionally considered to 
be quite significant. Therefore, the answers to this question represent a fair balance of 
opinions among the Qatari businesses concerning the issue of the country's simultaneous 
membership of both the GCC and the WTO. 
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Apparently, a lot of people appreciate the cultural and symbolic importance of being part oC 
the greater Arab community, while being simultaneously concerned about the cumbersome 
requirements of subscribing to two conventions on trade and commerce. 
Should Qatar sign Free Trade Agreements with other countries including the U. S and India. 
as well as being a member of the WTO? 
Answer 1 2 3 4 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
# of Respondents 25 23 5 i 
% of Total 42 37 8 5 
5% 
8% 
12% 
37% 
  strongly agree   agree Q disagree 0 strongly disagree   no opinion 
5 
lo Opinion 
5 
8 
There is a strong support for the idea of bilateral separate FT As with other countries, 
especially with economic power with which Qatar has strong relations. I loww, cv er. such 
agreements would complicate Qatar's relations with other GC'C countries, although Bahrain 
and Oman have signed FTAs with the United States. Qatar has not sought such agreements, 
as it has recognised the conflict between its multilateral commitments to the (i('(' and 
possible bilateral free trade initiatives. 
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Should the remit of the WTO include oil and gas exports entrenched under OPl. (' and other 
organizations? 
Answer 1 2 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
# of Respondents 10 15 
% of Total 17 25 
34S 
Disagree Strongly No opinion 
Disagree 
93 24 
15 5 
17% 
38°/ 
  strongly agree   agree o disagree 13 strongly disagree   no opinion 
This question caught most respondents 'off-guard', as a large portion (38%) had no opinion' 
on the subject, but the most responses (25) were from those who just 'Agree' that oil and gas 
should be included in the WT() remit in spite of the (W[('! It is most probahie that most of' 
the respondents have yet to see the operations of the two protocols to determine either their 
concerns or support. 
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Should Qatar open its transport system to all airline and shipping companies in order to 
ensure strong competition? 
Answer 1 2 3 
Strongly Agree Disagree St 
Agree I)i 
# of Respondents 15 32 4 
% of Total 25 52 7 
45 
rongly No opinion 
sagrec 
2 
13% 
7c' 
  strongly agree u agree o disagree a strongly disagree Ono opinion 
With a substantial 52% 'Agreeing' with this suggestion, none can doubt the popularity of this 
idea. In fact, a further 25% even said that they 'Strongly agree', concluding that 75 '%% of' 
those questioned accept the proposal of this idea. This is a clear seal of' approval tier pro- 
competition lobby in Qatar. 
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6.3. DISCUSSIONS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF TIIE FINIDINGS OF TIIE 
SURVEY 
6.3.1. The beneficial impact of the WTO on Qatar's private sectors 
The above results of the survey suggest that Qatar's membership within the WTO has been 
highly beneficial to both the people and country at large. This indicates that Qatar's business 
community is, to a large extent, in favour of the country's membership to the WTO. The 
survey used to assess the benefits Qatari companies enjoyed with the accession to the WTO 
revealed that 72% of the respondents hold the view that the membership has been beneficial 
to Qatari businesses. 20% held no opinion. This finding is helpful as it proves the fact that 
Qatar's accession to the WTO has brought significant advantages to businesses and 
businessmen, to a large extent, are appreciative of that fact. These findings are consistent 
with the analysis of the background chapters, demonstrating that the country's membership 
has brought about significant economic growth. 
However, it is relevant to point out the fact that a significant proportion of the respondents 
(20%) stated that they were without opinion with regards to the benefits realised as a result 
from Qatar's membership of the WTO. Arguably, this could perhaps be related to the fact 
that these businesses have not realised much influence from the membership. This can more 
or less be deduced from the fact that a percentage of the respondents have not seen how they 
can benefit from the country's accession to the WTO. 
In addition, although, in a general sense, the study has revealed that the majority of 
businesses do not face any extra burdens in complying with the WTO rules, a substantial 
proportion of the respondents reported that Qatar's membership of the WTO has increased 
the administrative burden of their company. This demonstrates that some Qatari businesses 
have faced problems in complying with the WTO procedures. 
6.3.2. Qatar's determination of its own rules and regulations 
An interesting argument was posed when the issue arose of whether Qatar would be 
considered to be `better off if it was free to determine its own rules and regulations relating 
to trade and commerce. Surprisingly, the majority of the respondents held the same view that 
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Qatar would be better off if left alone to determine its own trade and commerce rules. 
However, at this stage, it should be recalled that when the question on the benefits of Qatar's 
membership to the WTO was raised, an overwhelming majority responded in favour of 
Qatar's membership which can be seen as contradictory. A number of arguments can be put 
forth since this revelation: It does seem that, even though Qatari businesses welcome the 
membership, they are also concerned and worried that the associated consequences of its 
membership - such as the influx of foreign businesses and the impacts this brings - might 
also endanger some local businesses. In other words, while local businesses are happy to take 
advantage of the membership, especially with regards to economic advancement, they may 
still opt for a check on the rules. 
Therefore, the above conflicting responses seem to suggest that, although the business 
community in Qatar is positive concerning the accession to the WTO, it is still critical 
surrounding some of the implications associated with some of the rules. The way the 
participants responded to this question suggest that, while the people are generally happy 
about the WTO determining some of the commerce and trade rules, they are nevertheless 
critical about the idea of having all their trade rules determined by the WTO. They feel that 
there should be a fair deal in terms of the trade rules so that local businesses will not be left at 
the mercy of the longer foreign businesses. While this is, to some extent, inconsistent with the 
main elements of Qatar economic policies - which clearly highlight the policy elements as 
`the liberalisation of the economy and trade - the reduction of tariffs and removing of 
restrictions are still considered to be in line with its commitment to WTO'. Indeed, one can 
see that in its policy statement Qatar has demonstrated commitment to the WTO and its 
ensuing rules and procedures (Trade Policy Review, 2005). 
6.3.3. Competition among investors in the capital markets 
An overwhelming majority (85%) of the respondents revealed that they will significantly 
benefit from the competition among investors within the capital markets. It is envisaged that 
competition in the capital market has the effect of lowering interest rates, leading to increased 
financial capital for businesses and, consequently, expansion in production. Hence, these 
respondents are of the view that competition in the capital markets among investors will lead 
to better, more lucrative financial deals for the businesses. It has been reported that one 
advantage of the nation's accession to the WTO is the increased foreign investments within 
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the country. Consequently, this has been reported to lead to business diversifications. 
Potentially, the country will enjoy an increase in the banking and financial sector with its 
associated advantages. Responses from this question indicate that businesses have started to 
realise the benefits of an expanding financial sector; it is encouraging to note that Qataris are 
positive concerning the opening up of the financial and banking sector, and that they are 
ready to take advantage of that situation. Increased competition within the financial sector 
can force interest rates to come down. In addition, businesses can enjoy competitive financial 
products and packages which are likely to emerge as a result of the competition in the 
banking and financial sector. 
It is obvious that international commerce is more risky and associated with higher transaction 
costs than domestic commerce. Therefore, the existence of rules and a mechanism for 
enforcing them is crucial in reducing these transaction costs. Firms investing large sums into 
distribution and production need to be sure about the conditions which govern market access, 
and about the regulatory and competitive environments in which they will operate. In the 
absence of that certainty, the full potential of global engagement will not be realised. 
It is necessary to highlight that, paradoxically, enforceable trade rules arc important for the 
same reason that they are unpopular. Because trade creates winners and losers there is always 
political pressure to disrupt trade, even though its effects on the economy as a whole are 
positive. Under competitive conditions, imports provide consumers with benefits in excess of 
the costs to domestic producers, but producers often have more political influence; similarly, 
international competition puts firms and workers from different nations against one another, 
and also leads to pressures for national political leaders to assist local producers at the 
expense of foreigners. 
National producers' pleas for help will be particularly hard to resist if they can argue that 
their foreign competitors receive help from their governments. Under these circumstances, 
trade rules play a crucial role - both in restraining protective measures that may directly 
reduce consumer welfare and in helping to reassure investors and workers that the system is 
equitable. 
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6.3.4. WTO interference with the conditions of employment and remuneration 
The study revealed that the Qatari businesses who are considered to be not in favour of the 
WTO, extended into concerns over the interference of conditions of employment and 
remuneration. These businesses stated a desire to control their conditions of employment and 
remuneration. They queried that by allowing the WTO to be involved in determining 
conditions of employment and remuneration, there would be an increase in the financial and 
social responsibility of their businesses. 
Therefore, it has been made clear that Qataris do not want WTO rules and regulations to 
extend to determining local employment and remuneration. Again, this finding is consistent 
with the previous ones relating to the question of the extent of WTO's rules and regulations 
on trade and commercial matters and whether Qatar would be "better off', if it was left to 
determine its own trade regulations. The businesses in Qatar, as demonstrated in the survey, 
are of the view that they should be left alone to determine their own rules and regulations 
concerning employment and conditions of service. The businesses certainly sense that with 
the WTO determining rules of employment and conditions of services - particularly with 
regards to remuneration -- may lead to an increased responsibility and financial burden on 
them. In a sense, one can argue that, even though Qataris welcome the WTO with its rules 
and procedures, they are disinterested in any of those rules which are seen to negatively 
impact on their businesses. Rather, they look forward to developments that will bring 
opportunities for them while, at the same time, protecting their interests. 
6.3.5. WTO rules on intellectual property rights 
The above research findings have determined a clear conclusion, in that Qatari businesses 
appear to resent the extension of the WTO rules on intellectual property rights, such as 
trademarks and patents. There is an apparent fear among the businesses that, because they are 
at a developing stage, they have not acquired the required skills and know-how required in 
order to deal with such stringent and highly technical rules at this stage of the country's 
development. Nonetheless, a small percentage was still in agreement to the contrary. It should 
be noted that Qatar has taken steps to strengthen intellectual property rights by issuing 
legislation. 
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6.3.6. Bilateral Commitments 
The question on Qatar's subscription to the WTO and GCC conventions on trade and 
commerce produced significantly divergent views. 29% of the respondents were pleased with 
Qatar being both a member of the GCC and WTO; 18% of the respondents were not 
enthusiastic about the idea, while 20% decided not to voice their opinions. In an attempt to 
forward an explanation for the distribution of responses to this question, one is obliged to 
argue that each business is more concerned with its competitive position with regards to the 
country's membership of any convention. There is certainly some clear conviction that the 
businesses are positive about Qatar's membership to these two conventions. What they are 
perhaps uncertain and worried about is the impact of the membership on their businesses. In 
short, as long as membership will not bring along any burden on their businesses, they are 
unconcerned. With this said - and as mentioned earlier -- businesses will reject any rules or 
regulations which are seen to work against their interests. 
Therefore, it has been made categorically clear that Qatar's businesses are not interested in 
any other bilateral commitment. When this response is linked to the previous questions, it 
becomes clear that Qatari businesses appear to believe that they are already burdened enough 
by the WTO accession and its resultant rules. However, according to the Qatar Trade Policy 
Review Report, `the state of Qatar, since the mid-nineties, has been studying the 
opportunities to develop and to enhance economic cooperation and integration with different 
countries in different areas and regions, aiming to establish mutual Free Trade Agreements 
with those countries' (Trade Policy Report of Qatar, 2005). Consequently, Qatar has 
significantly progressed in forging bilateral commitments with members of the GCC, leading 
to the establishment of the Custom Union. In addition, Qatar has forged cooperation with the 
Arab countries, in terms of economic cooperation agreements such as those establishing the 
Greater Arab Free Trade Area. In preparation for establishing the Free Trade Area between 
the two groups of countries, 2004 negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement 
framework for the purpose of developing trade and investment relations. Similarly, Qatar is a 
participant in the ongoing negotiations between the GCC and the European Union, for the 
purpose of establishing a Free Trade Area between the two sides. 
Arguably, it can be said that Qatar is demonstrating serious commitment to the principles and 
objectives of the WTO and its emanated agreements, while taking advantage of the associated 
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benefits of becoming a member of the WTO. The fact that the respondents expressed their 
doubts concerning the idea of Qatar forging bilateral trade agreements with other countries is, 
perhaps, due to them not yet having realised the advantages of opening up for trade 
agreements. However, as a member of the GCC, it is in any case more appropriate for any 
new bilateral trade agreements to be negotiated by the GCC rather than by its individual 
members. Qatar has not negotiated separate trade agreements with overseas countries as 
Bahrain and Oman have done in the case of the United States. 
In short, the survey findings on this issue indicate that Qatari businesses support the idea of 
Qatar becoming a member of the Arab regional bloc (GCCA). However, the responses given 
also suggest that the Qatari businesses do, in fact, seem to be reluctant to subscribe to more 
than one organisation. This is probably due to the fear of having to meet complex 
requirements which might lead to administrative and financial complications. 
It is obvious that Qatar likes to think of itself as a nation which abides by its treaties and 
commitments; there is some indication that Qatar is committed to the international 
agreements. However, they are more likely to opt out of certain parts of agreements for fear 
that compliance would be contrary to their interest, and are likely to refuse to sign treaties on 
the grounds of potential legal exposure. This argument is in conformity with the respondent's 
opinion with regards to the WTO rules and procedures, as mentioned in the above findings. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that the country's behaviour towards the WTO is quite positive and 
it is ready to accept binding multilateral rules. This is perhaps because there is some 
indication that the rules of the WTO can improve the performance of their economy. 
6.3.7. The extension of the WTO remits to oil and gas sectors 
The study revealed that business community is not sure if the remit of the WTO should 
include oil and gas given the country's OPEC membership. This is due to the small 
percentage of respondents who responded affirmatively. It seems that Qatari businesses are 
unaware of possible conflicts between OPEC and WTO membership and their implications 
for oil and gas exports. 
To elaborate, the majority of the respondents did not make any useful comments (38% stated 
that they had `no opinion'). As with previous related questions, there is an indication that 
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most businesses have not yet started to realise the full impact of the WTO on their businesses. 
In addition, it can be argued that most of the people have yet to appreciate the impacts of the 
WTO and OPEC within the economy. This could be perhaps due to the various rules and 
objectives of the two protocols not being fully understood, with the same applying with 
respect to the full impacts in terms of their complementarities and confrontations. 
6.3.8. Opening transport system for foreign competition 
With regards to Qatar opening its transport system to all airlines and shipping companies to 
ensure competition, the responses suggest that Qatar business supports an open sky and open 
port policy. The Qatari businesses have indicated that they are prepared to open their 
transport system to all airlines and shipping companies. This was apparent from the responses 
on the question of whether Qatar should allow all airlines and shipping companies to operate 
to ensure strong competition produced very favourable responses. 77% of the respondents 
support this proposal. This is a strong indication that Qatar is very positive about foreign 
investments into the country and, to some extent, ready for the ensuing competition, as long 
as their companies shall be protected. This response also confirms other findings on similar 
issues. Private air carriers are allowed to operate scheduled flights in Qatar. According to the 
2004 Policy Review document, in principle, Qatar has no objections in allowing new entrants 
into the market. Qatar has signed bilateral agreements with 76 countries, Qatar has open-sky 
agreements with the United States, Malaysia, Lebanon, and Singapore (see Trade Policy 
Review, 2005). 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the results of the questionnaire survey. The main findings are that 
the business community in Qatar perceived the country's membership of the WTO to have 
benefited their companies and have locked-in the open economy and free trade policies of the 
Government. Respondents generally believed that the incorporations of the WTO regulations 
in the domestic laws of Qatar have made the business environment more transparent and 
predictable, which consequently attracts foreign investment into the country. These results 
are further supported by the findings of the semi-structured interviews as explained in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSTIONS OF THE SEMI- 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings from the semi-structured interviews. These interviews were 
conducted in order to obtain qualitative feedback on the implications of WTO membership 
for the economy of Qatar and its implications for the country's commercial laws. The aim of 
the semi-structured interviews was to add depth to the study having already conducted the 
survey of 61 companies, the findings from which were provided in the previous chapter. As 
in the previous chapter, this chapter is divided into two main sections; the first presents the 
findings of the interviews in a question and answer format and the second section provides 
the researcher's interpretations and discussions on the implications of these findings. Overall, 
the analysis of this chapter supports those of the survey, as most interviewees held the view 
that Qatar has benefited from the WTO membership. The latter regulations have made the 
market environment more transparent, predictable, and competitive. 
7.2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
As is indicated in chapter five, the researcher approached 22 people (policy and decision 
makers) but, only 17 people agreed to be interviewed. Seven questions were posed to each of 
the participants, yielding various responses, as detailed below: 
Q: What, in your view, have been the major benefits to Qatar from joining the WTO? 
A: This question attracted a fairly diverse response, but the most common view was that the 
WTO membership led to significant growth of the Qatari economy, as evidenced by a rise in 
the country's GDP (14 out of the 17 respondents); 6 indicated the removal of obstacles to the 
flow of trade with other countries, especially the attainment of the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) status and the signing of the trade agreement as one of the most important benefits of 
WTO membership. One respondent felt that `transparency' which enables members to design 
their own trading policies and strategies in light of information provided by other members 
on their trade activities is another important benefit of Qatar's membership. 
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Six respondents highlighted the boost to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), although one 
spoke of concerns that restrictions to FDI remain because of state domination of several 
sectors of the economy, notably telecommunications, as liberalization of trade generally has 
resulted in higher economic growth in the major markets for Qatar's oil and gas, which has 
increased their resource inputs. However, the key oil and gas sectors have done well 
indirectly under the WTO regime. 
Additionally, one respondent mentioned that, with the exception of oil and gas, Qatar had 
adopted measures to increase foreign direct investment inflows which aid development in 
sectors such as infrastructure, education, health and effective utilization of public 
expenditure. Furthermore, the respondent noted that economic, finance and fiscal reforms 
have also led to changes in key sectors of the economy, which are all the result of Qatar's 
active participation within the WTO. 
Overall, almost all of the respondents agreed that the WTO membership has made a positive 
contribution to all sectors of the economy. Two of the respondents called for technical 
assistance and capacity building for compliance to the WTO procedures. 
Q. Has the WTO membership had any detrimental effects on Qatar? 
A: Responses were all generally unanimous in agreeing that the WTO membership has had 
only very favourable impacts on Qatar's national economy, although the impacts were 
viewed as being marginal. The minor probable impacts were detailed by 10 respondents as 
being i) non-tradable goods could experience slowdowns at the expense of tradable ones, 
with an upsurge in the trade of the latter, and ii) it may `condense the opportunities of Qatar's 
subjects', which has been taken to mean that it could restrict their competitive advantage due 
to the fact that liberalization will unrestrainedly open the floodgates to foreign investors and 
foreign labour. This view was supported by one of the respondents who said that the lowering 
of tariffs on industrial imports - such as chemicals and plastics - could `dampen' the 
domestic industries producing these products. Specifically, it could also lead to an increase in 
the level of imports of these types of products into Qatar, and this might, in turn, have a 
negative impact on Qatar's national products, as they have to compete on equal ground with 
foreign imports. However, the respondent quickly qualified this by adding that the advantages 
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of Qatar's national products will militate against probable negative effects of low tariffs on 
such imports. 
Q. Has the WTO membership had any implications for the pricing and composition of 
Qatar's imports? 
A: In answer to this question, all the 17 respondents were unanimous on Qatar's strict 
compliance with its commitments to the WTO rules and Uruguay Rounds to place fewer 
restrictions on imports by way of low tariffs, so long as the party is found locally to buy the 
goods. The tariffs imposed by the various governmental agencies are only determined by the 
level of services offered by each particular agency, and neither affects the prices charged or 
revenues generated through them. Simultaneously, one respondent observed that Qatar was 
committed to its WTO obligations, putting the WTO agreements above its national 
legislation. 
Qatar's trade policies are aimed at facilitating its integration into the rule-based multilateral 
trading system, and help attract FDI as well as other benefits to the Kingdom. Above all, 
most of Qatar's exports are from the oil and gas sectors, whose prices are determined 
internationally, e. g., through the OPEC. 
Q. Should the remit of the WTO be extended to cover oil and gas exports, even if this means 
that Qatar could no longer adhere to the OPEC quotas? 
A: This question elicited mixed responses from the interviewees. In the main, all the 17 
respondents admitted that Qatar's economic fortunes are currently mainly tied to the oil and 
gas sectors, and hence, Qatar must pursue a policy in order to reduce its vulnerability to oil 
price fluctuations. However, the country must also balance its responses to global oil price 
fluctuations with its obligation to the OPEC's output quotas; that is to comply as much as 
feasibly possible. Up to 15 respondents hold similar views. They further argue that oil and 
gas are `non-agricultural goods' and, hence, should be subject to the WTO rules on trade. 
At the end of the questioning, there were three respondents who all held the opinion that, in 
fact, the primary aim of the OPEC is not to impose export ceilings on members but rather to 
serve as a common platform for oil exporting countries to organize and reconcile their 
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policies in order to preserve their natural resources and to ensure continuity and sustainability 
of supplies. In short, they disagree with the substance of the question's argument that Qatar 
could act without OPEC. 
A rather `wise' compromise was submitted by one respondent who reasoned that Qatar had to 
maintain its OPEC quota allocations but should negotiate changes from within and not 
without the oil cartel. 
Q. The WTO covers financial services as well as traded goods, Therefore, should Qatar open 
its banking and financial system to foreign investors? 
A: The general style of the responses was to reiterate the legal framework of Qatar's 
accession to the WTO as it relates to trade liberalization, namely, that the country has 
modified its laws to open up its banking services to the FDI. Even though there is near 
unanimity that this has a significant potential positive stimulus to the economy, most caution 
against wholesale liberalization. This would harm fundamental national interests such as the 
crowding out of Qataris from becoming majority share-holders in these banks and/or 
insurance houses. Hence, the country's Central Bank closely monitors the liberalization 
process in order to ensure compliance with relevant laws and policies, while at the same 
times ensuring that liberalization of financial services, is managed in an orderly way. 
It is consequently implied in these responses - tinged with patriotic concerns of the 
respondents - that `protectionism' should be applied in order to safeguard vital national 
interests, such as stimulating economic growth, diversification and employment generation. 
Q. Qatari investment activity has been involved in overseas acquisitions of companies, 
including the unsuccessful takeover bid for Sainsbury. Should Qatar allow foreign investors 
to acquire companies in Qatar, including local banks? 
A: Invariably, the substance of this question is very similar to that of the preceding Question 
and, hence, it is not surprising that the answers they yield are also very similar indeed. In the 
main, up to 15 respondents cited that, indeed, Qatari law and public policy are investment. 
friendly to the FDI and they do indeed provide incentive packages to foreign investors. For 
example, foreign investors are allowed to buy as much as 25% of the securities on public 
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companies listed on the Doha Securities Market (DSM), as well as being able to buy as much 
as 49% shares on any private company within the country. 
A substantial number of interviewees (seven) also suggested that there is a clear distinction 
between `investment' and `trade' as per WTO procedures, and perceptions of rigid 
nationalism by Qatar stems from this misconception. With respect to the latter, CATS Mode 
3 applies, which states that services providers should establish their businesses in importing 
countries but, at the same time, foreign investment is to be limited to a maximum ceiling of 
25% of investment. 
However, a cautious policy on FDI is advocated as not to allow 100 % foreign ownership of 
any serious company given Qatar's limited geographical size, as to do so would lead to 
`disasters to the economy as a whole'! Finally, one respondent disputed the assertion that 
Qatar has acquired any foreign companies but, rather, that the country has bought shares on 
external companies, a normal acceptable practice. 
Q. Qatar hosted the WTO meeting which resulted in the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations. 
This Round has, so far, not been successful. To what extent does Qatar support the objectives 
of the Doha Round, including, further trade liberalization on agriculture, services and 
intellectual property rights? 
A: The interviewees (all 17 participants), asserted that the Doha Round was a kind of 
watershed event that evolved into the much-quoted Doha Development Agenda that greatly 
promoted the interests of all developing countries. Specifically, the DDA includes the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies by developed countries, greater access to non- 
agricultural products, and the free movement of `natural persons'. The Doha Round 
unequivocally called on developed countries to `liberalize trade by removing the various 
obstacles that so far deprived developing countries of their right to enjoy international trade 
relations through equal opportunities'. 
Specific measures during the round were negotiated as a means to helping to ensure efficient 
financial flows to developing countries, especially FDI, in order to assist them in building the 
productive capacity they need to compete in the world market. Seven interviewees asserted 
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that, legally, non-Qataris are allowed 100% ownership of any investment in industry, 
agriculture, tourism, health, education and other projects. 
One respondent emphasised that Qatar's adherence to the global trade regulations could be 
seen in the incorporation of the WTO rules on intellectual property rights in its domestic 
laws. He added that Qatar also subscribed to many intellectual property rights conventions 
but, chiefly, those emanating from the WTO TRIPS agreement and the GCC's Unified Law 
on Patents of 2002. 
In an emphatic summary, a respondent is of the view that the Doha Round is the first 
negotiating forum to have both promoted the interests and met the requirements of 
developing countries in relation to goods, services, IPRs etc. Ile further submitted that 
Qatar's fortunes are tied to those of other developing countries and, hence, any gains through 
the DDA are bound to benefit Qatar. Another respondent observed that Qatar has assumed 
leadership roles among developing countries in advocating equitable trade relations with 
developed countries post-Doha. 
Having explored the main findings of the semi-structured interviews, the remaining of this 
chapter discusses the implications of these findings in relations to those of the survey and the 
analysis of earlier chapters. 
7.3. DISCUSSIONS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF TILE FINII)INGS OF TILE SI: MI- 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
7.3.1. Qatar's membership of the WTO 
More than half of the interviewees agree that Qatar's membership of the WTO has led to 
significant growth within the Qatari economy. This finding further supports those of the 
survey. The interviewees reported the following as the major benefits enjoyed with the 
country's accession to the WTO: the removal of obstacles to the flow of trade with other 
countries; the attainment of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status; the signing of the Free 
Trade Cooperation Agreements (FTA); and `transparency', which has enabled members to 
design their own trading policies and strategies. Furthermore, it was also reported by one 
interviewee that apart from oil and gas, Qatar has adopted measures to increase foreign direct 
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investment inflows which helps development in sectors like infrastructure, education, and 
health and ensures the effective utilization of public expenditure. All of these are as a result 
of Qatar's active participation in the WTO. 
It has been reported that Qatar favours trade liberalisation through the multilateral 
framework. The rules-based multilateral system should contribute to the further integration of 
least developed and developing countries into the world economy. Qatar believes that its 
membership to the WTO also sends a strong message to potential foreign investors 
concerning its commitment to a rules-based system (WTO, 1999). In addition to the benefits 
above, the WTO also provides more benefits than the responses have indicated as its 
provisions cover many issues of interest to Qatar. The WTO includes rules on standards and 
technical barriers to trade; it protects intellectual property; it covers agriculture and services. 
But, the biggest overall advantage of the WTO is that it includes a mechanism to enforce 
these rules, known as the `dispute settlement system'. This avoids the need for Qatar to resort 
to unilateral retaliatory measures, limiting an important source of tension between the United 
States and its partners, and so generating a significant foreign-policy dividend. 
Hence, it is evident that the interviewees were in support of the survey's findings that WTO 
regulations and principles work for the benefit of Qatar. As is mentioned before, the WTO 
provides the best means for the small economy of Qatar to integrate in the global economy. 
Qatar's exports such as petrochemicals would enjoy low tariffs in external markets and would 
be treated equally with other products. If Qatar felt that its exports were not treated equally 
with other foreign products in external markets or that unfair protective measures were 
imposed against them, it can resort to the dispute settlement of the WTO. Qatar can raise 
disputes under against any other member including the European countries or the United 
States. Hence, the WTO has furnished Qatar's exports with the suitable legal environment 
upon which its trading activities can functions on the basis of non-discrimination, 
transparency, and predictability. Thus, it is the task of Qatar's businesses and industries to 
utilise this legal environment of the WTO. 
The same argument applies to imports. As is mentioned in chapters two and three, WTO 
regulations oblige Qatar to treat all imports equally on the basis of the most-favoured nation 
principle. This will lead to increase the level of competition in the Qatari market between 
foreign products which will result in offering better consumer prices and higher quality. Also, 
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the national treatment principle whereby Qatar must treat foreign products equally with local 
products forces the latter to be of a higher standard in order to compete effectively with 
imports. Government supports and subsidies for domestic products will be difficult to carry 
out under the WTO, which leads to a reduction of financial burden from Government 
shoulder. 
7.3.2. Burdens in complying with the WTO rules 
The question on whether Qatari businesses realise any extra burden in complying with the 
WTO rules was raised in the survey and revealed that Qatari businesses face no problems in 
complying with the WTO procedures. Similar views were put forward by the interviewees 
who suggested that Qatar's membership of the WTO will also lead to very minimal negative 
consequences. While it can be argued that, in general terms, the rules and procedures of the 
WTO pose no potential hindrances, it is interesting to nevertheless note the minor probable 
negative effects raised by a few of the interviewees. 
Various interviewees held the argument that `non-tradable goods could experience 
slowdowns at the expense of tradable ones, with an upsurge in the trade of the latter', lt may 
also `condense the opportunities of its subjects'; here taken to mean to restrict their 
competitive advantage due to the fact that liberalization will unrestrainedly open the 
floodgates to foreign investors and foreign labour, and that by lowering tariffs on industrial 
imports such as chemicals and plastics, domestic industries producing these products could 
be `dampened'. Specifically, it can also lead to an increase in the level of imports into Qatar 
of these types of products, and this might, in turn, have a negative impact on Qatar's national 
products, as they have to also compete on equal ground with foreign imports. 
Although these arguments are held by a minority of the interviewees, the fact still stands that 
it is being raised as an issue, and suggests that, although Qatar is positive about the accession, 
they are nevertheless critical about some of the rules. They, perhaps, are only interested in 
those rules which they believe can work to promote their businesses. 
The concerns held by some of the interviewees are, to some extent, consistent with the issues 
raised in the Trade Policy Report 2005 with regard to the WTO rules and their 
implementation. According to the report, Qatar has expressed a number of concerns about its 
- 178 - 
difficulties in implementing the WTO agreements, as well as concerning the dangers of 
marginalising both developing and lesser developed economies. Accordingly, the 
implementation of some of its obligations resulting from the WTO agreements has been very 
difficult (WTO, 1999). Qatar has, therefore, expressed a request for clarification of some of 
the provisions on special and differential treatment for developing countries. 
7.3.3. QATAR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 
It is obviously clear that Qatar's participation in the WTO is generally welcomed by its 
government and people, and the objectives for becoming a member of the WTO fits well with 
the nation's policy goals which are to establish long-term strategies in helping to make 
Qatar's economy stable and diversified and, consequently, by creating and promoting a 
modern economy. This is consistent with the views held by the Qatar Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (2004) which has as a policy objective concerned with the development of 
Qatar's commercial sectors and other parallel services, while also diversifying trade and 
economic partnerships with regional and international entities, supporting the private sector, 
enhancing its role in the development process and promoting local investment and attracting 
foreign investments (Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2004). 
Based on the points raised above, it can be argued that Qatar realises the importance of 
exports. However, what the Qatari people should understand is that the gains from trade go 
well beyond that. There is a need for Qataris to understand that exporting raises the prices 
producers can charge for their products, and allows for economies of scale. Importing reduces 
product prices and increases the choices available to consumers. Trade also intensifies 
competition, thereby encouraging firms to be more productive and innovative. Ilowever, it is 
important to highlight the fact that trade cannot deliver prosperity in a vacuum. In a world of 
nations and states, moving goods and services across borders may require dealing with a host 
of institutional, regulatory, linguistic, legal, cultural, informational and political factors (sec 
Bradford and Lawrence, 2004). 
7.3.4. Opening up financial services for foreign investment 
It was found from the interviews that Qataris are positive about opening up their financial 
services to foreign investment. This is, to a large extent, consistent with the findings that have 
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emanated from the questionnaire. It is worth noting that Qatar's economic policy has been 
described as one which aims at promoting foreign investment. As such, it is not surprising 
that the interviewees were arguing in the same vein. However, the findings have repeatedly 
implied that despite the Qatari accession to the WTO being in line with the nations policy 
objectives of economic diversification, caution should nevertheless be applied to ensure that 
the policy of diversification - and, therefore, the opening up for foreign investment - is 
guided in order to avoid local businesses competing out of business. It can be deduced from 
the arguments above that Qataris, yes, are interested in foreign investments, but they are also 
critical concerning wholesale liberalisation. One interviewee puts it very clearly when he 
asserted that, `Protectionism should be applied to safeguard vital national interests such as 
stimulating economic growth, diversification and employment generation'. 
Nevertheless, being a member of the WTO means that Qatar has agreed to pursue the 
liberalisation commitments as required by the WTO regulations. This ultimately means that 
Qatar's pursuance of "trade protectionism" measures is very restricted as it works against the 
principles of the WTO. This does not mean that Qatar can not safeguard its national interests 
under the WTO. On the contrary, there are different provisions and measures which Qatar can 
resort to in cases of financial difficulties such as those related to balance of payment or 
dumping. But, these measures can be only applied under certain circumstances. 
7.3.5. Extending the remits of the WTO to oil and gas sectors 
When asked as to whether the remit of the WTO should be extended to cover oil and gas 
exports, differing responses were given. Unanimously, the interviewees believe that Qatar's 
economic fortunes are currently hugely tied to the oil and gas sectors, and hence, must pursue 
a policy to reduce its vulnerability of oil price fluctuations. However, the country must also 
balance its responses to global oil price fluctuations with its obligation to the OPEC's output 
quotas. That is, to comply as far as feasibly possible. They further argue that oil and gas are 
`non-agricultural goods' and, hence, are subject to WTO rules on trade. A smaller number of 
the interviewees, however, argued that, the primary aim of the OPEC is not to impose export 
ceilings on members, but rather to serve as a common platform for oil exporting countries to 
organize and reconcile their policies in order to preserve their natural resources, revenues, 
and to ensure continuity and sustainability of supplies. 
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It is important to note that Qatar's petroleum and natural gas wealth are owned by the state, 
under the Qatar Petroleum Company (QP) (Trade Policy Review, 2005), which is an 
exclusive Government agent in the conduct of petroleum and natural gas operations, either 
directly or in cooperation with foreign corporations through production-sharing agreements 
(PSAs) or development and fiscal agreements (DFAs). Crude Oil exploration and production 
activities may be carried out under PSAs, which allow foreign contractors to hold up to 100% 
working interest or under. 
A rather `wise' compromise was submitted by one respondent who reasoned that `Qatar 
should hold fast to its OPEC quota allocations but should negotiate changes from within and 
not without the oil cartel'. This is because Qatar shares mutual interests with other oil 
producing countries. Collective oil pricing policy makes Qatar's voice strong. 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that many interviewees did not clarify how the current 
WTO regulations could be better improved to address the interests of oil and gas producing 
countries. Unlike the case of agriculture or textiles, there is no separate agreement dealing 
with oil and gas. But rather, they are dealt with as any other non-agricultural products. 
However, given the importance of these energy products for the international economy it is in 
the interests of Qatar and other producing countries to see these products receive better 
treatment under the WTO. Perhaps, with the entry of Saudi Arabia to the WTO in December 
2005, all the GCC countries are now members of the WTO. Qatar and its GCC partners, 
along with other oil producing partners, could lobby for the foundation of a new separate 
agreement on oil and gas via which stability in energy prices is achieved and whereby the 
interests of producing and consuming countries are mutually taken into account. 
7.3.6. The implications for the pricing and composition of Qatar's imports as a result of 
its membership of the WTO 
The question relating to the implications for the pricing and composition of Qatar's imports 
as a result of its membership to the WTO produced a positive indication during most of the 
interviews. It appears that Qataris are aware of the fact that although most of their exports 
come from oil and gas whose prices are determined internationally this is not necessarily the 
case with imports. It was not a surprise, then, that there ensued a unanimous agreement 
among the interviewees that Qatar should strictly comply with its commitments to the WTO 
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rules and the Uruguay Round to place less restrictions on imports by way of low tariffs, so 
long as a party is found locally to buy the goods. `The tariffs imposed by the various 
governmental agencies are only determined by the level of services offered by each particular 
agency and neither affects the prices charged or revenues generated through them, ' was 
mentioned one interviewee. Certain products - such as gas, petroleum, electricity, and water, 
as well as some services e. g. telecommunication, air transport, postal and tourism - are 
subject to price controls. The prices of these goods and services are set by the relevant 
companies, subject to approval by the Council of Ministers. 
7.3.7. Attracting foreign investment 
Qatar's trade policies are aimed at facilitating its integration into the rules-based multilateral 
trading system, and sought to help attract FDI as well as other benefits to the country. It was 
previously discussed that one of Qatar's economic policies is to open up its market to foreign 
investments. When questions were asked relating to this policy, there has always been an 
indication that Qataris are positive concerning the idea of foreign investment. This is in line 
with Qatar's measures with regard to production and trade. This goes in line with earlier 
findings obtained through the survey. 
Qatar offers various investment incentives both to national and foreign investors. The 
purpose of the incentives is to encourage and orient investments in order to promote the 
country's development objectives, encourage the utilisation of, and add value to, local 
products; promote exports; and introduce new industries, products, and technologies 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Investment Incentives, 2008). The interviewees in responding to 
a related question which focused on foreign investment confirmed that Qatari law and public 
policy are investment-friendly to FDI and do indeed provide incentive packages to foreign 
investors. In furthering the confirmation, one interviewee reiterated that `foreign investors arc 
allowed to buy as much as 25% of the securities on public companies listed on the Doha 
Securities Market (DSM), as well as that they can buy as much as 49% shares on any private 
company in the country. This indicates that Qatar is positive about the privatisation of its 
economy with the aim of reducing public liabilities and raising cash to finance public deficits. 
A central objective is to increase the participation of the private sector in the economy, and 
make it an important driving force, rather than the small, under-developed sector it has been. 
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Furthermore, interviewees were also supportive of the Government policy of diversifying its 
investments in external markets. Buying shares in well-known companies in different parts of 
the world such as the European countries, the Untied States, and Japan helps the Government 
of Qatar achieve its objectives to diversify sources of income. Investing in foreign companies 
is also one of the best means to integrate in the global economy and achieve sustainable 
development. WTO regulations ensure that Qatar's interests in overseas markets arc well- 
safeguarded. 
7.3.8. Qatar's position in the Doha Round 
On the extent to which Qatar supports the objectives of the Doha Round, including, further 
trade liberalization on agriculture, services and intellectual property rights, the majority of the 
interviewees maintain that the Doha Round was a kind of watershed event which evolved into 
the much-quoted Doha Development Agenda which has greatly promoted the interests of all 
developing countries. Qatar's main interests in the DDA include the elimination of 
agricultural subsidies by developed countries, greater access to non-agricultural products, 
trade facilitation, and the free movement of `natural persons'. The Doha Round 
unequivocally called on developed countries to `liberalize trade by removing the various 
obstacles that so far deprived developing countries of their right to enjoy international trade 
relations on equal opportunities'. 
Although Qatar does not share the financial constraints facing many developing countries, it 
has an interest in the Doha Development Agenda being successful. If further international 
trade liberalisation helps increase income in developing countries, especially large states like 
India, this increases the market potentials for Qatar's oil and gas exports. It also increases 
opportunities for Qatar to invest in the markets of nearby large developing countries. 
Specific measures that help to ensure efficient financial flows to developing countries, 
especially FDI were negotiated during the round in order to assist them in building the 
productive capacity they need to compete on the world market. Qatar also supports the 
strengthening of technical assistance programmes for developing countries. 
As previously indicated, this study has made it clear that Qatar likes to think of itself as a 
nation which abides by its treaties and commitments. There is some indication that Qataris 
are committed to the international agreements. However, they are more likely to opt out of 
certain parts of agreements for fear that compliance would be contrary to their interests, and 
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are likely to refuse to sign treaties on the grounds of potential legal exposure. The study has 
shown that the country's behaviour towards the WTO is quite positive, and it is ready to 
accept binding multilateral rules. 
7.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has clearly demonstrated that the policy and decision making processes in Qatar 
are in support of the WTO membership; thus supporting the earlier findings of chapter six. 
WTO membership is perceived to have benefited the economy of Qatar. The incorporations 
of WTO laws and regulations have made the economy of Qatar and its market environment 
more transparent and predictable. WTO regulations helped Qatar achieve its strategies of 
attracting foreign investment, increasing competition, providing better services with higher 
quality with cheaper prices for consumers. Qatar's exports and its outwards investment are 
protected by the WTO regulations. If Qatar felt that its interests in overseas markets have 
been negatively affected as a result of discriminatory measures undertaken by other trading 
partners, the WTO dispute settlement can restore and protect Qatar's rights. Oil and gas 
sectors are still not adequately addressed under the current WTO regulations. Obviously, 
foundation of a separate agreement on energy sectors that takes into considerations the 
interests of both producing and consuming countries will be a very important development in 
the field of international commerce. Perhaps, Qatar and its GCC partners could lobby for the 
inclusion of the energy sectors in the current Doha negotiations. The latter also provide 
opportunities for Qatar to lobby for achieving its interests as a small developing economy in 
different sectors and issues; finance, telecom, insurance, health, education, agriculture, 
property rights, and dispute settlement. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this thesis, it was found that Qatar has achieved a measure of 
economic diversification which has been aided by the policy framework that resulted from 
WTO membership. The thesis has shown that, to a large extent, Qatar has succeeded in 
achieving its development objectives. A thorough study of Qatar's approach to development 
suggested that the main economic activity of the country centres on oil and gas production. 
The discovery of oil and natural gas resources has led to high technological development in 
Qatar and rapid urbanization. 
The objective of this empirical inquiry was to investigate the new legal norms imposed by the 
WTO in light of economic growth and diversification, and intellectual property rights in 
Qatar. The research explored and analyzed the performance of Qatar as it undertook trade 
liberalization and economic reforms and tackled the software piracy problem. The study, in 
essence, makes a comparison of Qatar's newly gained access to the WTO membership with 
the implementation of TRIPS to pre WTO accession. 
The research methodology adopted in writing this thesis included the use of macro-economic 
and micro-economic data, publications by the WTO, and several other international 
organizations, besides making use of primary and secondary source data. Also, several 
interviews were conducted for the purpose of gathering data pertaining to the thesis. 
Beginning with an analysis of the WTO, the research concludes that the WTO came to 
liberalize trade and remove trade barriers. From its inception to date, the WTO has attained 
some of its goals. The WTO initially sought to fulfil its role by having countries agree to 
reduce barriers to trade and to conduct trade in line with agreed rules. The agreements laid 
the foundation of the multilateral trade system upon which the member countries are 
committed, which is to attain the overall social goals of improved standards of living, full 
employment, expanded production and trade in goods and services, and to enhance the share 
of developing countries in world trade. The purpose of the agreements negotiated, i. e. to 
increase international trade, could create employment opportunities in developing countries 
by contributing to a reduction in poverty and, thus, improving the standard of living of those 
people. In the same vein, developed countries have a wider outlet available for their 
manufactured goods, and their companies can even relocate to developing countries where 
they can take advantage of the abundant availability of inexpensive labour. 
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8.1. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The research findings showed that the liberalisation of the trading system has brought 
substantial benefits for WTO member countries. The advantage of a reduced tariff level will 
certainly enable poor countries to fully participate in the export trade, particularly when these 
countries have standardization problems. At the same time, businesses in developed countries 
whose markets are saturated particularly with agricultural by-products can export these goods 
to countries which cannot produce enough. This can help ease prevailing food shortages in 
those countries. More importantly, it will also help reduce food prices. Allowing the export of 
raw materials would help both developed and developing countries alike. Developed 
countries can access raw materials from developing countries at the world market prices, 
while developing countries can also access raw materials that they do not have for their 
budding manufacturing industries. Exemptions from a tax burden may be more beneficial to 
developing countries because that could help bring in industries resulting in generating 
employment. By acceding to these agreements, the only obligation on a member is to accord 
the same benefits, unconditionally - to similar products or services of all members - once 
these have been given to a product or services of any country. 
It was also found that the agreements of the WTO - the WTO trade rules - are negotiated 
by governments, and these negotiations are ongoing. Clearly, it has been found that the role 
of the WTO is to serve as a forum for negotiations, the settlement of trade disputes, and as a 
reviewer of trade policies in checking non-compliance - all aimed at helping governments 
to liberalize the global trade and to provide better lives for their citizens. 
The analysis of Qatar's economic activities suggests that the economy of Qatar has 
increasingly been integrated in the world economy as the total exports of Qatar for 2007 
accounted for 59.15 percent as a percentage of GDP. These exports were comprised mainly 
of oil and gas, but the latter especially is subject to value added in Qatar. This, as has been 
discovered in this study, can increase the wealth of Qatar. Qatari economy is therefore said to 
be driven by international trade. 
It was found that Qatar's membership to the WTO provided the country with opportunities to 
diversify its export destinations, and to increase its manufacturing capacity. This shows that 
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Qatar's membership within the WTO has improved and boosted its international tradc 
activities. 
The real GDP has been found to be growing following the increases in capital investments. 
The cost of living has risen - but this was mainly due to the expansion of the economy, 
especially with regards to oil and gas, and not the WTO membership of Qatar. 
Qatar's policy for economic relationships centres around five objectives: namely, the 
liberalization of the economy and trade that can be realised via its WTO membership; 
reduction of tariffs; the alignment of its standards with the WTO commitments; export 
diversification; and access to the world market. The discovery of oil and gas, as mentioned 
earlier, has led to a great contribution to Qatar's economy, resulting over the years in the 
increase of gas-intensive industries, such as petrochemicals and fertilizers (sec Qatar 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2004). 
Qatar's share in the world's natural gas reserves has been increasing continuously and 
successively. The development of gas-intensive industries - such as petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, and refining - is a key component of Qatar's overall diversification strategy. 
Exhaustible natural resources - such as petroleum and natural gas - are fully state-owned 
in Qatar. All energy policies and relevant legislation are determined and enacted by the 
Council of Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister. It was shown that Qatar's crude oil 
production and reserves have increased owing, in part, to the fact that Qatar has the third 
largest gas reserves in the world. 
Qatar's crude oil is mostly imported by Asian countries, ranging from Japan and Korea, tu 
China and the Philippines, Singapore to Thailand, and even to India. The Qatar energy policy 
has two major objectives, which are `to sustain' the level of oil production, and `to mnaximize' 
the returns from gas reserves. 
In conducting this research, i. e. to determine the economic effects of Qatar's membership of 
the WTO, both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were utilised. The study 
showed that Qatar has significantly gained from its membership of the WTO. The country 
has attained the overall social goals of improved standards of living and employment 
opportunities have risen. The production and trade in goods and services have also been 
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enhanced. All of these factors are linked. The increased international trade has created 
employment opportunities in the country contributing to improving the standard of living of 
the people. Similarly, the country has created wider outlets for foreign companies to invest 
which has also opened up the possibility of more job opportunities. 
The research findings showed that the liberalisation of the trading system has enormous 
benefits for all the WTO member countries. The advantage of a reduced tariff level has 
enabled Qatar to fully participate in the export trade. At the same time, businesses in 
developed countries whose markets are saturated - particularly with agricultural by-products 
- have found that exporting these goods to countries which cannot produce enough can 
often help ease prevailing food shortages within those countries. More importantly, it also 
helps to reduce food prices. 
Allowing the export of raw materials would help both developed and developing countries 
alike. Developed countries can access raw materials from developing countries at the world 
market price, while developing countries can also access raw materials for their budding 
manufacturing industries. Exemptions from a tax burden may be more beneficial to 
developing countries as that could help bring in industries resulting in generating 
employment. By acceding to these agreements, the only obligation on a member is to accord 
the same benefits unconditionally, providing all WTO member countries with the same 
benefits. 
The study revealed that both the nation and businesses are optimistic about joining the W`l'O. 
With the WTO rules and procedures, Qatar is now competing in trade and attracting foreign 
direct investment as enshrined in the national economic policy. I lowever, despite the fact that 
Qatar is positive about the country's accession to the WTO, there is also evidence that some 
businesses are reticent to commit to some of the multilateral trade negotiations. One reason is 
the fear that some of the trade rules may place multiple demands on their limited resources. 
Another reason is that Qatar will have to fund some of the reforms before any benefits in 
terms of increased revenue and trade are seen. A major cause for concern which has been 
highlighted within this study is the difficulty in determining how much it would cost agreeing 
to all the trade rules and how much reform government and businesses would have to 
undertake before they started to reap the benefits. Agreeing to all the WTO trade rules, as fur 
as Qatar is concerned, has involved introducing new regulations, institutional changes, 
training, equipment and infrastructure. 
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It is evident from this study that some of Qatar's regulatory regimes are in conflict with WTO 
obligations. Similarly, there is the worry that consumer concerns may be manipulated by 
protectionist elements. These fears can raise the credibility of the WTO as an issue, especially 
where it is perceived that the WTO rules are applied in a way that does not reflect consumer 
concerns. In a way, therefore, both Qatar and the WTO is faced with a daunting challenge: 
For the WTO, the main issue is how to deal with the problems some developing countries are 
having in implementing the commitments they had made in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Developing countries are concerned not only about these difficulties but also about the 
overall balance of what was negotiated, believing it had been to their disadvantage and that it 
has failed to deliver the benefits they expected. Of central importance, however, is the fact 
that some developing countries do not have the administrative and technical capacity to 
implement commitments they were obliged to make. Consequently, both the WTO and Qatar 
must come up with new negotiations. 
The WTO will have to place the interest of poor members at the very heart of their work. 
Similarly, as far as Qatar is concerned, new trade negotiations are inevitable given the issues 
raised in this project. Negotiations will open markets up and reduce all forms of export 
subsidies, while taking into account non-trade and development concerns. Market access is 
certainly a key interest within any negotiation. Nonetheless, Qatar's best interest will be 
served by significant reductions in tariffs on all products, with access to a special safeguard 
clause. 
Regarding non-trade concerns, it is clear that negotiators ought to balance political needs and 
policy. However, it is vital that non-trade concerns avoid any trade distorting effects. Other 
issues to be addressed in future negotiation rounds should include: state trading entities; 
export credits; food aid; and two price systems and tariff rate quota administration. It is worth 
mentioning that, in order for Qatar to meet its overall liberalisation commitment, the 
following requirements must be met: the provision of assistance, capacity building and 
sufficient time for the desired results to be realised. Debates and discussions regarding the 
application of some of the WTO trade rules - especially with regards to trade liberalisation 
- will be needed in order to illuminate difficulties facing the country in this regard. 
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Qatar will have to study opportunities in order to further develop and enhance economic 
cooperation and integration with different countries, especially those in different areas and 
regions. To effectively manage these recommendations, there is a need for Qatar to establish 
a council that will be focused with, firstly, monitoring trade and investment relations, 
identifying opportunities for expanding trade and investment and issues relevant to trade or 
investment as appropriate to negotiation and in an appropriate forum, and secondly, hold 
consultations on specific trade and investment matters of interest to the WTO and other 
relevant parties, and thirdly, to identify and work towards the removal of impediments to 
trade and investment flows. 
The research has, to a large extent, revealed that Qatar has enjoyed benefits from the trade 
liberalisation, resulting partly from its accession to the WTO. Nonetheless, further trade 
liberalisation has the potential to deliver further gains in efficiency for the country. 
The thesis also discovered that Qatar's policy of trade liberalisation - which is in line with 
the WTO - helps improve living standards of the Qatari people. This is because it tends to 
increase average incomes and provide more resources with which to assist Qatari people 
improve their standards of living. Interestingly, it was discovered that while it generally 
affects income distribution, it does not appear to do so in a systematically adverse way. The 
study highlighted that most trade reforms hurt someone, by possibly triggering greater 
difficulties in living conditions, and that some reforms may worsen living standards, despite 
boosting total incomes. 
Although it was not the intention of this study to look at how trade liberalization can be 
implemented in such a way that its benefits are maximized, it is suggesting that future similar 
researcher could consider looking at `the public policy to be put in place for the 
implementation of trade liberation reforms for maximizing its benefits to improve overall 
living standards of the Qatari people'. 
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8.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are hereby submitted. 
Each of the recommendation is considered to be practical and realistic, and it is the hope of 
the researcher that when they are implemented, much of the trade-related problems 
highlighted above will be curtailed. The recommendations are, therefore, geared towards 
providing a way forward for both Qatar and the WTO, and the rest of the WTO member 
countries. 
The study has suggested the need for there to be more effective mechanisms in place for the 
enhancement of the simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures, 
covering the activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, 
communicating and processing data required for the movement of goods in international 
trade. According to the study, Qatar heavily relies on international trade, since its key 
economic activities centre on oil and gas, which are purposely produced for the international 
market. In recent years, international trade has been found to have grown rapidly across the 
globe. This certainly means more goods crossing borders and, therefore, having to comply 
with customs' formalities. It has been realized that this often puts strain on national the 
administrative personnel trying to cope with the increased road air and port traffic without 
extra resources. At the same time, businesses have become more aware of the costs involved 
in taking goods across borders, such as waiting time. 
Changing business practices has also put the spotlight on speed of delivery. In an 
environment of `just in time' production, business cannot afford to have imported or exported 
goods tied up for long periods at the border because of unnecessary or over-complicated trade 
procedures and requirements. 
There is also the question of costs inherent in the increased complexity of trade. 
Globalization and international competition encourage international corporations to use a 
variety of locations for the manufacture and sourcing of components and final products. 
Preferential trade agreements have added a proliferation of complex rules of origin to the 
mix. 
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In these circumstances, even methods that used to be satisfactory need to be rethought, while 
problems posed by inefficient methods are made worse. Inefficiency in border procedures - 
whether there are too few customs officers or unnecessarily complicated paper work - is 
costly, both for governments and business-costs which ultimately are passed on to the 
taxpayer or the customer. 
Businesses suffer both direct border-related costs, such as expenses related to supplying 
information and documents to the relevant authority, and indirect costs, such as those arising 
from procedural delays, lost business opportunities and a lack of predictability in the 
regulations. 
Inefficient border procedures cost governments in terms of lost revenue, smuggling, and 
difficulties in implementing trade policy, for instance due to failure in determining the origin 
of products or in collecting accurate statistics. Inefficient border procedures are also likely to 
lead to poor export competitiveness, and make the involved country less attractive to 
investment. 
In view of the above, a critical measure that Qatar must adopt is making the nuts and bolts of 
trading procedures easier to navigate. This requires transparency in the regulations and 
procedures, and consistency, predictability and non-discrimination in their application. The 
traders also need to be able to provide feedback on where the system works well and where it 
poses problems. Transparency of relevant domestic regulations, procedures and practices is 
essential for ensuring that regulatory objectives are achieved efficiently, while, at the same 
time, enhancing the benefits from trade and investment liberalization. 
Businesses need to be able to fully understand the conditions and constraints for entering and 
operating in a market. Openness about the way the system works also improves public 
confidence in the government's performance and that of the regulatory system. Consistency 
and predictability in the application of rules and procedures is also important. Traders need to 
know what to expect in their everyday dealings with customs and other border agencies, and 
how to act if a problem arises. 
There is a need for a renewed political impetus in order to make border controls more 
efficient, and strengthened international coherence in tackling the issue. Qatar must adopt 
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reforms towards enhancing efficiency in order to face an increasingly complex international 
trading environment. Certainly, some deeply entrenched outdated institutional settings and 
cumbersome procedures must be dealt with. 
There needs to be high political support from Qatar's Government, and sustained 
commitment of those involved in formulating and implementing trade policy. The WTO can 
be very instrumental in this regard by providing external discipline to ensure continuing 
domestic political commitment and shield from temptations to backtrack. 
The WTO must ensure that trade facilitation efforts - both at national and international 
levels - are coherent and consistent between different policy areas. A coherent multilateral 
setting would provide a solid background for designing well-targeted technical assistance and 
capacity-building projects, overcoming regional divides, ensuring that the projects' different 
components are mutually supportive, and better targeting aspects of co-operation between 
border agencies of concerned countries. 
The WTO should focus on benchmarking, capacity-building and peer pressure, in order to 
provide momentum, diluting the prospect of litigation under the dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
The WTO, in its multilateral efforts, needs to be realistic. No external discipline or pressure 
can deliver tangible outcomes if the commitments go beyond the existing capacity of a 
particular country to meet them. Matching commitments with capacity means designing 
disciplines which are seen to correspond to the circumstances of member countries, but 
matching commitments with capacity also means providing corresponding technical 
assistance where appropriate. 
All that being said, trade liberalization has the potential to deliver gains in efficiency and 
higher rates of growth for the world economy, particularly for the third world countries; it is 
considered as a fight against poverty, since it increases average incomes and provides more 
resources with which to tackle poverty. And, while it generally affects income distribution, it 
does not appear to do so in an undesirable way. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that 
most trade reforms can negatively affect some people, by possibly generating new or greater 
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poverty, and that some reforms may increase overall poverty, even while they boost incomes 
in total. 
In light of the above, what the Qataris are more interested in is a WTO which will open 
markets and reduce all forms of export subsidies. Negotiations in agriculture must include 
market access, export competition, and domestic support, by reducing tariffs on all 
agricultural products. The negotiators must allow balanced political needs and policy. The 
negotiations should liberalize the entry of foreign services in as many domestic sectors as the 
government choose, and make it easier to employ foreign workers on a temporary basis. 
Market access for industrial goods is another priority for Qatar. In this regard, the WTO 
should have in place capacity-building measures to assist the country, and commit itself to 
the objective of duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating from Qatar. 
In other words, Qatar is looking forward to a phasing-out of preferential agreements by 
developed countries, by offering total elimination of duties to the majority of the sectors. 
This study has indicated that some of the rules of the WTO are complex and cumbersome. In 
view of that, there is also the need for further clarification and improvement in the 
understanding and interpretation of the rules while simultaneously preserving the basic 
concepts, principles and effectiveness of these agreements, and their instruments and 
objectives, and taking into account the needs of Qatar and other member countries, 
The study suggests the need to establish multilateral framework rules for trade and 
competition, policy and foreign direct investment. 
On the issue of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement, the agreements should not 
prevent Qatar from taking measures to protect it self; the agreements should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect their interests. 
There is no doubt that sustained worldwide economic growth requires a renewed commitment 
to trade and to opening markets globally; strengthening the World Trade Organization as the 
bedrock of the multilateral trading system is therefore an economic imperative. Failure to 
achieve this could undermine business confidence and contribute to a further worsening of 
the world economy. This requires all WTO member countries to demonstrate their knowledge 
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and understanding of what they are doing. In view of this, the biggest challenge confronting 
the WTO is to make the multilateral trading system more development friendly, the outcome, 
of which, shall be judged by the extent to which developing countries achieve greater market 
access without their policy options being restricted, and by the disciplines that will prevent 
the later reversal of successful market access. 
For Qatar, a fundamental recommendation is concerned with a more balanced approach, 
whereby the WTO agreements would better reflect the interests of both developed and 
developing nations. This is because, as the study indicated, the people of Qatar have lingering 
doubts about new trade negotiations. They will want to benefit from the WTO rules-based 
system where they have a reasonable chance of beating the big powers if logic is on their 
side. Consequently, future negotiations must provide significant access and certainty to 
access for the products which Qatar can produce and export. It is necessary to mention that a 
successful negotiation needs greater openness from Qatar. WTO negotiations can help in 
putting together the necessary political elements domestically for this to happen. 
In precise terms, the study recommends that a `development round' of trade negotiations 
which would reduce global trade barriers should be launched. However, for a positive 
outcome, the industrialized countries must be willing to reduce taxes on the products and 
services which Qatar and other developing countries produce such as oil and gas. Similarly, 
Qatar can improve its own situation while, at the same time, winning concessions by 
liberalizing services and lowering barriers to import competition. Such a round is expected to 
produce win-win gains for the entire international community including Qatar. 
Engaging in global collective actions to promote trade outside the negotiating framework of 
the WTO is important: Providing market access may not be enough to elicit new trade from 
developing countries by itself. Increasing multilateral `aid for trade' development assistance 
to promote trade infrastructure, adoption of best practice standards and rules and a healthy 
investment climate could help. 
Unilaterally adopting pro-trade development policies in high-income countries: First, if the 
high income countries were to allow low-income countries duty-free and quota-free access to 
their markets, they would provide a strong stimulus to trade which would help these poor 
countries overcome their past lacklustre trade performance; second, high-income countries 
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could also demonstrate good faith by reining in mushrooming antidumping cases; third, 
increasing bilateral `aid for trade' can complement the multilateral effort. 
Enacting new trade reform in developing countries: Developing countries can individually 
improve their competitiveness through trade reforms that lower restrictive barriers, especially 
in service markets. Indeed, their own policies hold the largest potential for policy-induced 
gains from trade. Trade reforms - especially those reinforced with reforms in governance 
and in domestic investment climates - can enhance the value of policies adopted by other 
nations. 
There is understandable consumer worry that concerns may be manipulated by protectionist 
elements within a community. On the other hand, the credibility of the WTO may be at risk if 
it is thought that the WTO rules are applied in a way which does not reflect consumer 
interest. There is also a view that concerns may be related to a lack of confidence in national 
regulatory authorities to guarantee a trade that protects the interests of the people. There is an 
urgent need for consumer confidence to be improved, perhaps through the establishment of 
regional bodies. 
In addition to recommendations for the WTO, countries acceding to the WTO arc expected to 
have a regulatory regimes in place, which is not in conflict with WTO obligations, and which 
also has the capacity to deliver the observance of rights to other WTO members. 
WTO rules require that signatory governments assume full responsibility for the trade and 
trade-related actions of their governments. In some cases, signatory governments have 
positive obligations to seek observance to WTO rules on the part of their governments. 
Qatar trades oil with developing countries, which represent its growing markets for oil and 
gas. Therefore, in so far as the WTO liberalization aids for the developing world, it also 
benefits Qatar, which is increasingly involved in exporting to other countries of potential 
interest. From Qatar's perspectives, countries of interest are those nearby, such as South Asia 
or potentially the states of Eastern and Southern Africa. By the same token, Qatar should seek 
to promote the liberalisation of these two important sectors, oil and gas, at the current Doha 
multilateral negotiations. Qatar should coordinate its negotiating position with other oil and 
gas producing countries that are members of the WTO to lobby for the lowering of the 
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protective measures applied by some developed countries on energy intensive products such 
as petrochemicals. In return, Qatar could offer to open further service sector in the current 
GATS negotiations, as such openness would work for the benefit of Qatar's economy and 
further encourage foreign investment. 
The study revealed that Qatar's policy towards its regional neighbours in trade is mainly to 
develop and to enhance economic cooperation and integration with different countries in 
different areas and regions, with a primary aim to establish mutual Free Trade Agreements 
with those countries. In light of this, the state of Qatar has taken effective steps to deepen the 
cooperation with its regional neighbours. 
Consequently, since the mid-nineties, the state of Qatar, has been studying the opportunities 
to cooperate with its regional neighbours. Qatar cooperates with those countries by several 
economic cooperation agreements, such as by establishing the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. 
Similar arrangements have been made in order to establish Free Trade Agreements with India 
and Pakistan. 
Needless to say, Qatar is committed to forging bilateral trading agreements with many 
countries within its sub-region. The anticipation is that, under these agreements, Qatar and its 
partners could accord each other Most Favoured Nation treatment in all matters relating to 
their mutual trade relations. Qatar could coordinate its negotiating position at the multilateral 
level with these partners. However, these relations may be hampered by the fact that some of 
its trading partners within the sub-region - such as Iran - have yet to become members of 
the WTO. 
It has been noted that the main objective of the WTO is to `help trade flow smoothly, freely, 
fairly and predictably among member countries. The organization also acts as a forum for 
trade negotiations and settling trade disputes; since trade relations often involve conflicting 
interests, the WTO is therefore needed for the purpose of dispute settlement through a 
procedure based on an agreed legal foundation'. 
Qatar can benefit from a successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations. If 
this results in greater trade liberalisation, it will contribute to global economic growth, 
especially in Asia. As these economies grow, their demand for oil and gas will increase, 
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benefiting producers suppliers such as Qatar. This is perhaps Qatar's major benefit from 
WTO membership and its hosting of the original meetings that set the agenda for the Doha 
Round. 
In view of the above, it becomes more than necessary for all trading partners of the state of 
Qatar to join the growing membership of the WTO. It is therefore critical for the rest of the 
countries within the sub-region who have not yet joined the WTO, to be encouraged to do so. 
Qatar should therefore work hard with the international community in order to ensure the 
state of Iran and its other trading partners join the WTO, so as to enjoy and sustain the 
already good economic performance it is enjoying. 
Furthermore, Qatar should support the accession of Iran and other trading partners within the 
sub-region to join the WTO. Qatar should provide adequate technical and political assistance 
to Iran and other trading partners to facilitate their membership of the WTO. 
In conclusion, for oil, gas and petrochemical producing countries, the research has found that 
these three energy sectors are not adequately addressed under the WTO. Despite their 
importance for the international economy, they are not made subject to separate predictable 
and transparent trading rules under the WTO. In other words, there is no separate multilateral 
agreement that governs trade relations between energy producing countries such as Qatar and 
energy consuming countries such as those of the European Union, the United States, India, 
Japan and China. On the contrary, these energy sectors are dealt with in the same way as any 
other types of goods subject to the WTO/GATT regulations. This ultimately means that 
energy products, as any other types of products, are also subject to the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO. 
However, due to the substantial significance of energy sectors for the growth of the 
international economy and in order to achieve global stability with regards to these important 
sectors, the researcher holds the view that it is about time that WTO regulations adequately 
addressed the energy sectors. It is perhaps in the interests of both energy producing countries 
such as Qatar and energy consuming countries such as Japan, the U. S., and the EU to include 
"energy sectors" in the agenda of Doha negotiations. The continuing Doha Round provides a 
very good opportunity for such negotiations with the objective of reaching a separate 
agreement on "energy sectors" that could address the interests of both sides; energy 
producing and consuming countries. 
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During the GATT era there were very few energy producing countries that were parties to 
this multilateral agreement. Thus, the issue of "energy" was not well-addressed. However, 
many of the energy exporting countries have now become official members of the 
multilateral trading system, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Other major world 
energy suppliers such as Russia, Iran, Algeria, Ukraine, and Iraq are currently asking for 
membership, or negotiating their accession to, the WTO. "Energy sectors" have become 
increasingly important for the growth of the international economy. All these factors support 
the idea of the foundation of a new separate agreement under the umbrella of the multilateral 
trading system. 
Nevertheless, as is indicated previously, it is important for Qatar, as an energy producing 
country, to take into account that subjecting "energy sectors" to the WTO regulations is not 
only about reducing tariff and non-tariff measures. But, it is also about "liberalisation of 
services". The United States, the EU, and Japan have been calling for subjecting energy- 
related services to the WTO/GATS regulations. If this took place, it would mean that a wide- 
range of services that are now controlled by Government owned companies such as Qatar 
Petroleum and Qatar Gas will be subject to external regulations under the WTO. These 
services could include: drilling, derrick erection, repair and maintenance, services necessary 
for oil or gas extraction such as well casing, cementing, pumping and plugging and so on. 
Hence, it is important for Qatar to study the proposals of liberalising these services and their 
potential impact on its economy. 
Therefore, the continuous Doha Round negotiations provide Qatar with the opportunities of 
addressing its interests and concerns in different sectors, including the energy sectors. 
Building coalitions with other members at a similar level of development and with 
comparable economic structures, Qatar can make its interests and concerns better addressed 
in the current negotiations. These opportunities are not only about energy sectors, but they 
also apply to many other sectors that are important for Qatar's economy and trade. As is 
indicated before, Qatar is a net-food importing country and perhaps full liberalisation of 
agriculture will not be in its interests. This is because the price of food would be expected to 
increase if the exports subsidies provided by developed countries to their local farmers were 
reduced or eliminated. As a result, the latter would have to increase the prices of their food 
exports to other countries such as Qatar. Hence, although liberalisation of agriculture is of 
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interest to many developing countries, it will not be in the interests of Qatar as a net-food 
importing country. Therefore, it is in Qatar's benefit to line up with other net-food importing 
countries such as other GCC members to lobby in the Doha Round not to be negatively 
affected by the newly multilateral liberalisation of agriculture. However, as is indicated in 
chapter one, there are some potential indirect benefits for Qatar from agricultural 
liberalisation if it helps the growth of developing agricultural producers and increases their 
demand for fertilizers from Qatar. 
Further liberalisation of services such as telecommunications and banking are also on the 
agenda of the Doha negotiations. As a small economy seeking to develop its national 
industries, Qatar should clearly define its interests in different services sectors and evaluate 
the consequences of such liberalisation. As for current policy, Qatar is a supporter of services 
liberalisation and the rules of CATS go in line with its policies of free trade and open 
economy. Nevertheless, Qatar is also a small economy seeking to develop its national 
industries. The current GATS rules recognise such features and entail special provisions to 
consider the interests of developing countries. However, the CATS itself has been re- 
negotiated since 2000 with the aim of achieving further liberalisation for additional services. 
Due to disagreements on many issues between developed and developing countries, 
negotiations on the CATS are not yet concluded. Developed countries seek to achieve high 
levels of liberalisation for different sectors with very little government intervention. 
Nevertheless, developing countries seek to have greater flexibility to protect their national 
interests and not to be negatively affected by such liberalisation. Hence, it is in the interests 
of Qatar to follow the process of these negotiations and line up its negotiating stance with 
other developing countries in order to safeguard its interests. It is important to stress that the 
researcher is not calling here for "trade protectionism", but rather arguing for pursuing "trade 
liberalisation" in a carefully studied incremental way that does not jeopardise the interests of 
national industries and their employees, including local nationals. 
-200- 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
Abbot, Roderick (1993), "GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further 
Reflections on Earlier Reflections", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp 117-119. 
Abdullah, Hussein (2006). 'Turbulent Oil Prices, " Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 9-15 November 
2006, Issue No. 819. Retrieved May 9,2008 from website 
http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2006/819/ec3. htm 
Ables, Roberto, Cezar, Elsie, Reyes, Charmion, Sugapong, Daisy (2008). Industrial fuel 
switching. Retrieved July 14,2008 from website 
http: //www. iges. or. jp/en/cdm/pdf/philippines/03/20. pdf 
Advisory Centre of WTO Law (2009). Quick Guide to the ACIVL. Retrieved April 8,2009 
from website http: //www. acwl. ch/pdf/Quick%20Guide%202009. pdf 
Al-Hajhoj, Hassan (2007, March). Assessing the Arab Countries Global Readiness to Join the 
WTO: A Multivariate Analysis. Paper Presented at the Second Arab Conference on the 
Future Directions of the World Trade Organization: Opportunities and Challenges Facing 
Arab Countries. 
Anderson, Kym (1995), "The GATT's Review of Australian Trade Policy", The World 
Economy: Global Trade Policy. 
Anderson, Kym (2001). "Discipline and Agriculture Policy via the WTO". In Bernard 
Hoekman & Will Martin (Eds. ), Developing Countries and the W TO: A Pro-active Agenda 
(pp. 25-57). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Anderson, Kym. (2002). "Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement". 
World Trade Review, 1(2), 123-134. 
-201- 
Anez, C. (2003). "The Trade of Technical Services for Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production: Observations by an Old Venezuelan Contractor" in Energy and Environmental 
Services: Negotiating Objectives and Development Priorities. UNCTAD. United Nations: 
New York. 
Anwar al Rasid, 2003 `The Time to Withdraw has come, ' Al Qabas, March 27. 
Arab Political Systems (2005). Baseline Information and Reforms - Qatar. Retrieved March 
11,2008 from website 
http: //www. law. yale. edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/gatar/Qatar_APS. pdf 
Awerbuch, Shimon, and Sauter Raphael (2004); October 2004, "Exploiting the Oil-GDP 
Effect to support Renewables Deployment, SPR U working paper (October) 
Barkindo, Mohammed (2006). Global Energy Industry - Current Challenges and 
Opportunities. A speech delivered by Mr. Mohammed Barkindo, Acting for the OPEC 
Secretary General, at the Sixth Russian Oil & Gas Week, Moscow, Russia held between 30 
October -2 November 2006. 
Barnet, Richard and Cavanagh, John (1994). Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the 
New World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Barzel, Yoram (1997). Economic Analysis of Property Rights 2 ed. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
Bauer, M and Gaskell, G (ed). (2000). Qualitative Researching With the Text Image and 
Sound. London: Sage. 
Bell, J. (1999). Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in 
education and social science (3rd edition). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Berry, R. S. Y. (1999). Collecting Data By in-depth Interviewing. Exeter: University of 
Exeter. 
- 202 - 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1991). The World Trading System at Risk. 
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Blackhurst, R. (1998). "The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfill its Mandate". In Anne Kruger 
(Eds. ), The WTO as an International Organization (pp. 31-58). Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press 
Blackhurst, Richard (2005). "The Future of the WTO". World Trade Review, 4,3,379-390. 
Booth, W. 2003 "Leading Shiite Cleric Returns from Exile, " The Washington Post, May 11. 
Bown, Chad (2003). "Non-discrimination and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards". World 
Trade Review, 2,3,297-328. 
Bradford, Scott and Lawrence, Robert (2004). Has Globalization Gone Far Enough? 
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Amendments on Supplementary Financing Facility of the 
I. M. F. 8 Int'l Legal Materials 137 (1979); Section 28A; 35 Int'l J. 240 (1979-1980). 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Amendments on Supplementary Financing Facility of the 
I. M. F. 8 International Legal Materials 137 (1979). 
Bretton Woods, The Camps, Miriam; Laying Out a Brief Background to the Bretton Woocls. 
Bretton Woods Project (2007). What are the Bretton Woods Institutions? Retrieved July 4, 
2007 from website http: //www. brettonwoodsproject. org/item. shtml? x=320747 
Bryman, Alan (2004). Social Research Methods: Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bryman, A., and Bell, E. (2003) Business Research Methods. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
- 203 - 
Caroline Starbird, Dale DeBoer, Jenny Pettit (2004). Teaching International Economics and 
Trade. Denver: University of Denver Press. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1997). "Brookings". Washington, D. C. 
Carrasco, Enrique R. Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. [vii] (1996) Critical Issues Facing the 
Bretton Woods System: Can the IMF, World Bank, and the GATT/WTO Promote an Enabling 
Environment for Social Development 
Centre for Trade and Development (2007). Backgrounders: Guide to the WTO. Retrieved 
May 19,2007 from website http: //www. centad. org/relatedinfol_l. asp 
Charnoviz, Steve (2003). "Open World: The truth about globalisation". World Trade Review, 
2,1,119-120. 
Chand, I. (2002, December 22). "Young People Pose Challenge to Gulf States; Pressure 
Builds for Job Training". Gulf Daily News. 
Chandy, Cynthia (2004). "North-South Trade in Intellectual Property: Can It Be Fair? " World 
Trade Review, 3,2,317-328 
Cho, Sungjoon (2005). "A Request for WTO's Legitimacy". World Trade Review, 4,3,391- 
400 
Cicourel, A. U. (1964) Method and Measurement in Sociology. New York: Free Press. 
Cobb, John and Daly, Herman, Daly (1989). For the Common Good: Redirecting the 
Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Commercial Companies Law of Qatar. Law No. (5) of 2002. 
Communication from the United States, Energy Services, S/CSS/W/27,18 May (2000); 
Communication from Norway, S/CSS/W/59,21 March (2001). 
- 204 - 
Cohn, M. R. 2003 `Al-Jazeera's Free-Speech Gambit', Toronto Star, March 23,2003 
(Lexis/Nexis on April 30). 
Cordesman, A (2002). Saudi Security and the War on Terrorism: Internal Security 
Operations, Law Enforcements, Internal Threats, and the Need for Change (Washington 
D. C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
Cousins, M. (2003, January 27). "Human Rights Team Holds Frank Talks with Saudi 
Officials", Middle East Newsfile. 
Croome, John (1999). Reshaping the World Trading System. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International. 
Curzon Price, Victoria (1991), "GATT's New Trade Policy Review Mechanism", The World 
Economy, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp- 227-23 8. 
Daukoru, Edmund (2006). Oil market stability: the role of OPEC: Aspeech by Dr Edmund 
M. Daukoru, President of the OPEC Conference to the 28th Oxford Seminar, Oxford, 
England, on September 8,2006. Retrieved July 6,2008 from website 
http: //www. opec. org/opecna/Speeches/2006/DaukoruOxford. htm 
Daz, Bhagirath Lal (1998). The WTO Agreements Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required 
Changes, London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Daz, Bhagirath Lal (1999). The World Trade Organisation: A Guide to the Framework for 
International Trade. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Daz, Bhagirath Lal (2003). The Peace Clause in WTO's Agriculture Agreement. Retrieved 
March 9,2007 from website http: //www. twnside. org. sg/title/twninfo84. htm 
- 205 - 
Daz, Bhagirath Lal (2007). Why the WTO Decision-Making System of 'Consensus' Works 
Against the South. Retrieved May 9,2007 from website http: //www. twnside. org. sg/title/bg13- 
cn. htm 
Department of Economic Policies - QCB (2006), Financial Stability Report (March). Doha: 
Qatar Central Bank. 
Desta, Melaku Geboye (2003). "The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the 
World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements". Journal of World Trade, 37(3), 
523-551. 
Diego-Fernandez, Mateo (2008). "Trade Negotiations Make Strange Bedfellows". World 
Trade Review, 7,2,423-454 
Dillon, Thomas J. Jr. (1995). "World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World 
Trade", 16 Michigan Journal of International Law, 349. 
Directive 80/30, European Union-DG Energy and Transport. 
Dollar, David and Kraay, Aart (2001). "Trade, Growth, and Poverty". World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2615. 
Economic Intelligence Unit (2003). Kuwait Country Report (2003) London: EIU. 
Economic Intelligence Unit (2007). Country Report: Qatar (December) London: EIU. 
Economic Intelligence Unit (2008). Country Report: Qatar (December) London: BIU. 
Economic Intelligence Unit (2009). Country Report: Qatar (February) London: EIU. 
Economics Web Institute, (2008) Available at: www. economicswebinstitute. org (Accessed: 
11 February 2007). 
- 206 - 
European Economic Community (1988). EEC - Programme of Minimum Import Prices, 
Licenses and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, Report of the 
Panel, 18 October 1978, L/4687, BISD 25S/68,99, para. 4.9. See also Japan - Trade in Semi- 
conductors, Report of the Panel, 4 May 1988, L/6309, BISD 35S/116,153, para. 105. 
Edward, A. and Talbot, R. (1999). The Hard-Pressed Researcher: A research handbook for 
the caring professional (2"d ed). Harlow: Longman. 
Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter (2005). WTO Decision-Making Process: Attorney Articles. 
Retrieved July 19,2007 from website 
http: //www. wilmerhale. com/de/publications/whPubsDetai l. aspx? publication=83 
Embassy of Qatar in Washington D. C., (2005). Basic Economic Facts. Retrieved June 15, 
2007 from website http: //www. qatarembassy. net/basic. asp. 
English, Philip, Mattoo, Aaditya, and Hoekman, Bernard (2002), Development, Trade, and 
the WTO. New York: World Bank Publications. 
European Commission Energy (2008) Available at: www. europa. eu. int/comm/cnergy/bas 
(Accessed: 20 November 2008) 
Fadell, M. F. (2003). "Bahrain's Reforms Take the Politics out of Al Shura", Agence France 
Presse, March 13. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2007) Available at: www. ferc. gov (Accessed: 20 
November 2007) 
Flick, Uwe (1998). An Introduction to Qualitative research. Wilthshire: Sage Publication. 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Dec. 15,1993, Part II, ann. IA, para. 1, GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA_U. S. T. _33 
I. L. M. 1130, 
1145 (1994) [hereinafter the "Final Act"). 
-207- 
Finn, P. (2003) "Al Qaeda Arms Traced to Saudi National Guard, " The Washington Post, 
May 19. 
Finger, Michael (2007). "Trade Negotiations and Developing Countries". World Trade 
Review, 6,1,135 - 148 
Foley, S. (2002). "What Wealth Cannot Buy", in Barry Rubin (ed. ), Crisis in the 
Contemporary Persian Gulf. London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Friedman, Thomas L (1999). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar Straus & 
Giroux. 
Gallagher, Peter (2005). The First Ten Years of the WTO. Cambridge University Press 
Gallagher, Peter, Low, Patrick and Stoler, Andrew (2005). Managing the Challenges of {VTO 
Participation: 45 Case Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gary, Sick and Potter, Lawrence (1997). The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays on 
Politics, Economy, Security and Religion New York: St. Martin's Press 
Gary P. Sampson, and W. Bradnee Chambers (1999); The Role of the World Trade 
Organization in Global Governance. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Gary P. Sampson; Contributor Hans Van Ginkel; (2001). The World Trade Organization in 
Global Conferences. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Gaskell, G (2000). "Individual and Group Interviewing". In Bauer M and G Gaskcll (eds, ). 
Qualitative Researching With Text, Image and Sound (pp. 38-56). London: Sage 
General Secretariat fro Developing Planning (2009). Qatar National Development Strategy 
(2010-2015). Retrieved January 3,2009 from website 
http: //www. gsdp. gov. qalportal/page/portal/GSDP_Vision Root/GSDP_EN/What%2OWc%2 
ODo/Qatar%2ONational%20Strategy 
- 208 - 
George, A. (1997). "Labour Exodus Hits UAE Growth", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 
1. 
Ghabra, Shafeeq (2002). "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change". In Barry 
Rubin (ed). Crisis in the Contemporary Persian Gulf (pp. 117-118), (London and Portland, 
Oregon: Frank Cass 
Goldstein, Judith (1998). "International Institutions and Domestic Politics". In Anne Krueger 
(eds. ), The WTO as an International Organization. University of Chicago Press 
Greene, Jennifer, Caracelli, Valerie, and Graham, Wendy (1989). "Towards a Conceptual 
Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation Design". Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 11(3), pp. 255-274. 
Greider, William (1997). On World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism. 
New York: Touchstone. 
Guzman, A. T. (2002). "The Political Economy of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO". 
Public Law Research of University of California, Paper No. 98, 
Hainsworth, S (1998). An Insider's Guide To The World Trade Organization. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Limited. 
Hawken, Paul (1993). The Ecology of Commerce. New York: Harper Collins. 
Hammouda, H; Karingi, S, and Jallab, M (2006). "Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) 
Negotiations in WTO: Modalities for a positive post Hong Kong Africa Agenda", 
Economic Commission of Africa, ATP, Work in Progress No. 34. 
Hakim, C. (1987). Research Design: Strategies and Choices in the Design of Social 
Research. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. 
- 209 - 
Hertel, Thomas and Will Martin, Will (1999). "Would Developing Countries Gain from 
Inclusion of Manufactures in the WTO Negotiations? " Agricultural Economics: GTAP 
Working Papers, Purdue Libraries. 
Hilal, Mohsin Ahmed (2001). "Crude Oil and Negotiations On the Energy Sector in the 
WTO". Preparations for the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun". ESCIVA 
Briefing Notes, United Nation. 
Hitchcock, G. & D. Hughes (1989). Research and the Teacher: A Qualitative Introduction to 
School-based Research. London: Routledge. 
Hoekman, Bernard Kostecki, M (2001. The Political Economy of the World Trading System. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hoekman, Bernard, Matto, Aadita, and English, Philip (2002) (Eds. ), Development Trade and 
the WTO: A Handbook. Washington: The World Bank. 
Hoekman, B and Mavroidis (2001). "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and 
Surveillence" (pp. 131-146). In Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin (eds. ), Developing 
Countries and the WTO: A pro-active agenda. Oxford: Blakwell Pubishing 
Hudec, Robert (1975). The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. New York: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Income Tax Laws, which are enshrined in the Decree-Law No. (11) of 1993. 
Index Mundi, Qatar Imports - Partners, 2008. 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, (2006). Liberalization of Trade 
in Environmental Goods for Climate Change Mitigation: The Sustainable Development 
Context. Retrieved November 13,2008 from 
http: //www. iisd. org/pdf/2008/cph_trade_climate_liberalization trade. pdf 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (2006). IVTO Rules and 
-210- 
Sustainable Energy Policies. Retrieved November 20,2008 from 
http: //ictsd. net/i/news/bridges/I 1684/ 
International Energy Agency (2001). International Financial Statistics, Balance of Payments 
and Directions of Trade, 2006, International Monetary Fund, IMF. 
International Forum on Globalization (2009). The WTO and Oil. Retrieved February 3,2009 
from website http: //www. ifg. org/analysis/wto/cancun/usoilvm. htm 
International Gas Union (2007). IGU - The Worldwide Gas Technology Network. Retrieved 
May 5,2007 from website http: //www. igu. org/about-igu. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (2006). United Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. Retrieved November 19,2006 from website 
http: //www. iisd. ca/process/Climate_atm. htm#climate 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (2003). Special 301 Report: Qatar, page 1. 
International Monetary Fund (2008). Qatar and the IMF. Retrieved April 2,2008 from 
website http: //www. imf. org/external/country/qat/index. htm 
International Monetary Fund (2009). Qatar: Statistical Appendix, January, IMF Country 
Report No. 09/32. Retrieved April 3,2009 from 
http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/crO932. pdf 
Irwin, Douglas (2003). A world Without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free trade, and 
Global Governance by Mike Moore", World Trade Review, 2,2,251-253. 
Jackson, John J. March 15, (2000). "The WTO Constitution and Proposed Reforms: The 
Seven Mantras Revisited". PSIO program for the Study of International Organizations', a 
paper presented in the series of Academics and Negotiators Evening seminars, Graduate 
Institute of International Studies. 
- 211 - 
Jackson, John (1969). World Trade and the Law of GATT. " A Legal Analysis of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. New York: Bobb-Merrill Company. 
Jackson, John (1990). Restructuring the GATT system. London: Printer. 
Jackson, John (2006). Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International 
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kent, Jones ( 2009). "The Political Economy of WTO Accessions: The Unfinished Business 
of Universal Membership". World Trade Review, 8,2,279-314. 
Kenneth W. Dam (1977). The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization. 
Midway reprint. 
Kessler, G. and Sipress, A. (2000). "Bombings Kill 20 in Saudi Capital", The Washington 
Post, April 13. 
Khor, Martin (2000). WTO yet to Bridge North-South Divide. Retrieved September 9,2007 
from website http: //www. twnside. org. sg/title/2095. htm 
Khor, Martin (2003). Expiry of the Peace Clause in IVTO'SAgriculture Agreement. Retrieved 
March 8,2007 from website 
http: //www. twnside. org. sg/title/twninfo84. htm 
Korten, David (1996). When Corporations Rules the World. West Hartforld, CT: Kumarian 
Press Inc. 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Lacarte, Julio A Stud. Transnat'l Legal Pol'y 1 (2005); Role of the Bretton Woods Institution 
in Securing the Peace: General Reading. 
- 212 - 
Laird, Sam and Gary P. Sampson (1987), "Case for Evaluating Protection in an Economy- 
wide Perspective", The World Economy, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 177-192. 
Libby, R. (2003, May 12). "For Crime Victims in Iraq, No Place To Turn", The Washington 
Post. 
Lukman, Rilwanu (2008). The Role of OPEC in the 21 s` Century. Retrieved May 22,2008 
from website http: //www. eppo. go. th/inter/opec/RoleOfOPEC. html 
Mander, Jerry and Goldsmith, Edward (1996). The Case Against the Global Economy: And 
For a Turn Toward the Local. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 
Mazor, J. (2002). "Saudi Arabia', in Tom and Sarah Pendergast (eds)., The Worldmark 
Encyclopedia of National Economies, Detroit: Gale Group 
Mavroidis, Petros (1992), "Surveillance Schemes: The GATT's New Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism", Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 374-414. 
McCracken, G (1988). The Long Interview. Newbury Park: Sage. 
McGrady, Benn (2004). TRIPs and Trademarks: The Case of Tobacco. World Trade Review, 
3,1,53-83. 
Michalopoulos, Constanine (2001). Developing Countries in the IVTO. New York: Palgrave. 
Miles, M and Huberman, A (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis (2"d ed). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Ministry of Business and Trade of Qatar (2008). Foreign Trade. Retrieved December 8,2008 
from http: //www. mec. gov. qa/EconomicAffiers/overtrad. php 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar (2008). Investment Incentives. Retrieved January 2,2008 
from website http: //english. mofa. gov. qa/details. cfm? id=16. 
- 213 - 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2008). Joint Statement on Enhanced Cooperation. In 
Environment and Climate Change Issues between Japan and the Republic of Peru. Retrieved 
September 9,2008 from website 
http: //www. mofa. go. jp/region/latin/peru/joint08O3. html 
Moor, Mike (2001a). Ministerial Roundtable on Trade and Poverty in LDCs. 6VTO News: 
Speeches - DG Mike Moore (March, 19). Retrieved August 22,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm55_e. htm 
Moor, Mike (2001b). The WTO: Challenges Ahead. WTO News: Speeches - DG Mike Moore 
(April, 23). Retrieved August 10,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm59_e. htm 
Moore, Mike (2001c). The WTO and the Arab World: Preparations for Doha. Retrieved May 
6,2007 from website http: //www. wto. org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm65_e. htm 
Moore, Mike (2005). "The WTO's First Decade". World Trade Review, 4,3,359-366 
Murphy, K. (2003). "War with Iraq: Persian Gulf Reaction; The World; Arab Nations Work 
to Veil Cooperation with the U. S. ", The Los Angeles Times, March 20. 
Naji, K. (1996). "UAE Exodus Hits Projects", Financial Times, September 28. 
Narlikar, A. (2005). The World Trade Organization: A very Short Introduction. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
NaturalGas. com (2008). Storage of Natural Gas. Retrieved November 8,2008 from 
website http: //www. naturalgas. org/naturalgas/storage. asp 
Newsday (2008). Nationawide-Iraq. Retrieved July 20,2008 from website 
http: //www. newsday. com/news/nationworld/world/ny-woiraq 162826360aug 16/story 
Obaid, N. (2003). "Al Qaeda's Bomb Backfire", The Washington Post, May 18. 
-214- 
Okogu, Bright (2003). "The Middle East and North Africa in a Changing Oil Market". 
International Monetary Fund. Retrieved August 8 2007, from website 
http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/okogu/okogu. htm 
Oil and Gas Exploration News, (2008). Market Agency: Qatar 011. Retrieved November 20, 
2008 from http: //www. oilgasupdate. com/oil-market-agency-qatar-oi1-min-sees-tough- 
2009. html 
Oil and Gas Journal, January 1,2007 Top Proven Natural Gas Reserves as of January 1,2007 
Olemiss (2008). GATT/WTO Regime. Retrieved July 20,2008 from website 
http: //www. olemiss. edu/orgs/SGLC/Trade%20and%20the%2OEnvironment/tsIdOO2. htm 
Omae, Kenichi (1999). Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy 
Revised Ed. New York: Harperbusiness. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997). Reforming Energy and 
Transport Subsidies: Environmental Implications. Paris: OECD. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD (2000). 11romottng 
Competition in the Natural Gas. Paris: OECD. 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC (2000). Annual Statistical 
Bulletin - 2000. Vienna: Austria 
OPEC (2002). Annual Statistical Bulletin - 2002. Vienna: Austria 
OPEC (2003). Annual Statistical Bulletin - 2003. Vienna: Austria 
OPEC (2007a). Annual Statistical Bulletin - 2007. Vienna: Austria 
- 215 - 
OPEC (2007b). Third OPEC Summit: Riad - 2007. Retrieved April 7,2008 
from website http: //www. scribd. com/doc/6815801/OilOPEC2OBulletin2ORiyadh2O2007 
OPEC (2008a). OPECs Mission. Retrieved February 2008 from websites 
http: //www. opec. org/home. 
OPEC (2008b). What impact can OPEC have on industry? Retrieved December 3,2008 from 
http: //www. opec. org/library/FAQs/Petrollndustry/g8. htm. 
OPEC (2008c). Who are OPEC Member Countries? Retrieved October 4,2008 Retrieved 
from website http: //www. opec. org/library/FAQs/aboutOPEC/g3. htm 
OPEC (2008d). The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Brief 
History. Retrieved May 2,2008 from website 
http: //www. opec. org/aboutus/history/history. htm 
OPEC (2008e). Annual Statistical Bulletin - 2008. Vienna: Austria 
Panagariya, Arvind (1999). The WTO Trade Policy Review of India. In Peter Lloyd and 
Chris Milner (eds, ). The World Economy: Global Trade Policy 1999 (pp. 91-116). Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Patton, M. Q. (1987). How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation. California: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Pauwelyn, Joost (2001). Trade in Energy: WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Brussels. Belgium. 
Phelps, T. M. (2002) "Arabs Worry Fallout Could Shatter Mideast, " Newsday, August 16. 
Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber (2006). Developing Countries and the Doha Development 
Agenda of the WTO. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 
-216- 
Punch, K. F. (1998). Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches. London: Sage Publications. 
Punch, K. F. (2005). Introduction to Social Science Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches (Second Edition). London: Sage Publications. 
Qureshi, Asif H. (1990), "The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in 
Transparency or "Enforcement"? ", Journal of World Trade, June, pp. 142-160. 
Qureshi, Asif H. (1992), "Some Reflections on the GATT TPRM, in the Light of the Trade 
Policy Review of the European Communities -A Legal Perspective", Journal of World 
Trade, Vol. 26 No. 6, December, pp. 103-120. 
Regulatory and Business Strategy Division (2007). Electricity Transmission Revenue 
Proposal 2008/09 2013/14 (Issue 1), Melbourne. Retrieved August 8,2008 from website 
http: //www. aer. gov. au/content/item. phtml? itemId=710389&nodeld=c37400b3c6b505e51 d61 
57650601 ea61 &fn=SP%20A. 
Ryan, Peter (2004). Oil prices influenced by politics: OPEC, Retrieved from website 
http: //www. abc. net. au/pm/content/2004/s 1194953. htm 
Reumann, Meyer (2001). "The Endeavours of Gulf Countries to Meet WTO Rcquircmcnts", 
Arab Law Quarterly, 16,49-54. 
Rodrik, Dani (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington D. C.: Institute for 
International Economics. 
Ruggiero, Renato (2005). "The World Trade Organization: Three Priorities", World Trade 
Review, 4,3,355-358. 
Sampson, Gary (2005). "The Future of the WTO in World Economic Affairs". i6'orhl Tra(le 
Review, 4,3,419-428. 
Selivanova, Yulin (2004). "World Trade Organization Rules and Energy Pricing: Russia's 
Case". Journal of World Trade, 38(4), 559-602. 
- 217 - 
Selivanova, Yulin (2007). "The WTO and Energy: WTO Rules and Agreements of Relevance 
to the Energy Sector". ICTSD Programme on Trade and Environment (August, Issue Paper 
No. 1). 
Schofield, Richard. (1997). "Border Disputes: Past, Present, and Future". In Gary G. Sick and 
Lawrence G. Potter (eds. ), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays on Politics, Economy, 
Security and Religion (pp. 127-66). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Shaffer, Gregory (2006). "The Challenges of WTO Law Strategies for Developing Country 
Adaptation". World Trade Review, 5,2,177-198 
Shipp, Trevor (2009). The Four Main Factors that Determine Prices at the Pumps. Retrieved 
May 2,2009 from website http: //ezinearticles. com/? The-Four-Main-Factors-That-Determine. 
Prices-at-the-Pumps&id=l 740509 
Shojai, Siamack (1995). The New Global Oil Market: Understanding Energy Issues in the 
World Economy. New York: Praeger Publishers. 
Sillin, John (2004). "The Electric Power Industry Business Model for the 21" Century". The 
Electricity Journal, vol. 17, issue 3, pp. 42-51. 
Slackman, M. (2003) `Iraq War May Incite Terrorists; Saudi Authorities Fear Increased 
Attacks. They Cite Al Qaeda's Presence and a Rise in Arms Smuggling and Violence against 
Westerners', Los Angeles Times, March 15. 
Smith, James McCall (2003). "WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in 
Appellate Body rulings", World Trade Review, 2,2,65-100. 
Srinivasan, T, N (2005). "Nondiscrimiantion in GATT/WTO: Was Thcre Anything to I3cgin 
With and Is There Anything Left". World Trade Review, 4,1,69-96. 
Starbird, Caroline; DeBoer, Dale and Pettit, Jenny (2004). Teaching International Economics 
and Trade. Denver: University of Denver. 
- 218 - 
Sullivan, Paul (2005). "Barriers to Economic Development in the Arab world". A paper 
presented at CSID Sixth Annual Conference, `Democracy and Development: Challenges for 
the Islamic World (April 22-23), Washington, DC 
Sunil Thacker (2006) 'The Legal Protection of Computer Software: Differences between 
United States and Europe'. Cardiff: Cardiff University 
Sutherland, Peter (2005). "The World Trade Organization at Ten Years", {Vorlc! Tracle 
Review, 4,3,341-353 
The Los Angeles Times, April 18, (2003) 
The WTO Secretariat (2000). Guide to the GATS: An Overview of Issues for Further 
Liberalization of Trade in Services. London: Kluwer Law International. 
Tharakan, P. K. M (1999). "Beyond Transparency: An Analysis of the Trade Policy Review of 
the European Union". In Peter Lloyd and Chris Milner (eds. ), The World Economy: Global 
Trade Policy 1999 (pp. 117-128). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Thomson, Derek (2009). Can the Oil Shock Alone Explain the Financial Crisis? Retrieved 
May 3,2009 from website 
http: //business. theatlantic. com/2009/04/can_the_oil_shock_alonc cxplain_thc financial crisi 
s. php 
Thomas, Dillion (2007). World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade. 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 16, p. 352. 
Tokarick, Stephen (2007). "How Large Is the Bias Against Exports From Import Tariffs? ". 
World Trade Review, 6,2,193-212 
Tyler, P. E. 2003 "Threats and Responses: Gulf Allies; Saudis Plan End to U. S. Presence, " 
The New York Times, February 9. 
- 219 - 
United States Census (2008). Trade With Qatar: 2008. Retrieved January 8,2008 from 
Website http: //www. census. gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5180. html#2008 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2000). 'Trade Agreements, 
Petroleum and Energey Policies: Energy Services and International Trade: Development and 
Implications. New York: UNCTAD. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008). World Investment Report 
2008. Retrieved April 18,2008 from website 
http: //www. unctad. org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir08_fs_ga_en. pdf 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific - UNESCAP 
(2009). The least developed countries in the WTO: Strengthening participation capacities. 
Retrieved April 9,2009 from website 
http: //www. unescap. org/tid/publication/chap4_2047. pdf 
U. S. Department of Energy (2006). U. S. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Federal Encrgy 
regulatory Commission, Federal Register, vol. 71, No. 234. 
Vernon, R. (1995) The World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and 
Development. In: Ravenhill, J. (ed) Global Political Economy. New York: Oxford University 
Vodafone Qatar (2009). About Vodafone. Retrieved May 25,2009 from website 
http: //www. vodafone. com. qa/go/en/aboutus 
Wagbara, Obindah (2006). "How Would the Gas Exporting Countries Forum Influences Gas 
Trade? " Energy Policy, vol. 35, issue 2, pp. 1224-1237. 
Weiss, Wolfgang, (2003). "Security and Predictability Under the WTO Law". World Trade 
Review, 2,2,183-220. 
Wells, Jim (2006). Energy Markets: Factors Contributing to Higher Gasoline Prices. 
Retrieved April 8,2007 from website http: //www. gao. gov/new. items/d064I2t. pdf 
-220- 
Wenden, A. (1982) The Process of Self-directed Learning: A Study of Adult Language 
Learners. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation): Teachers College, Columbia University. 
Whipple, Tom (2008). Peak Oil Review. Energy Bulletin, May 19,2008. Retrieved January 
7,2009 from website http: //www. energybulletin. net/node/44432 
Wilkinson, Rorden (2006b). The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade. 
London: Rutledge Taylor & Francis Group. 
Wilkinson, Roden and Scott, James (2008). "Developing Country Participation in the GAT]": 
A Reassessment". World Trade Review, 7,3,473-510. 
Wolf, Robert, (2003). "Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO". 
World Trade Review, 2,2,157-182. 
Yi-Chong, Xu (2004). Governance in World Trade: International Civil Servants and the 
GATT/WTO. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Zarrilli, S. (2003). "International Trade in Energy Services and Developing Countries" In 
Energy and Environmental Services: Negotiating Objectives and Development Priorities. 
UNCTAD. United Nations. New York. US. Geneva. Switzerland. 
Zawya (2008). Qatar GDP Growth to Reach 14.3% in 2008, says SA/313. Retrieved December 
8,2008 from website http: //www. zawya. com/story. cfm/sidv5l n 12-3NC 19 
Vernon, R. (1995). The World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and 
Development. In: Ravenhill, J. (ed) Global Political Economy. New York: Oxford University. 
Vail, Jeff (2008). The Geopolitics of Energy: A systems-Thinking Approach, September 30.. 
Retrieved January 8,2009 from website 
http: //peakenergy. blogspot. com/2008_09_01_archive. htm 
-221- 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS: QATAR 
Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2004) 
Qatar Central Bank (2005). Annual Report No. 28 - 2004. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Central Bank (2006). Annual Report No. 29 - 2005. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Central Bank (2007a). Quarterly Statistical Bulletin: March 2007. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Central Bank (2007b). Quarterly Statistical Bulletin: June 2007. Doha: QCI3. 
Qatar Central Bank (2007c). Quarterly Statistical Bulletin: September 2007. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Central Bank (2007d). Annual Report No. 30 - 2006. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Central Bank (2008a). Quarterly Statistical Bulletin: March 2008. Doha: QCI3. 
Qatar Central Bank (2008b). Quarterly Statistical Bulletin: June 2008. Doha: QCB. 
Qatar Economic Review (2008). The Economy of Qatar. Doha: Qatar National Bank. 
Qatar Central Bank (2009). Banking system. Retrieved March 8,2009 from website 
http: //www. qcb. gov. qa/English/AboutQCB/Pages/Governance. aspx 
Qatar BusinessDirectory (2009). Companies. Retrieved March 3,2008 from wcbsitc 
http: //www. arabo. com/links/, 222,216,209/, 212,209,223,199,202/ 
Qatar Airways (2009a). Qatar Airways Fleet. Retrieved July 3,2008 from website 
http: //www. gatarairways. com/global/en/our-fleet. html 
Qatar Airways (2009b). CEO's Message. Retrieved June 3,2008 from wcbsitc 
http: //www. gatarairways. com/global/en/ceo"message. html 
- 222 - 
Qatar Airways (2009c). Qatar Airways Fleet. Retrieved September 3,2008 from website 
http: //www. qatarairways-com/global/en/our-fleet. html 
Qatar Petrochemical Company - QABPCO (2009). About Us. Retrieved February 3,2009 
from website http: //www. qapco. com/qapco/en/aboutus. php 
Qatar Petroleum - QP (2008a). Mission and Objectives. Retrieved May 3,2008 from wcbsitc 
http: //www. qp. com. qa/qp. nsf/web/au_mission 
Qatar Petroleum - QP (2008b). Qatar Petroleum Refinery. Retrieved June 5,2008 from 
website http: //www. qp. com. qa/qp. nsf/web/au-refining 
Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (2007). Annual Report - 2006. Doha: QLGC. 
Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (2008). Annual Review - 2007. Doha: QLGC. 
Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (2009a). Qatar Gas Operating Company Limited. Retrieved 
March 7,2009 from website http: //www. qatargas. com/AboutUs. aspx. 
Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (2009b). Qatar Operation. Retrieved March 7,2009 from 
website http: //www. gatargas. com/AboutUs. aspx? id=62 
Qatar Statistics Authority (2008). Foreign Trade. Retrieved March 8,2008 from website 
http: //www. qsa. gov. qa/eng/FrequentData/FT/IMPORTS%2010%20YEAItS. xls 
- 223 - 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS: WTO 
World Trade Organization (1995a). The Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994. Lcgal 
Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995b). Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995c). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Legal Texts, 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995d). General Agreement on Trade and Services. Legal Texts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995e). State Trading Enterprises (GATT Article XV1) . Legal 
Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (19951). Balance of Payments, Understancling. Legal Texts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995g). Regional Trade Agreements (Article XXIV). Legal Tcxts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995h). Agriculture Agreement. Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995i). Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Legal Texts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995j). Textiles and Clothing. Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995h). Technical Barriers to Trade. Legal Texts. Geneva: 
WTO. 
- 224 - 
World Trade Organization (1995j). Technical Barriers to Trade. Legal Texts. Geneva: 
WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995k). Trade-Related Investment Measures. Legal Texts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (19951). Anti-dumping (Article of GATT 1994). Legal Texts. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995m). Customs valuation. Legal Tcxts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995n). Rules of Origin Agreement. Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995o). Agreement Import Licensing. Legal Texts. Geneva: 
WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995p). Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCMAgreement). Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995q). Agreement on Safeguards. Lcgal Tcxts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995r). Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Legal Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995s). Dispute Settlement Understancling. Legal Texts. Geneva: 
WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995t). Agreement on Government Procurement, Lcgal Tcxts, 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (1995v). GATT 1994: - Article XXon General Exceptions. Legal 
Texts. Geneva: WTO. 
- 225 - 
World Trade Organization (1996). Protocol of Accession of the State of Qatar to the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
World Trade Organization (1996). The First WTO Ministerial Conference: Singapore 
Ministerial Declarations. Retrieved November 9,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto e/minist e/min96_e/min96_e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2001). Doha Ministerial Declaration 2001. Retrieved August 6, 
2007 from website http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto e/minist_e/minO1_c/mindccl_c. htm 
World Trade Organization (2003a) 10 Common Misunderstandings about the J6'TO. 
Retrieved October 31,2006, from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/I Omis-c/l OmOO-e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2003b). "Negotiation on Environmental Goods: Ef cient, Lower- 
Carbon and Pollutant-Emitting Fuels and technologies". TN/TE/W/19, TN/MA/W/24,28 
January. 
World Trade Organization (2003c), "Harmonized system (HS) Classification Codes of Gas- 
Related Goods". TN/TE/W/27, TN/MA/W/33,25 January. 
World Trade Organization (2003d), Understanding the JVTO (3"d cd). Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2005a). Trade Policy Review Report By Qatar. WT/TPR/G/lß 4 
(January 24: Restricted). Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2005b). Trade Policy Review: Qatar: Report by the Secretariat. 
WT/TPR/G/144 (January 24: Restricted). Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2005c). The Multilateral Trading System - Past, Present, and 
Future. Retrieved October 30,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e. pdf. 
-226- 
World Trade Organization (2005d). World Trade Organization Trade in Services Division. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
World Trade Organization (2005e). WTO Cotton Sub-Committee: African Group proposes 
cotton distortions. Retrieved May 2,2008 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/news_e/newsO5_e/cotton_19apri105 e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2005d). A Handbook on the GA TS Agreement. Geneva: WTO 
ý`4 
World Trade Organization (2005e). Trade Policy Review. Discussions of Qatar's Trade 
Policy Review Report on 21 and 23 February 2003. Minutes of Meeting. Issued 24 March 
2005. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2007a). World Trade Report - 2007. Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2007b). Understanding the IVTO (3rd ed). Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2007c). Developing Countries: Howe the JVTO Deals with the 
Special Needs of an Increasingly Important Groups. Retrieved May 9,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/theWTO-e/whatis-e/tif e/utw chap6 e. pdf 
World Trade Organization (2007e). Trade Related Technical Assistance: IVTO Reference 
Centres (RFCs). Retrieved October 9,2007 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/train_e/ref centres_c. htm 
World Trade Organization (2008a). Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN. GNS/W/120, 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (2008b). WTO Members and Observers. Retrieved February 8, 
2009 from website http: //www. wto. org/english/theWTO_c/whatis_c/tif e/org6_e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2008c). Trade Policy Reviews. Retrieved May 9,2008 from 
website http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e. htm 
-227- 
World Trade Organization (2008d). Plurilateral Agreements: Minority Interests. Retrieved 
July 19,2008 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/agrmIO_e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2008e). Lamy Creates WTO Task Force on Financial Crisis. 
News items (October 14). Retrieved March 19,2009 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/news_e/news08 e/tnc_chair report_octO8 e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2009a). Energy services. Retrieved March 2,2009 from websitc 
http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/energy_e/energy_e. htm 
World Trade Organization (2009b). Trade Related Technical Assistance: WVTO Technical 
Assistance and Training. Retrieved April 2,2009 from website 
http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/devel-e/teccop_e/tct-e. htm 
World Trade Organization and United Nations Conference Trade and Development (2008). 
World Trade Review: Qatar. Geneva and New York: WTO and UNCTAD. 
-228- 
Appendix A: 
PhD Scholar 
International Commercial Law 
Durham University 
United Kingdom 
öI. J-0.1 Zttj 
v3,. 0 ß, 11 c tI1 
ýAJJ t 
Questionnaire survey 
- The following questions are designed 
for academic purposed, as part 
of PhD requirements at Durham University in the United Kingdom. 
The research main question is "what are the economic effects of 
Qatar's membership to the World Trade Organizations? " 
- Please, choose your answer by circulating one of the numbers (1 - 5) 
that reflects your opinion. 
- Please, choose only one answer to each question. 
1) Has WTO membership been beneficial for your company? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
2) Has the requirements to comply with WTO procedures resulted in 
an increased administrative burden for your company? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
3) It would be better if Qatar was free to determine its own rules and 
regulations in trade and commerce rather than being bound by 
the WTO. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
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4) Competition in the banking and financial s ervices sectors in Qatar 
would be beneficial for my company. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
5) The WTO should not get involved in interfering with conditions of 
employment and remuneration? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
6) The WTO is concerned with the problem of intellectual property 
rights including trade marks and patents. Do you agree it should 
interfere in these areas? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
7) Is membership of the GCC important for Qatar, or is being a 
member of the WTO enough? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
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8) Should Qatar sign Free Trade Agreements with other countries 
including the U. S. and India, as well as being a member of the 
WTO? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
9) Should the remit of the WTO include oil anti gas exports 
entrenched under OPEC and other organizations? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
10) Should Qatar open its transport system to all airline and shipping 
companies in order to ensure strong competition? 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) No opinion 
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Semi Structured Interviews Questions 
1) What in your view have been the major benefits to Qatar from 
joining the WTO? 
2) Has WTO membership had any detrimental effects on Qatar? 
3) Has WTO membership had any implications for the pricing and 
composition of Qatar's imports? 
4) Should the remit of the WTO be extended to cover oil and gas 
exports even if this means that Qatar could no longer adhere to 
OPEC quotas? 
5) The WTO covers financial services as well as traded goods. Should 
Qatar open its banking and financial systems to foreign investors? 
6) Qatar investment activity has been involved in overseas acquisitions 
of companies, including the unsuccessful take over bid for Sainsbury. 
Should Qatar allow foreign investors to acquire companies in Qatar, 
including local banks? 
7) Qatar hosted the WTO meeting that resulted in the Dolia Round of 
trade negotiations. This round has not been successful so far. To 
what extent does Qatar support the objectives of the Doha Round, 
including, further trade liberalization on agriculture, services, and 
intellectual property rights? 
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Appendix -C 
Regression Results 
Variables EnterediRemovedb 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
I Imports a Enter as%of GDP 
a. All requested variables entered, 
b. Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
uare 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin"Watson 
1 . 9718 . 942 . 933 2.19483 1.268 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Imports as%of GDP 
b. Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model uares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I egression 471.417 1 471.417 97.859 OOV 
Residual 28.904 6 4.817 
Total 500.321 7 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Imports as%of GDP 
b. Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Coefflclents" 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig, 
i (Constant) 7,619 4.384 1.738 . 133 Imports as%of GDP 2.043 . 207 . 971 9.892 . 000 
a. Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Residuals Statistics" 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 41.3306 64.6222 50,3050 8.20642 8 
Residual "2.61768 3.77119 . 00000 2.03202 8 Std. Predicted Value " 1.094 1.745 . 000 1.000 8 Std. Residual "1.193 1.718 . 000 . 926 8 
a. Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
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Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GOP 
d 
d 
LL 
Mean " 2.74E-15 
Std. Dev.. 0.926 
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- 234 - 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
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Variables EntorediRomovedb 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
1 ann. gdp 
gravti after . Enter WTO 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: ann. gdp growth before WTO 
Model Summaryb 
Model R RS uare 
Ad1'usted R 
S uare 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 . 203 . 041 ". 065 4043.76960 . 642 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ann. gdp growth after WTO 
b. Dependent Variable: ann. gdp growth before WTO 
ANOVAb 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Si . egression 6344101.9 1 6344101.870 88 . 5494 Residual 1 E+008 9 16352072.540 
Total 2E+008 10 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ann. gdp growth after WTO 
b. Dependent Variable: ann. gdp growth before WTO 
CooNicients° 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 25755.438 2372.773 10.855 
. 000 ann. gdp growth after WTO ". 015 . 025 -. 203 -. 623 . 549 a. Dependent Variable: ann. gdp growth before WTO 
Residuals Statistics° 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted a ue 22794.715 25246.668 24487.545 796.49670 11 
Residual -6274.730 6406.0430 . 00000 3836.25668 11 Std. Predicted Value -2.125 . 953 . 000 1.000 11 Std. Residual -1.552 1.584 . 000 . 949 11 
a. Dependent Variable: ann. gdp growth before WTO 
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Curve Fit 
Model Description 
Dependent Variable 1 non-oil sector GDP 
Equation 1 Linear 
Independent Variable Imports as%of GDP 
Constant Included 
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in 
Plots Unspecified 
Caso Procossing Summary 
N 
Total Cases 
Excluded Cases, 0 
Forecasted Cases 0 
Newly Created Cases 0 
a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis. 
Variable Processing Summary 
Variables 
Dependent Independent 
non-oil Imports 
sector GDP as%of GDP 
Number of Positive Values 8 8 
Number of Zeros 0 0 
Number of Negative Values 0 0 
Number of Missing User-Missing 0 0 
Values System-Missing 0 0 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Model Summa Parameter Estimates 
Equation R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant bi 
Linear 
. 942 97.859 1 6 . 000 7.619 2.043 
i ne it epenaern vanaoie is imports as'/ of uur. 
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Non-oil sector GDP 
Q Observed 
-linear 
Import as % of GDP 
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I V. vv 'Q. vv cv. vv ZZ. W 24.00 26.00 28,00 
Curve Fit 
Model Description 
Model Name MOD 4 
Dependent Variable 1 non-oil sector GDP 
Equation 1 Linear 
2 Growtha 
Independent Variable Imports as%of GDP 
Constant Included 
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in 
Plots Unspecified 
a. The model requires all non-missing values to be positive. 
Case Processing Summary 
N 
Total Cases 
Excluded Casesa 0 
Forecasted Cases 0 
Newly Created Cases 0 
a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis. 
Variable Processing Summary 
Variables 
Dependent Independent 
non-oil Imports 
sector GDP as%of GDP 
Number of Positive Values 8 8 
Number of Zeros 0 0 
Number of Negative Values 0 0 
Number of Missing User-Missing 0 0 
Values System-Missing 0 0 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: non-oil sector GDP 
Model Summ Parameter Estimates 
Equation R Square F df1 df2 -Sig. Constant bi 
Linear 
Growth . 
942 
. 923 
97.859 
72.157 
1 
1 
6 
6 . 
000 
. 000 
7.619 
3.095 
2.043 
. 039 [he independent variable is Imports as%of GDP. 
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Appendix (D) 
Details of some companies and business entities which 
answered the researcher's questionnaires 
No. Company Names 
1 Al-Dair Company 
2 Ali bin Ali Trading 
3 Arab Bank 
4 F. M. B for Petrol and Gas Services 
5 Chifron International Gas Inc 
6 Dalma for Energy company 
7 Dolphine Energy Limited Company 
8 Abdul-aL-Jabbar Company 
9 AI-Mohil- Trading Company 
10 AI-Muftah Group 
11 AL mashree bank 
12 Bahrain bank 
13 Oil National Construction Company 
14 BUTEC oil Company 
15 Commercial Bank 
16 CNE-Limited company 
17 CTC Company 
18 Doha Bank 
19 B. G. S. for Explorations 
20 Ernst and Young company 
21 Editor Qatar Olympic Committee 
22 General EMC Limited 
23 H. -Aha-Company 
24 Itaya Group 
25 International relations company 
26 Inksns-Company 
27 Khazans Company Qatar CO (Conserved 
food stuff distributes) 
28 Lorjee-Oil-Gas-Keme 
29 Mannai oil Company 
30 Mannai Trading CO 
31 Masraf al-rayan 
32 Mitsubishi Motors 
33 Middle -East company 
34 Meeta Contracting and trading (WLL) 
35 Noffa Groups Company 
36 New-Doha international airport 
37 Oil Services Mohammed AL brony 
company 
38 MA Company 
39 Olef Group Company. 
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40 Pun'- llo d Company 
HSBS bank 
42 Projects-International 
43 Qatar's National Bank 
44 Qatar International Islamic Bank 
45 Qatar-Electricity & Water. 
46 Qatar Press 
47 Eisar for Oil Limited Coma n 
48 QAAC Oil and gas services Company 
49 Qtel-Qatar-Telecom 
50 Regnce Travel Agent 
51 Kostein for Oil and Gas Coma n 
52 Su reme-Council of education 
53 S. P. A Italy Company 
54 S. B. A. Group Companies 
55 HSBC 
56 Tnekster company 
Kromo Oil Limited Company 
58 Teachers ITS Company 
59 The Group 
60 Toben constructor 
61 Vision Trading 
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Appendix (E): 
Details of some people interviewed by the researcher 
Name Position 
H. E. Abdulla Al - Attiyah First Deputy of the Prime Minister / Minister for 
Energy & Industry 
H. E. Abdulla Al-Qahtani Minister of Health 
H. E. Dr. Mohammed Al - Sada Minister for Energy & Industry 
Dr. Abdulla Al Kubaisi Director of H. E. Shk. Mouza AlMisnad's Office 
Dr. Manar Mohsen Economic Expert, Economic & Trade 
Organization Dept, Ministry of Business and 
Trade. 
Mr. Ahmed Ahin Director of the Administration - Ministry of 
Business and Trade 
Mr. Mansoor Al-Saadi Director of the Public Affairs and Stockholders 
- Ministry of Electricity 
Mr Ahmood Nassir Al-Subaiy Director of Operations and Financial and 
Administrative Affairs, Qatar Statistic Authority 
Mr. Tariq Abdullah Director of the under secretary assistance office 
- Ministry of Business and Trade 
Mr. Nassir Al-an aoe Qatar Representative in the WTO 
Shaik Fahad Al-Thani Director of GSM - (QTEL) Qatar National 
Company of Telecom 
Mr. Ihab Fathie Area Manager - Qatar Airways 
Other five interviewees Ministry of Business and Trade, Ministry of 
Energy and Industry, Qatar Petrochemical 
Company (QAPCO), General Authority for the 
Developmental Planning, and Qatar Central 
Bank. 
Note: 
These interviewees did not like their names to 
be exposed. 
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